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Abstract
The thesis studies the e¤ect of scal policy on a small-open economy by
estimating the DSGE Model calibrated for Thailand. The considered scal
policies are composed of an increase in government spending and a decrease
in tax rates, namely, a sales tax, a payroll tax, and a capital income tax.
The model foundation is adopted from The Bank of Thailand Structural
Model which is introduced by Tanboon (2008). This thesis extends the
model and introduces a rich scal block for analysis of the e¤ect of scal
policy. The important ndings are that the impact of scal policy on a small-
open economy is smaller than the one on a closed economy. An increase
in government expenditures has a positive impact on the domestic rms
output, whereas exporting rms respond by lowering their production. The
impact multiplier of government spending on the national output is 0.25
and the impact multipliers of sales tax, payroll tax, and capital tax are 0.08,
0.37 and 0.09, respectively.
The second paper studies the optimal capital income tax and optimal
labour income tax in a small-open economy with an imperfectly
competitive market and habit formation preferences. This paper uses
numerical estimates and analytical investigation. The numerical approach
i
solves the Ramsey problem, by parameterizing to Thailand data. The
numerical nding indicates that the optimal capital income tax appeared
to be negative. The analytical investigation simplies the models in order
to explain factors that inuence the numerical results. The analytical
results highlight that i) the optimal capital income tax in a small-open
economy with a perfectly competitive market is not di¤erent with optimal
capital income tax in a closed economy and equals to zero, ii) the optimal
capital income tax in small open-economy with an imperfectly competitive
market is negative and negatively related to price markup, iii) the deep
habit preferences create a volatile and countercyclical markup, hence, the
capital income tax is not smooth over the horizon. It should be increased
during an economic boom period and lower in recessions.
The third paper examines the impact of the government spending on
health on the economic growth by analyzing the improvement in national
health condition. The research questions are i) what is the e¤ect of the
government spending on health on the improvement in national health
indicators, such as life expectancy, infant mortality, and under-ve
mortality, ii) does an improvement in human capital on health leads to an
economic growth. Three panel estimations are implemented: xed-e¤ect
model, random-e¤ect model, and the mean group estimator. The main
ndings show that the government spending on health has a signicantly
positive e¤ect on the health status. An increase in life expectancy has a
positive e¤ect on output in developing countries but does not have a
signicant e¤ect on output in developed countries. In addition,
non-medical determinants of health, such as tobacco consumption and
alcohol consumption have a signicant e¤ect on economic growth of OECD
countries.
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Part 1
INTRODUCTION
Fiscal policy is an important governmental tool for stabilizing and
maintaining economic growth, especially during a economic crisis. During the
global nancial crisis in 2008, many countries introduced remarkable scal
expansions in order to stimulate their economies. The scal stimulus packages
sizes are relatively large and unprecedented. For example, G20 countries
launched $2 trillion (1.4 percent of global GDP) stimulus packages and China
spent roughly 12.7 percent of its GDP for scal expansion policies (ILO 2011).
Many smaller countries also launched scal expansion policies. For example,
Thailand introduced a scal stimulus package worth of $10 billion to stimulate
aggregate demand and raise employment. The e¤ectiveness of scal expansion
policy is extensively examined in the macroeconomic literature. The impacts of
scal policy on closed economies have been examined in studies such as
Fernández-Villaverde (2010), Eggertsson (2011) and Zubairy (2014). However,
the estimation of a scal multiplier in closed economy models may be su¢ ciently
di¤erent from the estimation of one in a small-open economy, because trading in
the goods and services sector can be important, and trade can potentially impact
the exchange rates adjustment and interest rates response to scal policies.
Therefore, it is worthwhile to study the e¤ectiveness of scal policy on an open
economy.
This thesis is composed of three papers presented as Part II, Part III and
Part IV correspondingly. The rst paper studies the e¤ect of scal policy on a
small-open economy by estimating the DSGE Model, which is calibrated for
Thailand. The rst parts research questions are: i) What are the e¤ects of
expansionary scal policy shocks, such as an increase in government spending or
a decrease in sales tax, payroll tax, and capital tax shocks, on macroeconomic
variables in a small-open economy?, ii) How large is the scal multiplier in a
1
small-open economy?, and iii) What is the long-term e¤ect of the scal
policy? In order to answer these questions, a medium-scale DSGE model for a
small-open economy is constructed and calibrated to Thailands parameters.
Thailand is a small-open economy in South East Asia with large amounts of
trade. In 2014, trade openness, measured as a sum of exports and imports, was
147 percent of GDP. Thailands economy relies highly on the international trade
of goods and services. The models foundation is adopted from The Bank of
Thailands Structural Model (DSGE model), which is introduced by Tanboon
(2008) and is used mostly for monetary policy analysis. The DSGE model
includes a number of micro-founded frictions, such as habit-adjusted
consumption, sticky wages, sticky prices and investment adjustment costs. This
thesis extends the DSGE model and introduces a rich scal block for analyzing
the e¤ect of scal policy. The model simulates the impulse responses to an
increase in government spending and a decrease in tax rates, namely the e¤ects
of the reduction in sales tax rates, payroll tax rates and a capital income tax
rates on various macroeconomic variables, such as the output of domestic rms,
the output of export rms, the householdsconsumption and the labour supply.
Two measures of the scal multiplier are used: one measures the size of the
immediate response to scal expansion, while another measures the long-term
e¤ect and is computed as the net present value of the e¤ect over the net N
periods. This allows the analyst to compute and compare the short- and
long-term e¤ects of the di¤erent types of scal expansions.
The most important nding is that an increase in government expenditures
has a signicantly positive impact on the domestic rms output, whereas
exporting rms respond by lowering their production. This is because the
government consumes only domestically produced goods. An increase in demand
for the domestic sector generates higher prices for inputs, such as wage and
capital rent, which leads to higher costs for the export sector. Thus, the total
e¤ect of an increase in government spending is smaller in a small-open economy
as compared to a closed economy model. Moreover, the reduction of the tax rate
2
has a fairly positive stimulative e¤ect on domestic output. However, depending
on the tax base, it can have a positive or negative e¤ect on exporting rms. For
example, a reduction in the payroll tax rate stimulates an export rms output,
while, in contrast, a reduction of the capital tax rate worsens an export rms
output. This can probably be explained by the di¤erence in the market structure
of the domestic and exporting rms. It is assumed that the export sector is
perfectly competitive, while the domestic rms price their goods with a positive
mark-up.
This study nds that the impact multiplier of government spending on the
national output is 0.25, and the impact multipliers of sales tax, payroll tax, and
capital tax are 0.08, 0.37 and 0.09, respectively. The long-term impact of
government spending is smaller than the long-term impact of the tax cut. Just
after one year, the e¤ect of reductions in any of the tax rates surpasses the e¤ect
of an increase in government expenditures. Lastly, lowering the payroll tax can
be the most e¤ective means in the long-term.
The next paper studies the optimal taxes, namely the optimal capital income
tax and optimal labour income tax, in a small-open economy with an imperfectly
competitive market and habit preferences. Early studies of optimal taxation
consider a perfectly competitive market and suggest that the optimal capital
income tax on it is appeared to be zero (Chamley 1981, Judd 1985, Chamley
1986, Lucas 1990, and Chari et al. 1991). However, Judd (1997) shows that, if an
economy is imperfectly competitive, the optimal capital income tax is negative
and a capital income subsidy should be used to o¤set monopolistic distortions.
Consequently, when the price markup is constant over time, the optimal level of
capital income subsidies does not change either. This result is called tax
smoothing. The intention of this chapter is to check whether a tax smoothing
policy is optimal in an economy with a time-varying markup. For this purpose, a
model with a deep habit formation Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2006) is
investigated. Households with deep habits tend to smooth aggregate
consumption over the time and gradually adjust their consumption to exogenous
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disturbances (Dynan 2000). This type of preference obviously changes the
households behaviour and makes the demand for particular goods more
persistent and less responsive to price changes. Facing more persistent demand,
rms reduce prices to increase the market share when the business environment
is favorable. This results in a countercyclical markup; in fact, the price markup is
negatively related to the output growth. When markup declines, the optimal
capital income tax rate should increase. Therefore, the second paper also
suggests that the capital income tax should be higher during an economic boom
and lower during a recession in an economy with a countercyclical price markup.
Moreover, when a price mark-up is volatile, tax smoothing is sub-optimal.
The second paper starts with numerical calculation of the optimal tax rate in
a DSGE model. The numerical approach solves the Ramsey problem in order to
calculate the optimal capital income and labour income tax rates. The procedure
consists of maximizing the households utility subject to the households
behaviour and rms prot maximization constraints. The model is
parameterized to Thailands data.
Since the considered model has various frictions and includes monopolistic
distortions, the optimal capital income tax appears to be negative, which is
consistent with Judd (1997) s results. However, it is necessary to understand the
e¤ect of each models distortions on the nal result. Therefore, a number of
simplied models are considered, and analytical results are derived in order to
explain factors that inuence the optimal taxs simulation results. The
simplications include a zero investment adjustment cost and exible wages and
prices. The focusing factors are trade openness, an imperfectly competitive
market and habit preferences. Three models are incorporated in the analytical
result section, which are the closed economy model with an imperfectly
competitive market, the closed economy model with an imperfectly competitive
market and deep habit preferences, and the simple small-open economy model.
The most interesting result comes from the model with deep habits, where the
optimal capital tax is negatively related to a counter-cyclical price mark-up.
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According to Ravn et al. (2006), deep habits preferences create a negative
correlation between the price mark-up and economic growth. The price markup
is lower in an economic boom, because rms have incentives to buy habits when
aggregate demand is high. Therefore, rms reduce their prices below the level
that maximizes the current prot in order to gain more market shares and
generate higher prots in the future.
The second paper of this thesis contributes to the literature in the following way.
First, this thesis extends the Judd (1997) results for the optimal capital income
tax and calculates optimal tax rates in a small-open economy with an imperfectly
competitive market and habit persistence, as in Tanboon (2008) s model. The
result indicates that governments should subsidize capital income taxes to o¤set
gaps between the price and the marginal cost. Therefore, the capital income tax
and the mark-up are negatively related. The nding is similar to the result of
closed economy with an imperfectly competitive market studies of Guo, Lansing
et al. (1995), Judd (1997) and Judd (2002). The labour income tax is set to
maintain the implementability of the government budget.
Moreover, the analytical investigation highlights three important ndings.
First, the optimal capital income tax in a small-open economy with a perfectly
competitive market is not di¤erent from the optimal capital income tax in closed
economy, and it equals to zero as in Chamley (1981), Judd (1985), Chamley
(1986), Lucas (1990) and Chari, Christiano & Kehoe (1991). Second, the optimal
capital income tax in small-open economy with an imperfectly competitive
market is negative and negatively related to price mark-up. This analytical result
ensures the nding regarding optimal capital income tax in numerical
calculation. Third, deep habit preferences create a volatile and counter-cyclical
mark-up. Hence, capital income tax is not smooth and volatile over the horizon
as a response to the price mark-ups adjustment. The optimal capital income tax
rate should be increased during an economic boom period and lowered during
recessions.
The third chapter examines the impact of the government spending on health
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on economic growth by analyzing improvement in the national health condition.
As a measure of national health, three indicators are considered: life expectancy
at birth, infant mortality and under-ve mortality rates. Global life expectancy
at birth signicantly has risen by approximately 16 years in the past ve decades.
The improvement of public health care is one of the main factors that contribute
to this increase in global life expectancy. A rise in global life expectancy creates
several economic advantages. Healthier workers with better physical and mental
conditions are more productive and e¢ cient. Healthy people with longer life
expectancies also tend to train more and have higher abilities than whom have
shorter life expectancies, as in Becker (1993), Barro & Lee (1994) and Oster,
Shoulson & Dorsey (2013). Moreover, a longer life expectancy can lead to an
increase in saving, because the population tries to save more for consumption
after retirement. An increase in saving leads to higher amounts of physical
capital and investment, which consequently induces more economic activity and
output (Well 2007). The improvement in national health leads to an increase in
human capital in the form of health, which contributes to economic growth. The
paper intends to look at two research questions. The rst one investigates the
e¤ect of the governments spending on health on the improvement of national
health indicators, such as life expectancy, infant mortality and under-ve
mortality. The global panel data, which is the most up-to-date and observed over
200 countries (including developed countries and developing countries) is used for
the study. The health model is estimated by using the xed-e¤ects model, the
random e¤ect model, and the two-stage least-squares approach, which is applied
for dealing with the reverse causality problem. In addition, this study introduces
private health spending to the model, which has not been considered in the
literature on health due to a lack of data (Gupta, Verhoeven & Tiongson 2002).
The second research question considers the importance of human capital for
productivity and economic growth. The hypothesis of this model is that an
increase in human capital in the form of health, such as a longer life expectancy,
can contribute to economic growth. Three panel estimations are implemented:
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the xed-e¤ect model, the random-e¤ect model, and the mean group estimator,
which is used to deal with a cross-sectional dependence problem. The models are
estimated with three data-sets: global data, developed countries data, and
developing countriesdata. Moreover, non-medical determinants of health, such
as tobacco consumption, alcohol consumption, sugar supply, and total fat supply,
are used as proxies for health indicators in developed countries. According to
Larson & Mercer (2004), life expectancy and mortality rate may not be
appropriate health indicators for developed countries, since they reect neither
the quality of life nor the lifestyles of populations in developed countries. The
data of non-medical determinants of health are obtained from the OECDs
country statistics.
The third paper discusses a number of interesting results. First, government
spending on health has a signicantly positive e¤ect on health status by
improving life expectancy at birth, infant mortality and the under-ve mortality
rate. For example, an increase in government spending on health by the amount
equal to one percentage of GDP leads to approximately a half year increase in
life expectancy and a reduction in infant mortality rate and under-ve mortality
rate by 11.1 and 1.3-1.6, respectively. These results are consistent with Gupta
et al. (2002) and Baldacci, Guin-Siu & Mello (2003) studies, which nd a
negative relation between government spending on health and mortality rates.
This is in contrast to the early ndings of Filmer & Pritchett (1999) , who
concludes that government spending on health is not a powerful determinant of
the mortality rate. Interestingly, private spending on health has a signicant
positive e¤ect on life expectancy, but it does not have the signicant e¤ect on
mortality rates. This gives rise to the implication of government budget
allocation on health. Private spending on health can e¤ectively substitute
government spending on health for improving longevity.
The second result is that an increase in life expectancy has a positive e¤ect
on output in developing countries. The model predicts that a one-year increase
in life expectancy can raise output by one percent. The nding is consistent with
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studies by Barro et al. (1996), Bloom & Williamson (1998), Bloom & Canning
(2000), and Bloom, Canning & Sevilla (2004). Their ndings suggest that a one-
year increase in the life expectancy can generate a 4 to 6% increase in national
output. However, an increase in life expectancy does not have a signicant e¤ect in
developed countries. Since most developed countries have signicantly longer life
expectancies and lower mortality rates than developing countries, more resources
are required to improve health in a developed country than in a developing country.
The third result is that tobacco and alcohol consumption have a signicantly
(at 10% level) positive e¤ect on economic growth in OECD countries. This may
be surprising, but tobacco and alcohol consumption may have two o¤setting
e¤ects on economic growth. On the one hand, tobacco and alcohol consumption
certainly lower human capital, because they shorten the consumers life
expectancy (Olshansky, Passaro, Hershow, Layden, Carnes, Brody, Hayick,
Butler, Allison & Ludwig 2005, Valkonen & Van Poppel 1997, Bloom
et al. 2004). On the other hand, the positive e¤ect of higher tobacco and alcohol
consumption on economic growth arises from the higher demand, which may
increase economic activities, create jobs related to manufacturing (in the farming,
industrial production, wholesale, transportation and retail sectors, for example)
and generate additional tax revenue. In addition, a higher tax revenue can be
used to support the scal health of OECD countries.
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Part 2
Fiscal Policy in Small-Open
Economy : An Estimated DSGE
Model for Thailand
2.1 INTRODUCTION
During the Global Financial crisis, numerous scal stimulus policy and
bailout plans were introduced to tackle the economic contraction and high
unemployment in several countries. Fiscal policy, such as increase in government
spending or decrease in tax rates, is an important government tool that can
stabilize and stimulate economies. According to Kollmann, Roeger et al. (2012),
the United Statess expansionary scal policy in 2009 and 2010 was comprised of
a rise in government spending and the lowering of tax rates, measures with
impacts calculated at 1.98 and 1.77 percent of the countrys annual GDP
respectively. Similarly, the European Unions policies in 2009 and 2010, which
are akin to those utilized by the United States, are calculated to have impacts of
0.83 and 0.73 percent of annual GDP respectively. Although the scal policy is
believed to be a useful treatment for the economic crisis, more research needs to
be done to investigate the e¤ectiveness of scal policy and the factors upon
which its e¢ ciency depends.
The most signicant article to approach this eld studies scal multipliers in a
small-open economy, applying a similar type of analysis as the form employed in
closed economy models (Zubairy, 2014). Since the trading of goods and services
is not modelled within its closed economy framework, the articles ndings may
be inaccurate for determining the impact of scal policy expansion on an open
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economy country. The behavior of scal multipliers can be signicantly di¤erent
in small-open economies as compared to closed economies. According to Ilzetzki,
Mendoza & Végh (2013), the e¤ectiveness of scal policy shocks on countries
relies on several trade-specic factors, such as a degree of openness of trade, an
exchange rate regime, a government liability and public debt. International trade
and the openness of nancial markets impact the exchange rates adjustment and
interest rates response to scal policies, which can potentially a¤ect the output
of exporting rms. That is why studying scal policies in a small-open economy
should be done in order to close the gap in the existing body of literature.
This paper seeks to provide a more detailed investigation regarding the e¤ects
of scal policy shocks, including government spending shocks and various tax
rate shocks, such as decreases in sales taxes, payroll taxes and capital taxes, on
macroeconomic variables in Thailands small-open economy. Countries with
small-open economies trade their goods and services in the global market.
Because of its small size, small-open economy countries are price-takers, whilst
their policies are not large enough to alter global prices. This paper models
Thailand, small-open country in Southeast Asia, which has a large degree of
openness, calculated to be 147 percent of GDP in 20141. The characteristics of
Thailands economy will be investigated and employed for a parameterization of
the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model designed by
Thailands central bank (Tanboon 2008). The analysis in this paper will mainly
focus on the investigation and explanation of the e¤ect of scal policy on
macroeconomic variables, including national output, private consumption, private
investment, ination, exchange rates and interest rates. This investigation is
performed by employing a micro-founded medium-scale DSGE model, which
employs a number of valuable features, such as habit-adjusted consumption,
capital accumulation, investment adjustment costs, and wage adjustment costs.
The model is extended by introducing a rich scal block focusing on government
1The data of gross domestic product is obtained from O¢ ce of the National Economic and
Social Development Board (http://www.nesdb.go.th)
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spending as nanced by taxes on sales, labour and capital income. Fiscal
stabilization policies are modelled in the form of dynamic scal rule.
The contributions of this study are valuable, as the resulting outcomes can be
capitalized not only for academic works but also as guidelines for the practical
implementation of scal measures in Thailand. This studys ndings will then
assist policy planners and governments in understanding the mechanisms and
impacts of scal policy innovations on macroeconomic variables in small-open
economies. The explicit examination of the e¤ectiveness of scal policy can be
useful for annual government budget planning, introducing new stimulus policies
when a country faces an economic downturn and in stabilizing an economy for
long-term growth. Moreover, the results illustrate a comparative e¤ect among
various types of scal policy measures. An appropriate policy, based on an
increase in government revenue with the fewest side e¤ects, can then be selected
and delivered over the proper period. Imposing an e¤ective scal policy during
economic recessions can successfully mitigate economic problems and smoothly
restart economic engines. Furthermore, the current study will enhance the
academic development of the DSGE model in small-open economy countries,
such as Thailand and other developing states in Asia, which are still developing
scal policy analyses.
This article is divided into seven sections. In Section 2.2, economic theories
on scal policy mechanism and previous academic literature examining the role
and impacts of distorting scal policies are thoroughly reviewed. Various scal
policy models are compared for their advantages and disadvantages. This section
also shows di¤erent views of the New Keynesian economics school and the New
Classical macroeconomics school on the theoretical impacts of distorting scal
policies. Section 2.3 explains the main structure of DSGE model. The economic
agents behaviors in the households sector, the business sector, the bank sector,
the government sector and the central bank sector are all dened. Moreover, this
section explains the calibration of the model based on the various empirical data
from diverse sources, and parameters are calibrated for Thailands economic data.
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Section 2.4 shows the dynamic e¤ects of scal policy shocks on macroeconomic
variables in small-open economy countries by employing the DSGEmodel. Impulse
responses, such as a response to an increase in government expenditure, a reduction
of various tax rates, namely, sales tax, payroll tax, and capital tax, are investigated
in this section. In addition, the scal multipliers generated by di¤erent scal shocks
are computed. Two multiplier calculation approaches are used to provided a clear
understanding of the impact of scal policy distortions on an economy. Finally,
Section 2.5 concludes the study.
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW
In this section, economic theories and various concepts related to scal policy
implications will be thoroughly explained. Understanding the principle of scal
policys role would be a great value for exploring the remaining chapters. Moreover,
the related academic research from recent journals is summarized. The advantages
and disadvantages of each methodology from seminal papers will be compared.
2.2.1 Fiscal Multipliers
The literature on scal multipliers is divided into two groups, namely the New
Keynesian economics school and the New Classical macroeconomics school. The
rst group argues for the positive ability of expansionary scal policy to aggregate
output, whereas the second group considers that a scal multipliers benet is
equal to zero. The main anchor of the second group is the Ricardian equivalence
proposition, which employs a rational expectation of households.
The theory of scal policy implementation has been studied by both the New
Keynesian economics school and the New Classical macroeconomics school for
almost a century. During the 1930s, John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) initially
introduced the theory of economic stabilizing through scal policy
implementations. During an economic downturn, most households may lower
12
2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW
their consumption since they are aware of the futures uncertainty. Therefore,
private consumption cannot generate enough aggregate demand. Consequently,
production rms lower demand for labour and an unemployment rate continually
rises. Keynes states that implementing a scal policy in this period can increase
economic activity, employment, and aggregate demand (Keynes 1936). Keyness
proposition has been an essential foundation of scal policy analysis for many
well-known researchers. The e¤ect of scal policy is transmitted to the economy
through aggregate demand and aggregate supply adjustment (Mankiw 2009).
Fiscal policy expansion can a¤ect various macroeconomic variables, such as,
private consumption, private investment, import of goods and service, employment
and ination. A higher private consumption can cause a second round e¤ect, an
expansion of aggregate demand. This additional aggregate demand stimulates
an animal spiritwithin companies and an anticipated optimism (Mankiw 2009).
Firms, who expect a positive expansionary e¤ect from scal policies, try to produce
more output to meet a surplus demand in the future by increasing investments in
production, employing more labour and reserving more raw materials. Therefore,
the second round e¤ect not only creates a larger output but also raises employment,
thereby ensuring the benets of scal policies on economic growth.
Despite a number of advantages of an expansion scal policy from the
Keynesian perspectives view, there is an argument from some New Classical
school economists that scal expansion cannot e¤ectively increase aggregate
demand or stimulate an economy (Hur 2007). This group, also known as the
non-activists, believes that government should neither intervene nor support the
economy. This argument is primarily based on three main assumptions. Firstly,
wages and prices are fully adjustable to clear labour and product markets; thus,
the economy always reaches its equilibrium at full employment. Therefore, scal
expansion cannot increase production and the aggregate supply curve in this case
is a vertical line instead of a downward sloping line (Almeida 2012). Secondly,
households are assumed to be forward-looking agents with innite planning
horizons, and the Ricardian equivalence proposition may hold. Their current
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consumption decisions depend on the present and future government budget
plan. If the government would like to increase government expenditure today for
stimulating aggregate demand, it can issue bonds for nancing the government
decit. The forward-looking households will consider that, in the future, they
will be more taxed for repaying a government debt; thus, they will not change
their consumption today and begin to save more for the future. The result of an
expansionary scal policy can be eventually similar to the result of an increase in
tax today, and neither of these scal policies would a¤ect the real variables. This
hypothesis was introduced in the early nineteenth century by David Ricardo
(Ricardo, Gonner et al. 1891) and elaborately examined by Barro (1974). Barros
study is the central pillar of the New Classical macroeconomics, which is built on
the rational expectation assumption. Lastly, crowding out e¤ects can mitigate
the e¤ectiveness of expansionary scal policy because of the increase in interest
rate. When governments choose to rise scal spending, they borrow money from
the nancial market, causing an increase in the interest rate. In addition, an
increase in government expenditures or a decrease in taxation can lead to a rise
in public debt and a higher debt-to-GDP ratio. Since risk premiums have
positive relations with the debt-to-GDP ratio, the interest rate within the
nancial market will increase. Ultimately, the higher interest rate crowds out the
e¤ect of expansionary scal policies and worsens both private investment and
private consumption (Hur 2007).
However, the Ricardian equivalence proposition require strong assumptions,
including, for example, that taxes are not discretionary, that households have
innite planning horizons and form rational expectations, that the economy is a
closed economy and has no nancial friction and that both prices and wages are
adjusted perfectly. These conditions are crucial for the Ricardian equivalence
proposition. If one condition is missed, the Ricardian equivalence proposition
cannot hold. For instance, if the government increases spending to improve the
infrastructure, it will improve technologies and increase productivity. In this
example, the Ricardian equivalence proposition is violated and the scal
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multiplier may not be equal to zero. The present paper includes four
assumptions that are inconsistent with the Ricardian equivalence: 1) the model
considers distortionary taxation, 2) borrowing interest rate depends on the
government debt to GDP ratio, 3) prices and wages are sticky, because price
adjustment is costly for rms as in Rotemberg (1982) (For further discussion on
rms price setting behavior see Romer (2006)), and 4) the model considers an
open economy where a scal expansion a¤ects the change of the terms of trade
and the exporting sector.
2.2.2 Openness and Fiscal Multipliers
The study of the open economy environment is one of the essential parts of
this paper. Although the e¤ect of scal policy has been widely investigated in
the last decade, some recent and advanced papers have considered the closed
economy environment, for example the study of Fernández-Villaverde (2010),
Eggertsson (2011), and Zubairy (2014). It is interesting how those models will
perform in a small-open economy framework. An e¤ect of scal policy in an open
economy, which has a free trade of goods and services, may signicantly di¤er
from one in a closed economy. The open economy assumption violates the
Ricardian equivalence proposition, because scal explanation leads to the
exchange rate adjustment. Gärtner (2009) believes that the presence of the
foreign exchange market a¤ects the scal multiplier. The most well-known model
that can clearly explain the mechanism of foreign exchange market is called The
MundellFleming model, which includes a balance of payment components
(Fleming 1962, Mundell 1963). Fiscal policy shock can inuence the equilibrium
in foreign exchange market which may lead to an appreciation or a depreciation
of exchange rate. Gärtner (2009) illustrates that the impact of expansionary
scal policy on the economy relies on how the foreign exchange market is
managed. Under the exible exchange rate regime, the e¤ect of scal policy
expansion on the overall output is lower due to the exchange rates adjustment.
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The scal policy expansion leads to an excess demand. As a result, the exchange
rate appreciates, consequently damaging the economys exporting sector.
Exchange rate appreciation reduces the positive e¤ect of scal policy expansion
by decreasing exports; thus, an expansionary scal policy has smaller e¤ects on
an economy with a exible exchange rate regime. In contrast, under xed
exchange rates, the exporting sector su¤ers less. As a result, the output is higher
at the new equilibrium and the scal policy expansion has a more signicant
e¤ect to outputs under xed exchange rates.
2.2.3 Costs of Borrowing and Fiscal Multipliers
Since the Ricardian equivalence propositions assumption is demanding, it is
easily violated. One important assumption that should be addressed is the
absence of nancial friction. Financial friction leads to a higher cost of borrowing
and lending. This thesis considers a developing economy that relies on foreign
loans for its private investments. In this case, nancial friction arises from a
higher interest rate risk premium when the foreign debt-to-GDP ratio increases.
That ratio depends on the exchange rate, which in turn depends on scal policy.
A country with high foreign debt may experience a high risk premium and a
correspondingly high cost of borrowing that reduces productive investments.
Moreover, as foreign debt consists of both private and public debt, an increase in
scal expansion may result in larger foreign debt. After the global nancial crisis
in 2008, a number of countries encountered a high level of foreign debt and
consequent increases in the cost of private borrowing. As higher debt increases
the cost of borrowing, the Ricardian equivalence proposition does not hold.
Therefore, the e¤ectiveness of scal policy should be re-evaluated under a new
paradigm, which the present paper contributes towards by including the e¤ect of
nancial friction in its model.
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2.2.4 Fiscal multiplier in DSGE models
According to Hur (2007), examinations of the e¤ectiveness of scal policy can
be done through the general equilibrium approach, which is a well-known analytical
technique employed to study the response of national output to scal policy shocks.
Among general equilibrium models, the DSGE model gained additional popularity
in the 2000s. Kydland & Prescott (1982) introduces the real business cycle (RBC)
model by modifying the equilibrium growth model, which may be considered as
an early stage of DSGE model development. In 1997, Rotemberg & Woodford
(1997) adapts the RBC model by examining monopolistically competitive rms
and price stickiness. Their inuential model is recognized as the New Keynesian
DSGE model. The DSGE model achieves its reputation because of its adequate
assessment of monetary policy, although it may also be applied to determine the
e¤ect of scal policy. The important advantage of the DGSE model is that it
is invulnerable to Lucass critique, since it employs rational expectation. This is
because Lucass critique is raised in conventional macro-econometric models. The
DSGE model is extensively used in economic research and employed by well-known
policy making organizations (Eggertsson 2011). The DSGE framework is used for
studying the e¤ects of scal policies on output in Forni, Monteforte & Sessa (2009),
Furceri &Mourougane (2010), and Eggertsson (2011). Zubairy (2014) also used the
DSGE to compute the scal multipliers associated with government expenditures
and tax reduction.
Several DSGE model studies in the literature report that scal policy shocks,
such as an increase in government spending shock, and a reduction of tax rate
shock, have positive e¤ects on national outputs. These studies have been examined
by Zubairy (2014), who used the DSGE model with full scal policy elements and
several channels of government expenditure innovation, and Fernández-Villaverde
(2010) , who examined the impact of scal policy by using the DSGE model
with nancial friction by setting an asymmetric information between borrower
and lender. In addition, the DSGE model has been appropriated to explore scal
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policy impacts on the Eurozone economy by Ratto, Roeger & int Veld (2009), who
studied the e¤ects of scal and monetary policies by using a DSGE model for an
open economy with Bayesian estimation techniques. Forni et al. (2009) evaluated
the e¤ect of scal policy in the Euro area by using a DSGE model featuring a
fraction of non-Ricardian agents. Moreover, the e¤ect of scal policy distortion on
various GDP components is also described in several studies, such as Forni et al.
(2009), Furceri & Mourougane (2010), and Bhattarai & Trzeciakiewicz (2012).
Some studies nd a rise in ination after an increase in government
expenditures. Among them are a DSGE scal model with endogenous
government bond yields by Furceri & Mourougane (2010), a new Keynesian
DSGE model in the UK by Bhattarai & Trzeciakiewicz (2012) and a DSGE
model in the Eurozone by Forni et al. (2009). The other studies reported
declining ination after a reduction of various tax rate shock (Forni et al. (2009),
Bhattarai & Trzeciakiewicz (2012) and Zubairy (2014)).
Furthermore, several studies have investigated a crowding in and crowding
out of scal policy shocks to private consumption and private investment. Ratto
et al. (2009), Forni et al. (2009) and Bhattarai & Trzeciakiewicz (2012) nd a
crowding out e¤ect of private consumption of Ricardian households, which is a
decrease in private consumption in response to an increase in government
expenditures. The reason behind a crowding out e¤ect from private consumption
is that Ricardian households anticipate a rise in taxation for nancing a massive
increase in government spending during the current period. Thus, they begin to
consume less and save more when the shock is introduced. Similarly, Zubairy
(2014), Ratto et al. (2009) and Bhattarai & Trzeciakiewicz (2012) nd a
crowding out e¤ect from an increase in government expenditure on private
investment since the cost of investment increases following the rise in interest
rates after a rise in public debt. The tax reduction shocks crowding out e¤ect is
also shown in some research. Unlike an increase in the government expenditure
shock, decreases in tax rate di¤erently a¤ect private consumption. The tax rate
shocks impact depends on the type of taxes. Forni et al. (2009) and Bhattarai &
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Trzeciakiewicz (2012) nd a crowding in e¤ect from private consumption as a
response to a decrease in sales taxes. Once a sales tax rate drops, the price of
consumption goods decreases. Consequently, household consumption increases.
In contrast, a decrease in the capital tax leads to the crowding out of private
consumption for non-Ricardian households. Forni et al. (2009) and Bhattarai &
Trzeciakiewicz (2012) explain that the decrease in the capital tax makes capital
more attractive. Firms re-allocate the factor of production from labour to
capital, thus decreasing the demand for labour. The decrease in labour demand
lowers income from wages and labour. Therefore, consumption by non-Ricardian
households declines according to lower incomes.
2.2.4.1 Empirical evidence
In order to test theories, an empirical investigation is generally used to
estimate a reduced-form equation. Empirical studies are employed to examine
the e¤ect of scal policy on GDP and other macroeconomic variables. A
well-known reduced-form equation is called the Structural Vector Autoregressive
(SVAR). The SVAR procedure has several distinctive features for analyzing
shocks. Isolating a change in the exogenous variable is one of the signicant
advantages of employing the SVAR method. Bouakez, Chihi & Normandin
(2010) suggest that inspecting an e¤ect of scal policy requires a clear
identication and an additional assumption. When the scal shock hits the
economy, it is useful to isolate the adjustment of exogenous variables, which are
not theoretically related to scal shocks. This objective can be clearly achieved
by using the SVAR approach. In addition, various desirable relationships
between exogenous variables and endogenous variables can impose a restriction
when examining a scal policys e¤ects. Furthermore, the SVAR approach can
also properly explore policy transmission mechanisms (Gottschalk 2001).
A number of empirical research on the impact of scal policy suggests that a
scal multiplier is non-zero. Most studies on SVAR approaches reveal a positive
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e¤ect of scal policy on output, such as, Perotti (2005), Caldara & Kamps (2008)
and Mountford & Uhlig (2009). Several macroeconomic variables signicantly
respond to scal shock, for example, Caldara & Kamps (2008) and Mountford &
Uhlig (2009) suggest a notable increase private consumption after the
implementation of expansionary scal policy. However, when the expectation
formation is considered, the impact of scal policy on private consumption is
remarkably negative as illustrate in an SVAR study by Tenhofen & Wol¤ (2007).
The economys size is another factor that inuences the impact of scal policy.
Perotti (2005) has employed the VAR for investigating the e¤ect of scal policy
to 5 OECD countries2, e.g., Australia, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom
and the Unites States. He suggests that the government spending multiplier for
the Unites States is the largest among the 5 countries. Additionally, it is unclear
whether a tax cut policy or an increase in government expenditure policy is more
e¤ective. Later, a VAR model featuring an anticipation of Mountford & Uhlig
(2009) found that a tax cut policy has the largest impact on increases in GDP.
In order to measure the degree of scal policy impacts, a number of studies
have calculated the scal multiplier of each shock on national output and
macroeconomic variables, such as private consumption, private investment, and
employment. Zubairy (2014) nds that an impact scal multiplier of an increase
in government expenditure (1.07) is considerably higher than an impact scal
multiplier of a reduction of taxation (0.13 and 0.34 for labour tax shock and
capital tax shock, respectively). She also reports that the present value of the
government spending multiplier decays over time, which obviously contrasts with
a present value tax multiplier that accumulates along the horizontal axis. These
adjustments of the present value multiplier are in line with the ndings of Furceri
& Mourougane (2010).
The scal multipliers size is depended on various economic characteristics of
2OECD is the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development which has the
objective to improve the economic and social welfare of people around the world. The members
consist of 35 countries, including many of the worlds most advanced countries and also emerging
countries.
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the country and structural parameters. Ilzetzki et al. (2013) nd that exchange
rate regimes, the degree of trade openness, a level of government debt and the
stage of economic development inuence the size of the scal multiplier of each
country. In a large open economy country or a exible exchange rate regimes
country, they suggest that scal policy shock does not cause a signicant increase
in national output. In addition, Furceri & Mourougane (2010) exploit a DSGE
model to calculate the e¤ect of various kind of scal shocks on national output
of European countries. They nd that price persistence and the share of liquidity
constrained by households could signicantly change a scal multiplier.
Despite extensive uses of the DSGE models and the SVAR models, there are
numerous contradictions in the previous studiesndings. Ilzetzki et al. (2013)
investigate the discretionary scal policy multipliers of 44 counties by using the
SVAR approach. Their ndings reveal that the impact of an increase in government
consumption is fairly small in the short-term and signicantly large in the medium-
long term. Nevertheless, their ndings contrast with the result from DSGE model
by Furceri & Mourougane (2010) in various aspects. Furceri & Mourougane (2010)
suggests strong positive impacts from scal policy in the short-term, especially
from an increase in government investment and consumption. An impact multiplier
of government investment for one year on output is revealed to be around 0.6, while
a long-run multiplier in 10 years is slightly smaller at 0.2.
The next section presents a model calibrated for the Thailand economy in order
to investigate scal multipliers.
2.3 THE MODEL
The present model shares a number of features with The Bank of Thailands
DSGE model introduced by Tanboon (2008). The Bank of Thailands DSGE
model has been used to investigate the Thailand economic factors related to
microeconomics foundations. This model incorporates a habit-adjusted
consumption, a households capital accumulation, and an investment and wage
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adjustment cost. Nominal rigidities, such as wage and price, are included in
model features. Moreover, for examining the various scal policy shocks, a rich
scal policy block is developed from Eggertsson (2011) and Zubairy (2014).
Various tax policies are added to the households constraint equation for
studying the behavior and reaction of households to taxation shocks.
Government equations contain the scal stabilizer function which controls the
tax rate with respect to output for preventing an undesirably explosive
government debt. The present DSGE model is used for investigating the dynamic
respond of endogenous variables to uncertainties. Micro-level structures
determine the relationship among economics variables. Five vital sectors, namely,
households, rms, banks, government, and the central bank, simultaneously
interact and optimize their behaviors subject to constraints. In the households
sector, household agents maximize their expected utility by adjusting
consumption and leisure with respect to budget constraints. Firms maximize
their expected prots by setting prices subject to production functions and the
demand for output. In the nancial sector, the bank receives a deposit from
households and lends it to rms subject to the cost of hiring labour. The
government, in the role of scal authority, maintains a scal rule by setting
government expenditures according to the total production. Lastly, the central
bank, in the role of monetary authority, manages a monetary rule by adjusting
an interest rate subject to the expected ination and target interest rate. The
detail of each sector is illustrated as follows.
2.3.1 Households Sector
There are numerous identical innitely lived households who populate the
economy. The preference of all households is regularly similar over their lifetime
and innite consumption series. Households are homogeneous with respect to
consumption and labour service. The continuum of expected lifetime households
utility can be assumed as follows:
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E0
1X
t=0
t

(1  ) log ~Ct   'L L
1+
1 + 

(1)
Habit-adjusted consumption is dened by:
~Ct =
Ct   ht
1   (2)
Households make the decision for consumption and labour service supply. The
utility that households obtain from consumption is represented in a logarithm
function. Habit-adjusted consumption ~Ct is used in an expected lifetime
households utility equation, instead of using a current period consumption, Ct .
The advantage of applying habit-adjusted consumption is illustrated by Fuhrer
(2000). He nds that employing a habit formation for consumers in the monetary
model substantially enhances the response of macroeconomic variables to policy
shocks. Habit formation specication transmits an intention to households for
smoothing an adjustment of consumption. In addition to the utility that
households obtain from consumption, they sacrice their leisure by supplying
labour to rms. The second term of continuum represents a disutility that
households sacrice. The disutility equation is expressed in an exponential
function, which depends on a number of labour supply, Lt. The continuum of
expected lifetime households utility is composed of four important parameters.
Firstly,  is a discount factor which represents a percentage rate required to
compute the present value of the households utility in the next period.
Normally,  is greater than zero and smaller than 1,  2 (0; 1):
From habit-adjusted consumption equation, ~Ct represents consumption in the
current period that is adjusted by a degree of habit, ht, and a consumption habit
persistence factor, . It is employed to describe a change of consumption over two
periods with respect to householdshabits. When households consume more in the
current period, it will lower the marginal utility of consumption of this period but
raise the marginal utility of consumption for the next period. Naturally, the more
the households consume today, the more starving they face in the future (Ravn
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et al. 2006). ht reveals the size of householdshabits.
ht = (1 + )Ct 1 (3)
ht is the function of the previous period consumption, Ct 1; and productivity
growth rate,  . The higher the last periods consumption is, the greater the degree
of householdshabits. Under simple model, steady-state of zero growth rate,  is
set equal to 0, therefore, ht = Ct 1and ~Ct =
Ct Ct 1
1  . Now, households only gain
more utility when their current consumption is greater than  proportion of the
last periods consumption. Moreover, habit-adjusted consumption in steady-state
of zero growth rate, ~CSt , equals to current period consumption ,C
S
t , or ~C
S
t = C
S
t .
Hence, the householdsutility will only depend on current period consumption.
The householdsutility function is subject to householdsbudgeting constraints,
which is assumed as:
(1+ st)P
D
t Ct+P
D
t It+Dt  (1 +Rt 1)Dt 1+(1 wt )WtLt+

1  (1  )  kt

RKt Kt+
X
j=D;X
jt
(4)
At time t, households allocate their income into three parts, namely,
consumption, investment, and deposit. These allocations should be smaller or
equal to total households budget, which is composed of a deposit from previous
period plus interest, return from supplying labour, return from capital, and a
prot of rms operation. PDt is a price of goods that households consume and
invest. Consumption goods and investment goods are assumed to have the same
price level. It is a current period investment. Dt is an amount of money that
households deposit to a bank. Rt is an interest rate for the deposit which is
similar to the policy interest rate. Wt is a nominal wage rate. It is a price of
labour supply which is returned to households who provide their labour. RKt is a
nominal price of capital or a return that capitals owner receives. Dt and 
X
t is a
prot of domestic rms and export rms that households who are a rmsowner
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receive from goods production. Three types of taxation are collected from
households budget constraint.  st denotes the sales tax that is collected from
households consumption in the current period. wt is a payroll tax which is
imposed on wage payment. Lastly,  kt is the capital taxed which is taxed from a
persistent capital.
Capital accumulation constraint is assumed as:
Kt+1  (1  )Kt + F (It;It 1) (5)
Capital accumulation constraints which are composed of two parts, represents
the capital of households in the next period, Kt+1. The rst part is capital in the
current period, Kt, which is decayed by the rate of depreciation, . The second
part is an investment adjustment costs function, F (It;It 1), which can be assumed
as follows:
F (It; It 1) =
"
1  
I
2

It
It 1
  (1 + )
2#
It (6)
An investment adjustment costs function is an investment minus an adjustment
cost. It is the knowledge that converts a current periods investment and a previous
periods into an installed investment for the next period operations (Christiano,
Eichenbaum & Evans 2005). A second term represents an adjustment cost which
is multiplied by an investment adjustment cost parameter, I . An adjustment cost
is considered when a growth rate of investment is greater than the growth rate of
the economy at balance growth path, or It
It 1
> . An adjustment cost lowers the
amount of investment that will be carried into the future. In contrast, when the
investment adjustment cost parameter is absented, I = 0; investment adjustment
costs function will be shortened to It:
Households maximize their utility subject to budget constraints and capital
accumulation. Lagrangian formulation, which is constructed from households
utility function, budget constraint, and capital accumulation, is employed for
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determining a households intertemporal problem. The Lagrangian function is
assumed as follows:
L = E0
1X
t=0
t
(
(1  ) log ~Ct   'L L
1+
t
1 + 
+ t

(1 +Rt 1)Dt 1 + (1  wt )WtLt +

1  (1  ) kt

RKt Kt
+
X
j=D;X
jt   (1 +  st )(1  )PDt ~Ct   (1 +  st )PDt ht   PDt It  Dt
35
+tQ
K
t [(1  )Kt + F (It; It 1) Kt+1]
	
(7)
Households decisions consist of capital for investment, Kt, a labour supply
for rmsproduction, Lt, a habit-adjusted consumption, ~Ct, investment, It;, and
a saving deposit to a nancial institution, Dt. t shows an additional change in
utility from a unit change in nominal income, namely a marginal utility of nominal
income. QKt represents a shadow price of capital. The rst-order condition of
each variable is applied for determining the households decisions (the detailed
exposition is described in Appendix A.1).
Consumption-decision is acquired from deriving the rst-order condition by
applying @L
@ ~Ct
= 0
t =
1
(1 +  st)P
D
t
~Ct
(8)
Capital decision is obtained from deriving the rst-order condition by using
@L
@Kt+1
= 0
QKt = Et
t+1
t

1  (1  )  kt+1

RKt+1 +Q
K
t+1 (1  )

(9)
Investment decision is received from deriving the rst-order condition by
applying @L
@It
= 0
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QKt
PDt
=
1
1  I It
It 1

It
It 1   (1 + )

  I
2

It
It 1   (1 + )
2
"
1  IEt t+1
t
QKt+1
PDt

It+1
It
2It+1
It
  (1 + )
#
(10)
QKt
PDt
is called a Tobins q, which is rstly introduced in 1968 by James Tobin
and William Brainard. It can be used to describe the level of investment. Tobins
q is the proportion of a replacement cost for the newly production unit or a
shadow price of capital, QKt ; and the market valuation of investment goods or a
price of investment, PDt (Tobin 1969). When a cost of investment adjustment is
absent, investment adjustment costs function, F (It; It 1); will be equal to It in
the equilibrium. Thus, Tobins q is equal to 1 or QKt = P
D
t
If labour market were perfectly competitive and without friction, the Labour
supply decision would be acquired from deriving the rst-order condition by
applying @L
@Lt
= 0
(1  wt )tWt = 'LLt (11)
In a competitive wage setting, households solely provide their di¤erentiated
labour to rms for production. Christiano et al. (2005) indicates that there is
a labour aggregator who merge a di¤erentiated labour supply into a group of
labour (Tanboon 2008). The essential role of labour aggregator is negotiating
labour supply, Lt , and optimal nominal wage, Wt , as a representative of a group
of labour with rms. In a generalization of competitive wage setting, marginal
labour cost and nominal wage are equated. Qlt denotes the solution of the e¤ective
market
(1  wt )tQlt = 'LLt (12)
However, this model employs a monopolistic distortion in the wage setting and
assume that the wage is set higher than the marginal cost of labour. If W t is a
exible wage in a monopolistic market, the wage setting equation would be
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W t = 
wQlt (13)
, where w > 1 is wage setting markup. In addition to monopolistic distortion,
the characteristic of wage rigidity follows the study of Rotemberg (1982). The
labour aggregator tries to minimize
min
Wt
E0
1X
t=0
t
h
(Wt  W t )2 + W
 4Wt  4 Wt 12i (14)
The rst term describes a gap between Wt and W t that labour aggregator try
to minimize. The di¤erence between wage increase, 4Wt, and aggregated wage
ination of previous period, 4 Wt 1 , which is given by policy maker is shown in
the second term. W expresses a wage rigidity. When W=0, no rigidity, nominal
wage is set equal to optimal wage (Wt = W t ). The minimization problem of wage
aggregator can be solved by applying the rst-order condition with respect to Wt.
Wt = W

t + 
W
   4Wt  4 Wt 1+ Et  4Wt+1  4 Wt (15)
The above equation, namely a wage setting, illustrates the three components of
nominal wage that labour aggregator concerns. Three elements can be assumed as
follows. The rst element is an optimal wage, W t ; which will be solely presented
in no rigidity case. The second part is di¤erence between current period wage
ination, 4Wt; and last period wage ination, 4 Wt 1. When wage ination in
the current period is greater than wage ination in the previous period (4Wt >
4 Wt 1 ), the nominal wage will reduce because of the negative sign of the second
component, and vice versa. The last part is the di¤erent between next period
expected wage ination, 4Wt+1; and current period wage ination, 4 Wt. When
an expected wage ination in next period is higher than a current period wage
ination (4Wt+1 > 4 Wt ), households expect a rise in wage ination in the
future. Thus, the nominal wage will increase because of a positive sign of the last
component coe¢ cient.
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The saving and borrowing decision is acquired from deriving the rst-order
condition by applying @L
@Dt
= 0
t = Ett+1 [1 +Rt] (16)
The above equation represents an optimal deposit which is chosen by
households. A level of deposit is allocated after households make a decision on
consumption and investment.
2.3.2 Financial openness
This thesis assumes that domestic capital market is open and any investor
can buy both domestic and foreign debt. However, the domestic bonds are more
risky than foreign. The domestic bond market is subjected to nancial friction in
the form of risk premium The foreign bonds are trades at international risk free
rate and the domestic interest rate Rt is traded with risk premium as following
(1 +Rt) = (1 +R

t )Et (dSt+1)

StB

t
2PDt Y
N
t
1
 
B
t (17)
dSt+1 =
St+1
St
(18)
, where B > 0 reects the elasticity of the home interest rate with respect to
domestic risk of borrowing, the foreign debt in domestic currency, Bt, is given by
Bt = StB

t : (19)
Where Bt is total foreign debt in foreign currency.
The di¤erence between domestic interest rate and foreign interest rate composes
of two components. The rst part is the expected change of nominal exchange
rate, which shows expected depreciation or appreciation of local currency. It is
the di¤erence between current period nominal exchange rate and the expected
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nominal exchange rate of the next period. Gärtner (2009) explains that when
investors do not expect the change of exchange rate, EtdSt+1=1, the UIP suggests
the equivalent of domestic interest rate, Rt; and foreign interest rate, Rt , Rt = R

t .
If the nominal exchange rate is expected to depreciate EtdSt+1 > 1 (i.e. in case
of xed exchange rate policy), the domestic assets became less desirable, the price
for domestic bonds fall and the domestic interest rate interest will increase. The
last part is a risk premium that arises when local debt to nominal GDP ratio is
greater than a ratio of debt to GDP in steady-state,  . Term t represents the
shock to transaction costs.
The linkage between international trading and foreign debt in local currency is
an important part of the present small-open economy model. The relation of the
value of net export and households debt is dened by
Bt = (1 +Rt 1)Bt 1   (PXt Xt   PMt Mt) (20)
, where Xt and Mt represent export and import, PXt and P
M
t are prices for
export and import in domestic currency.
The above equation is called the Law of Debt Motion, and it explains the
dynamic of foreign debt in local currency. The rst term shows that foreign debt
grows at the rate of interest rate, Rt 1; over time. The second term is a trade
balance, TB = PXt Xt   PMt Mt, which is equal to the value of the export of goods
and service minus the value of the import of goods and service. Foreign debt and
a trade balance have a negative relation, because the gain of the trade balance and
the value of goods being exported is higher than the value of goods being imported
(PXt Xt > P
M
t Mt). Therefore, the current period foreign debt falls.
2.3.3 Firms Sector
The essential role of rms is as goods producers for the economy. Two types
of rms, namely, domestic rms, and export rms, are considered in the present
DSGE model. A destination market is used for classifying rms categories.
30
2.3. THE MODEL
Domestic rms only produce goods for domestic market, while export rms only
sell their goods in a foreign market. Nevertheless, both rms share a similarity in
production technology. A Cobb-Douglas production function is the technology
that both types of rms employ. The detail of each type is described as follows:
2.3.3.1 Domestic Firms
Domestic rms acquire resources for producing goods. Three factors of
production are labour, LDt ; a capital K
D
t ; and raw imported intermediary goods
such as raw material for domestic rms, MDt . Moreover, the production of
domestic rms also depends on labour-argumented productivity, At. The
production function of domestic rms can be described as follows:
Y Dt = (AtL
D
t )
DL (MDt )
DM (KDt )
1 DL DM ; (21)
, where Y Dt is the output of domestic rms, 
D
L denotes a labour income share,
DM indicates an imported input income share and 1  DL   DM is a capital service
income share. Domestic rms are exhibited as monopolistic competitive rms since
they have the power to set their prices (Tanboon 2008).
The total costs, TCD; and prots, Dt ; of domestic rms can be presented as
follows:
TCD =
 
1 +RLt

WtL
D
t + P
M
t M
D
t +R
K
t K
D
t (22)
Dt =

PDt Y
D
t   (1 +RLt )WtLDt   PMt MDt  RKt KDt

(23)
The cost of domestic rmsproduction, TCD; is composed of three components:
wage payments, the cost of raw imported material, and interest rate payments from
the borrowing of capital. The wage bill is paid up-front and therefore has to be
borrowed from nancial institutes at a lending rate, RLt . The intermediary input,
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MDt ; is imported at an import price, P
M
t . The payment for a unit of capital, K
D
t ;
equals capital rental rate, RKt .
Domestic rms chose the composition of inputs (LDt ; K
D
t and M
D
t ) in order
to minimize production costs subject to a production quantity constraint. The
Lagrangian function is
LD =  1 +RLt WtLDt + PMt MDt +RKt KDt +QDt hY Dt   (AtLDt )DL (MDt )DM (KDt )1 DL DM i
(24)
The labour demand decision is acquired from deriving the rst-order condition
by applying @L
D
@LDt
= 0
 
1 +RLt

WtL
D
t = 
D
LQ
D
t Y
D
t (25)
The raw imported material demand decision is obtained from deriving the rst-
order condition by using @L
D
@MDt
= 0
PMt M
D
t = 
D
MQ
D
t Y
D
t (26)
The capital service decision is acquired from deriving the rst-order condition
by applying @L
D
@KDt
= 0
RKt K
D
t =
 
1  DL   DM

QDt Y
D
t (27)
Combining the solution (25, 26, 27) with total costs (22), the Lagrange
multiplier QDt represents marginal costs. If price were exible, and the price
elasticity of substitution between domestic goods were i; the price setting
equation would be equal to the xed mark-up over marginal costs.
PDt = 
DQDt (28)
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Where PDt is the optimal price in exible price economy, and 
D = i
(i 1) is
the monopolistic mark-up:
However, the price rigidity follows the price rigidity from the study of
Rotemberg (1982), and price updating is costly. Therefore, domestic rms set
prices minimizing the following loss function:
min
PDt
E0
1X
t=0
t
h 
PDt   PDt
2
+ D
 4PDt  4 PDt 12i (29)
The rst term represents the price gap between the price of goods, PDt and
an optimal price, PDt . Therefore, domestic rms try to set a price of goods as
close to an optimal price as possible. The second term illustrates the cost of price
adjustment, which is presented by a degree of price rigidities, D. The di¤erence
between the increase in rms price index, 4PDt , and the previous economy-wide
ination, 4 PDt 1, creates a cost of price adjustment.
The minimization problem of price setting can be solved by applying the rst-
order condition with respect to PDt .
PDt = P
D
t + 
D
   4PDt  4 PDt 1+   Et4 PDt+1  4 PDt  (30)
4 PDt = PDt   PDt 1 (31)
The above equation represents the price setting of domestic rms. A domestic
price, PDt , is divided into three essential components. The rst part is an optimal
price, PDt ; which is equal to a margin cost, Q
D
t ; times a domestic price markup,
D. If there were no costs of price adjustment (D = 0), the domestic rms would
set their price equal optimal price. The second part appears, because rms want
to minimize the current costs of price adjustment, and the last component shows
that rms account for the future price adjustment costs.
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2.3.3.2 Exporting Firms
The exporting rms only produce and trade goods in the export market. The
production function of export rms requires three-factor inputs, which are labour,
LXt ; capital service,K
X
t and raw imported material,M
X
t . Export rmsproduction
can be described as follows:
Y Xt = (AtL
X
t )
XL (MXt )
XM (KXt )
1 XL XM (32)
, where XL , 
X
M and 1 XL XM are shares of labour, imported input and capital
service correspondingly. In contrast to domestic rms, export rms are price-
takers since the considered economy is a small-open economy. Price is immediately
adjusted to the international market price (Tanboon 2008).
A total cost of export rms is slightly di¤erent from a total cost of domestic
rms. An important di¤erence is the nancing of labour cost. Export rms are
assumed to have a substantial capital investment. It can raise funds for paying a
labour cost without borrowing from a bank, which contrasts with domestic rms.
Therefore, an interest rate component for a labour cost loan is absent from the
total cost function. However, the other costs, which are a raw imported material
cost and a cost of capital service, are similar to domestic rmscost. In addition,
Export rms prot, Xt ; is a total export rms revenue less total cost of production.
The cost of export rmsproduction, TCX , and export rms prot, Xt ; can be
presented as follows:
TCX = WtL
X
t + P
M
t M
X
t +R
K
t K
X
t (33)
Xt = P
X
t Y
X
t  WtLXt   PMt MXt  RKt KXt (34)
Export rms try to maximize their prot with subject to a production function
constraint. Their decision consists of a level of labour input, LXt , a capital service
input, KXt and a raw imported material input, M
X
t . The Lagrangian function can
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be assumed as follows:
LX = PXt Y Xt  WtLXt   PMt MXt  RKt KXt  QXt hY Xt   (AtLXt )XL (MXt )XM (KXt )1 XL XMi
(35)
The labour demand decision for export rms is acquired from deriving the
rst-order condition by applying @L
X
@LXt
= 0
WtL
X
t = 
X
LQ
X
t Y
X
t (36)
The raw imported material demand decision is obtained from deriving the rst-
order condition by using @L
X
@MXt
= 0
PMt M
X
t = 
X
MQ
X
t Y
X
t (37)
The capital service decision is received from deriving the rst-order condition
by employing @L
X
@KXt
= 0
RKt K
X
t =
 
1  XL   XM

QXt Y
X
t (38)
Price setting by export rms contrasts to price setting by domestic rms. Their
goods are sold in a global market that is assumed to be a perfectly competitive
market. Hence, export rms only receive a global market price for their price
setting. The export rmsprice, at equilibrium, can be expressed as follows:
QXt = P
X
t (39)
QXt is a shadow price of export rms. P
X
t is a price of export rms in term of
a local currency that is the product of nominal exchange rate, St; and the price of
export goods in a foreign currency, PXft . The price of export rms can be expressed
as follows:
PXt = StP
Xf
t (40)
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Similarly, PMt denotes a domestic import price which is the product of foreign
import price PMFt and St:
PMt = StP
MF
t (41)
The di¤erence between import price and export price is called term of trade,
T , and it can be assumed as follows:
T =
PX
PM
(42)
The output of domestic rms and export rms is summed into gross domestic
product (GDP), which can be assumed as follows:
Y Nt = Y
D
t + Y
X
t (43)
Y Nt is the economys real GDP.
2.3.4 Banks Sector
The essential role of the bank is lending money to borrowers, which are
domestic rms. The bank acts as a nancial intermediary between depositors
and borrows. The banking model of Atta-Mensah & Dib (2008) is employed to
be a foundation of the banking sector since monetary policy can be conducted
through lending channels (Tanboon 2008). Capital is directly collected from a
deposit of households, then a bank lends it to domestic rms for nancing a
labour cost at rate RLt . The risk premium which banks charge depends on the
state of domestic economy.
RLt =
sp
t
Rt (44)
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Where sp is the steady-state risk premium and t is a deposit lent out to rm
ratio. It is a cyclical component , dening as
t =

Y Dt
(1 + )Y Dt 1

(45)
The above equation illustrates that when the growth rate of national output
increases, the credit spread declines and  denotes an elasticity of lending spread
to a growth rate of national output.
2.3.5 Government sector
The government sector is one of the important components of this present
model. The important roles of government are consumption and supporting a
sustainable economic growth. These government objectives require a
well-planned government policy. The present model employs an automatic
stabilizer process for the government sector. This process can minimize
uctuations in real GDP. The automatic stabilizer process can be managed by
controlling a level of current-period government spending in response to a
last-period government spending, government bond and a last-period national
output. Hence, the size of government spending corresponds to the level of GDP
in the previous period. Excessive government spending not only over stimulates
economic activity, but it also creates a scal burden in the future. Therefore, a
scal rule is introduced to the model for managing a rule of government
expenditure. A scal rule can be assumed as follows:
Gt = 
GGt 1 + G;b
G
bGt 1 + 
G;Y NY Nt 1 (46)
Gt is a real government expenditure in current period. A scal rule illustrates
that government expenditure is composed of three main components. The rst
component is the last period government expenditure, Gt 1. A 1-period-lag
government expenditure is adjusted by the persistence in government
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expenditure, G. The persistence in government expenditure illustrates the
correlation between a previous period nominal government expenditure and a
current period nominal government expenditure. The higher the value of G , the
larger the persistence e¤ect. In the second component, G;B
G
is a feedback in
government bond shock on government expenditure, and bGt 1 is a real
government bond in last period. Normally, the government negatively responds
to the level of government bonds for curbing the future debt. Lastly, G;Y
N
is a
feedback in real GDP shock on government expenditure.  shows a proportion of
nominal government expenditure to GDP. In practice, government usually sets a
size of nominal government expenditure to a certain percentage of GDP.
The government budget constraint, which is composed of a level of government
spending, a total government revenue and a government bond, is adapted from
Zubairy (2014). Her study employs a DSGE model with a rich scal policy block.
The present model investigates three type of taxes, namely, a sales tax, a payroll
tax and a capital tax. Each government revenue can be assumed as follows:
Sales tax revenue
T st = 
s
tP
D
t Ct (47)
Payroll tax revenue
Twt = 
w
t WtLt (48)
Capital tax revenue
T kt = (1  )  ktRKt Kt (49)
The government budget constraint can be assumed as follows:
BGt = (1 +Rt 1)B
G
t 1 + P
D
t Gt  
X
j=s;w;k
T jt (50)
BGt is a government bond which is issued for nancing government expenditure
by scal authority. The government bond can be bought by household agents,
domestic rms and foreign rms. There are two components of government bond.
The rst component is a bond in last period including interest rate payment. The
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second component is a primary government decit, which is the di¤erence between
government expenditure and total government revenue. The sum of tax revenue
is composed of a sales tax revenue, a payroll tax revenue and a capital income
tax revenue. In addition, the real government bond, bGt =
BGt
PDt
; can be assumed as
follows:
bGt =
(1 +Rt 1)
t
bGt 1 +Gt    stCt   wt wtLt   (1  )  kt rKt Kt (51)
2.3.6 Central Bank Sector
The central bank is another signicant authority in the model. The primary
objective of the central bank is ensuring the economys price stability by employing
monetary policy. The monetary rule can be expressed as follows:
Rt = 
RRt 1 +
 
1  R Rss +   dPDt    (52)
A policy interest rate, Rt; which is set by the central bank, is composed of two
weighted components. R denotes a weight that assigns to each component. The
rst term is a weighted average of previous period interest rate, Rt 1. The central
bank is assumed to acquire ination targeting policy for their principle anchor.
The second term is a weighted target policy rate in the current period. Target
policy interest rate is composed of a steady-state nominal interest rate, Rss, and
a response of the di¤erent between expected ination in the next period, dPDt ,
and a target ination, . The degree of the central banks reaction to an ination
deviation is called .
2.3.7 Denition of equilibrium
The models equilibrium is made up of a series of prices and an allocation of
households and production rms such that all of the rst order conditions and a
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zero prot equilibrium of perfect competitive banks is achieved. The examples of
the rst order conditions are a maximization of discounted present value of utility
of households and a maximization of the discounted present value of prot of rms.
Both a simple scal rule of government and a simple monetary rule of the central
bank are satised. All of the dynamic equations, which is presented as a law of
motion, such as a law of debt motion, are fully accomplished. Lastly, a markets
clearing condition is satised and a steady-state condition of all markets is cleared.
2.3.7.1 Market Clearing Condition
In New Classical economics, a market clearing condition refers to the market
which has a level of goods supply equal to a level of goods demand. A price level
that a level of supply meets a level of demand is called a market clearing price. Both
price and quantity are freely adjusted until reaching a market clearing condition.
Domestic output and export output under the market clearing condition can be
expressed as follows:
Y Dt = Ct + It +Gt (53)
Y Xt = Xt (54)
Moreover, factors of production are also adjusted until they reach a market
clearing condition. The following are market clearing conditions for factors of
production:
Lt = L
D
t + L
X
t (55)
Mt =M
D
t +M
X
t (56)
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Kt = K
D
t +K
X
t (57)
The equilibrium on the loan market denes the demand for nancing through
domestic deposits.
Dt +Bt = WtL
d
t +B
G
t (58)
, where BGt is government debt.
2.3.7.2 Steady State Condition
After a period of adjusting, all macroeconomic variables reach the nal
condition, which is called a steady-state condition. In the steady-state, some
properties of variable are unchanged, such as quantity and growth rate. An
explosion or a collapse of macroeconomic variables can be averted when the
growth rate of these variables is set to be a constant (Tanboon 2008). The
steady-state condition of each macroeconomic variables can be assumed as Table
1
Table 1: Steady state condition of each macroeconomic variables
Variables Growth rate (%)
Real Variables
Y D; Y X ; Y N ; C; I;G;X;KD; KX ;MD;MX 
LD; LX 0
Domestic Prices
PD; PX ; PM ; RK ; QD; QX ; QK 
R;RL; R 0
W;QL + 
Nominal Variables
B;BG + 
Foreign Prices
PXF ; PMF 
Exchange Rate
dSt+1    
Most of the steady-state condition of the present DSGE model shares several
features with Tanboon (2008)s study. In the steady-state, all real variables, except
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labour supply, increase at a productivity growth rate, ; on the balance growth
rate. The labour for domestic rms and labour for export rms are not grown,
zero growth rate, for avoiding an explosion of the population. The growth rate of
all domestic prices, except interest rate, labour loan interest rate, nominal wage,
and shadow price of labour, are set at the target rate of ination. All interest
rates are xed at a constant in the steady-state. Nominal wage and shadow price
of labour are grown at the rate of  + . The growth rate of nominal variables,
which are Y N ; B; BG is + :The foreign price of export and import goods grow
at . Lastly, the depreciation rate of the expected exchange rate is    .
2.3.8 Structure of Exogenous Processes
This section explains the dynamic of exogenous processes of selected exogenous
variables, such as a government spending and tax rates. Exogenous processes
are primary shocks that a¤ect the economy. These processes occur once at the
beginning of the examination. In the present model, the exogenous processes
follow an automatic stabilizer process of selected exogenous variables. Although
literature reviews have indicated that there was no specic structure of scal policy
(Romer & Romer 2007), a structure of scal policy shocks in this model follows
a scal study by Romer & Romer (2007) and Zubairy (2014). A government
expenditure innovation and a taxation innovation are presented as follows:
2.3.8.1 Government expenditure shock
A government maintains expenditures with an automatic stabilizer process.
This feature allows a minimizing of uctuations in real GDP. Without specic
new legislation, government spending is set to have a feedback response to three
components: 1) the state of an economy, which is recognized by a one-period lag of
GDP, 2) the level of government debt, which help to prevent a high debt situation,
and 3) a one-period lag in government expenditures. Innovation processes for
government expenditures can be assumed as:
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Gt = 
GGt 1 + G;B
G
bGt 1 + 
G;Y NY Nt 1 + "
G
t (59)
A one-time increase in government expenditures is implemented for
investigating an impact of scal policy on the small-open economy. This scal
policy innovation represents a common government practice when a country faces
an economic recession. The government expenditure process consists of three
persistence parameters; namely, persistence in government expenditure shock, G,
feedback in government bond shock on government expenditure, and feedback in
real GDP shock on government expenditure, G;Y
N
. These parameters are set in
the range (-1,1), or
GS; G;BG ; G;Y N  < 1 to achieve a stationary process. "Gt is
a white noise process with a zero mean and constant variance, 2".
2.3.8.2 Taxation shocks
Similar to government expenditure innovation, a government maintains
taxation by the automatic stabilizer process. Taxation is also set to have a
countercyclical process with three components: 1) the state of an economy, 2) the
level of government debt, and 3) the one-period lag in government expenditures.
The objectives of taxation policy are to establish long term economic growth and
to control the level of scal decit. Taxation innovation processes can be
assumed as:
 st = 
s st 1 + 
s;BGbGt 1 + 
s;Y NY Nt 1 + "
s
t (60)
wt = 
wwt 1 + 
w;BGbGt 1 + 
w;Y NY Nt 1 + "
w
t (61)
 kt = 
k kt 1 + 
k;BGbGt 1 + 
k;Y NY Nt 1 + "
k
t (62)
A one-time decrease in the tax rate is implemented for investigating the impact
of scal policy on the small-open economy. Similarly, a reduction in the tax rate
is usually introduced during economic slowdowns. Each taxation process consists
of its feedback parameters, such as a feedback in tax rate shock, 
i
, a feedback
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in government bond shock on tax rate, 
i;BG ; and a feedback in real GDP shock
on tax rate, 
i;Y N ; where i represents three types of taxation. To ensure the
stationary process, the absolute value of all feedback is smaller than 1, as follows: i < 1: Moreover, "st ; "wt ; "kt is a white noise process with a mean of zero and
constant variance, 2".
2.3.9 Opportunities and limitations of the model
A DSGE model is constructed in order to imitate both long-run and
short-run (business cycle) properties of a small open economy. Several models
features are employed to mimic Thailand economy such as habit formation
specication, investment adjustment cost, price mark-up specication, and wage
setting specication. For the business cycle property, the persistences in macro
economic variable are important features of this DSGE model. The persistence
shows how today economic shock a¤ects the macroeconomic variables in the
future. The persistence is commonly measured by autocorrelation function. The
higher autocorrelation coe¢ cient, the larger the persistence. According to
Tanboon (2008), Thailands detrend output, private consumption, and
investment have a high rst-order autocorrelation coe¢ cient (approximately
0.6-0.7). The large rst-order autocorrelation coe¢ cient illustrates that Thailand
economy has a signicant degree of persistence in private consumption and
investment. Therefore, including the habit formation specication and the
investment adjustment cost in the DSGE model helps satisfying the business
cycle property of this model.
The model incorporates the monopolistic distortions and the rigidities in the
price and wage setting. The monopolistic distortion in wage arises in an imperfectly
competitive labour market since the trade union has a collective bargaining power
with rms to gain a wage mark-up. Thailand has a number of labour organization
(1482 organizations in 2016)3, for example, Public Enterprise Association, Labour
3Source: Yearbook of Labour Protection and Welfare Statistic 2016, Department of Labour
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Union (Private Enterprise), Public Enterprise Labour Union Federation. Labour
organization not only use their collective bargaining power to increase real wage
but also improve welfare and living standards of their members. The monopolistic
distortion in price occurs from several factors, such as when rms can di¤erentiate
their product when rms invent and acquire patents of a new product, and when
rmsproduction function is an increasing return to scale (Judd 2002). A price
mark-up can be computed from an input-output table as the ratio of the total value
of production to the total cost of production. The National Statistical O¢ ce,
Thailand, publishes the input-output table of Thailand economy annually. The
calculation suggests that the price mark-up is not zero. Hence, the monopolistic
distortions in price and wage are the important characters of Thailand economy.
The characteristic of wage and price rigidities follows the study of Rotemberg
(1982). The price adjustment is costly for rms, for example, rms have to print
new price tags. According to Levy, Bergen, Dutta & Venable (1997), the menu
costs is approximately 0.70 percent of revenues and 35.2 percent of net margins
of multistore supermarket chains. In addition, a recurrent price adjustment may
bother customers perception. A number of price rigidity studies agree that
prices are sticky (Rotemberg 1982, Alvarez, Dhyne, Hoeberichts, Kwapil, Bihan,
Lünnemann, Martins, Sabbatini, Stahl, Vermeulen et al. 2006). Rotemberg
(1982) investigates U.S. postwar price and concludes that the hypothesis that
price is not sticky is rejected. Alvarez et al. (2006) study price setting by using
consumer price index and producer price index in Euro area. They nd that a
price stickiness in Euro area is higher than a price stickiness in the U.S.
Financial frictions in bank sector and bond market are included in the present
DSGE model. The risk premium in bond market arises when foreign debt to
nominal GDP ratio is greater than a ratio of debt to GDP in steady-state.
Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé & Villani (2007) study the incomplete pass-through in
Eurozone and add the premium on foreign bond holdings in the uncovered
interest rate parity. They suggest that the risk premium shows an imperfect
protection and welfare, Ministry of Labour, Thailand.
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integration in the global nancial markets. The nancial frictions in bank sector
occur when there is a spread between a lending interest rate and deposit interest
rate. This spread is larger during economic contraction as bankswillingness to
lending is reduced and smaller during an economic boom. Atta-Mensah & Dib
(2008) study the role of bank lending under alternative Taylor-type rules with
nancial friction in bank sector. They nd that the nancial friction magnied
the responses of real variables to monetary policy, for example, output.
Therefore, the nancial frictions in bank sector and bond market are important
features of the dynamic of the economy.
Fiscal rule and taxation shocks are presented as a persistence and feedback
process. In contrast to monetary policy, scal policy is not generally specied.
Government tries to maintain long-term economic growth and stabilize the
economy when faces external shock. The scal rule of the present model follows
Zubairy (2014). Fiscal rule and taxation shocks respond to the state of an
economy, the level of government debt, and the one-period lag in government
expenditures. The empirical data shows that Thailand scal rule is consistent
with this process. For example, Thailand government expenditure to GDP
increases from 16.3% in 2007 to 17.9% in 2009, as a response to the global
nancial crisis 4 and a high correlation of a government expenditure in the
current and previous periods (0.85 during the 1989-2014 period).
The monetary rule of this model composed of two weighted components,
namely, a persistence of one-period lag in interest rate, and a ination targeting
term. The bank of Thailand conducts ination targeting policy for its principle
anchor since 2000. The target range is set for a core ination at 0-3.5 percent.
The bank of Thailand deliberately raised policy interest rate when ination is
higher than the target ination, for example, in 2006. This ensures the overall
price stability in the long run.
Although this model employs several economic frictions, there are a number
of friction that can be further investigated, for example, trade frictions (when the
4Source: The Databank, Worldbank, https://data.worldbank.org
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law of one price does not hold).
2.3.10 Model Parameters Calibration
The DSGE model parameters can be determined from two extensively used
methods. The rst method is called an estimation. Even though an estimation
can properly generate model parameters, this method has several drawbacks
through estimating a corresponding likelihood, as it can create several local
maxima and discontinuities (Tanboon 2008). Nevertheless, to remedy the
problem of likelihood estimation, the Bayesian estimation has been lately
introduced for DSGE models. The problems of identication and misspecication
can be solved by using Bayesian approach (Canova & Sala 2009). The second
method is a calibration which uses various empirical data for adjusting the model
parameter. The calibration method is used for the present study, because it can
conveniently describe the Thailand economy structure. The model parameters of
this thesis are mostly obtained from Tanboon (2008) and calculated from raw
data. The data for calibrating the Thailand economy is received from numerous
sources, including The Bank of Thailand Structural Model for Policy Analysis
(Tanboon 2008), O¢ ce of the National Economic and Social Development
Board5, the Bank of Thailand Macroeconometric Model, Fiscal Policy O¢ ce, and
The Revenue Department of Thailand. The model parameters are summarized in
Table 2.
The parameters of households are explained as follows. Discount factor, ; is
calculated based on a real interest rate of 3% per year. The Discount factor is
transformed from an annual parameter to an quarterly parameter through a
power of 1
4
, where  = 1
(1+0:03)1=4
= 0:9926. The consumption habit persistence
factor, ; is adopted from Tanboon (2008). He employs the Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM) estimation, which is e¤ectively applied with moment
equation, for estimating of . The Euler equation is constructed from Thailands
5http://www.nesdb.go.th/
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Table 2: The model parameters
Symbol Parameter Value
 Discount factor 0.9926
 Consumption habit persistence factor 0.85
'L Scaling parameter of labour disutility function 1
 Inverse of Frisch elasticity 3.0303
I The elasticity of investment adjustment cost 0.9
 Productivity growth rate 0
 Depreciation rate 0.0072
W Wage markup 1.05
W The elasticity of wage adjustment cost 9
R Foreign interest rate 0.0036
B The elasticity of interest rate premium
on foreign debt holdings 0.35
 The foreign debt-to-GDP ratio at steady-state 0.299
 The gap between domestic and foreign interest rate 0.0025
DL Labour income share of domestic rms 0.76
DM Imported input income share of domestic rms 0.12
D The elasticity of price rigidities 9
D Domestic price markup 1.02
XL Labour income share of foreign rms 0.72
XM Imported input income share of foreign rms 0.14
 The degree of bank willingness to lend subject to
the relative GDP growth rate 0.6
G The degree of government expenditure persistency 0.85
 The specic ratio of government expenditure to GDP 0.149
R The degree of interest rate policy persistency 0.9
 Ination target 0.0
 The sensitivity of interest rate policy to ination 20
T The degree of terms of trade persistency 0.8
 Foreign ination at steady stage 0.0
48
2.3. THE MODEL
Table 2: The model parameters (continued)
Symbol Parameter Value
PD Domestic price of consumption and investment goods 1.0
PXF Foreign export price 1.0
PMF Foreign import price 1.0
 s Sales tax 0.07
w Payroll Tax 0.131
 k Return on capital Tax 0.1

s
The degree of sales tax innovation persistency 0.9

w
The degree of payroll tax innovation persistency 0.9

k
The degree of return on capital tax innovation persistency 0.9
G;B
G
The feedback in government bond shock on government expenditure -0.17

s;BG The feedback in government bond shock on sales tax rate 0.020

w;BG The feedback in government bond shock on payroll tax rate 0.029

K ;BG The feedback in government bond shock on capital tax rate 0.017
G;Y
N
The feedback in real GDP shock on government expenditure -0.039

s;Y N The feedback in real GDP shock on sales tax rate 0.100

w;Y N The feedback in real GDP shock on payroll tax rate 0.132

k;Y N The feedback in real GDP shock on capital tax rate 0.148
consumption data between 1994 and 2006, and his result illustrates the value of
 in the band of 0.84 to 0.88. The scaling parameter for labour disutility
function, 'L, which represents a wideness of distribution of disutility function, is
set to 1. This implies no scaling for labour disutility function. The inverse of
Frisch Elasticity, , is computed from a Frish elasticity of Tanboon (2008). The
researcher employed OLS estimation to a labour supply equation by using
Thailand labour data. The estimated Frisch elasticity is 0.33, and this result is
comparable with a range from 0.27 to 0.53 and 0.54, results which are
respectively estimated by Reichling & Whalen (2012) and Chetty, Guren, Manoli
& Weber (2011). Therefore, in this equation,  = 1
0:33
= 3:0303. The elasticity of
investment adjustment cost, I , is set to 0.9 for compatibly adjusting the
dynamic response of investment to Thailands economy. This parameter
measures the degree of investment adjustment cost when the growth rate of
private investment, ( It
It 1
), is not equal to 1 + , which is the growth rate of
economic at balance growth path. The productivity growth rate, , is set to 0 for
the simplicity of the model. A depreciation rate, , is estimated from Thailands
gross capital stock and investment during 1980-2012. This calculation is derived
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from a capital accumulation equation as given.
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + F (It;It 1)
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + It
 =
Kt  Kt+1 + It
Kt
(63)
The estimation illustrates that Thailand average annual depreciation rate is
2.9% or 0.72% per quarter. The wage markup, W , is employed from Tanboon
(2008). The calculation is based on data from the National Statistic O¢ ces
website6 and The O¢ ce of the National Economic and Social Development
Boards website. Tanboon (2008) suggests that W is 1.05. The elasticity of wage
adjustment cost, W , represents the intensity of wage rigidity. For consistency
with a dynamic response of Thailands economy, W is set to 9. Foreign Interest
Rate, R, is an average interest rate of Thailands major trading partners,
namely, the United States, the European Union, China and Japan. The average
interest rate of Thailands major trading partners as of 9 Feb. 2015 is 1.45%,
thus, R = 1
4
ln(1 + 0:0145) = 0:0036: The elasticity of interest rate premium on
foreign debt holdings, B is set to 0.35 for elaborating the exchange rates
dynamic response in Thailands economy. The foreign debt-to-GDP ratio at
steady-state,  ; is set to 29.9%, which is the average of Thailand Foreign
Debt-to-GDP Ratio during 2005 to 2014. The gap between domestic and foreign
interest rate, ; is set to 0.0025, which implies one percentage point of gap
between domestic and foreign interest rate, or  = 1
4
ln(1 + 0:01) = 0:0025:
In addition, the parameters of both domestic and foreign rms are described
as follows. The labour income share of domestic rms, DL , is set to 0.76 , which
is selected from Guerriero (2012). She estimates the labour share of 89 countries,
both developed countries and developing countries, during year 1970-2009.
Moreover, his study also illustrates that the labour income share is varied over
the time. The nding of Guerriero (2012) is comparable with 0.69 and 0.70,
6http://web.nso.go.th/
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which are respectively estimated by Ahuja, Peungchanchaikul & Piyagarn (2004)
and Tanboon (2008). The remaining income share of domestic rms is equally
allocated to the imported input income share, DM ; and capital income share,
1  DL   DM ; or DM = 1  DL   DM = (1 0:76)2 = 0:12: The labour income share of
foreign rms, XL , is set at 0.72, slightly lower than one of the domestic rms.
The main di¤erence is a lower labour intensiveness in the production technology
of foreign rms. Similarly, the remaining income share of foreign rms is
uniformly assigned to the imported input income share, XM ; and capital income
share, 1   XL   XM ; or XM = 1   XL   XM = (1 0:72)2 = 0:14: Since the imported
input income share of foreign rms is greater than one of the domestic rms,
foreign rms use imported input more than domestic rms.
The elasticity of price rigidities, D; which represents the cost of the di¤erent
of ination expectation, is set to 9 for properly adjusting the dynamics of ination
to actual Thai data. The domestic price markup, D; is employed from Tanboon
(2008) and set to 1.02. The price markup is calculated based on an input-output
matrix which is collected from the O¢ ce of the National Economic and Social
Development Board. The degree of bank willingness to lend subject to the relative
GDP growth rate,  ; is set to 0.6, which is located between 0.5 and 1.48 from the
estimation of Tanboon (2008) and Atta-Mensah & Dib (2008), respectively. The
spread of Thailands deposit interest rate and borrowing interest rate is particularly
uniform and corresponding with economic growth (Tanboon 2008). Thus,  is
calibrated for producing a realistic and dynamic response in Thailands banking
sector. The specic ratio of government expenditure to GDP, , is set to 0.149.
This value reects an average share of government expenditure, which, as the sum
of government consumption and government investment at 1988 prices, is 14.9%
during the 2005-2014 period.
The degrees of persistence and parameters of monetary policy authority is
assumed as follows. The degree of interest rate policy persistency, R; and the
sensitivity of interest rate policy to ination, , is adjusted for illustrating the
structure of interest rate channel of Thailands economy. R is set to 0.9 and 
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is set to 20. The ination target,  , is set to 0, which implies zero ination
along the balanced growth path: Similarly, the foreign ination at steady-state,
; is set to 0. The degree of terms of trade persistence; T ; is set to 0.8. This
parameter conducts the persistence of trade terms in a rst-order autoregressive
process. The domestic price of consumption and investment goods, PD; foreign
export price, PXF ; and foreign import price, PMF ; is normalized to 1.0.
For the exogenous processes of scal innovation, the degree of government
expenditure persistence, G, is calculated from the Thailands government
expenditure during the 1989-2014 period. The result shows that G is 0.85,
implying a considerably high correlation of a government expenditure in the
current and previous periods. The degree of tax innovation persistence, namely ,

s
; 
w
; 
k
; is set to 0.9. A setting of the persistence in government bond shock
and the persistence in real GDP shock follows the approach of Zubairy (2014).
She suggests that the scal persistence parameters should be set in order to curb
the level of government debt during the next period taxed. Furthermore, a lower
level of government expenditure over time is necessary for satisfying a
government budget constraint and reaching the equilibrium. A numerical
representation of the feedback is directly adopted from Zubairy (2014), such as,

K ;BG ; 
w;Y N ; 
k;Y N . The sales tax,  s; is set to 0.07, and is used to represent a
Value-Added Tax (VAT) at 7% in Thailand. The payroll tax, w; is calculated
from Thailands personal income tax in 2011. Since Thailands personal income
tax is collected based on the progressive rate, the payroll tax is the weighted
average of Thailands personal income tax. The number of taxpayers is used for
determining the weight of each tax bracket. The nding shows that the weighted
average personal income tax of Thailand is 13.1%. The capital income tax,  k; is
set at 0.1. The return of capital can be received in the form of capital gains and
dividends. In Thailand, a capital gain is not levied, while a dividend income is
taxed at 10%.
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2.4 FISCAL POLICY SHOCKS
This section illustrates the dynamic e¤ects of scal policy shocks on a
country with a small-open economy. The responses of macroeconomic variables
towards new a steady-state after various shocks are computed. The calculation is
composed of two essential procedures. The rst step is an estimation of the
steady-state condition of each equation in real terms. The steady-state value of
all variables is computed on the balance growth path given zero productivity
growth rate,  = 0, and zero ination,  = 0. The second process is a
log-linearizational equations, in real terms, by applying the Taylor rst-order
approximation. The details of the estimation of all log-linearized equations can
be found in Appendix A.2. These Log-Linearlized equations will be used to
describe the dynamic response of macroeconomic variables. After deriving
Log-Linearlized equations, the Dynare7 is employed for computing the transition
dynamic of each variable to its new steady-state when several types of shocks are
introduced. As part of this, a prospective increase in government spending
shocks is also explained. Later, the taxation shocks, namely, sales tax shock,
payroll tax shock, and a capital income tax shock, are illustrated and compared
with other forms of tax. The x-axis and y-axis present the scal quarters after
these scal shocks a¤ect both the economy and the percentage deviation from
the steady-state value respectively.
2.4.1 Government Expenditure Transmission
In order to investigate the transmission of government expenditures, the
DSGE model introduces one standard deviation of increase in the government
expenditure shock in period 1 to the small-open economy. This shock is
temporary and follows an automatic stabilizer process. Hence, it gradually
7Dynare is a MATLAB software which is used to simulate economic models, in particular
DSGE model. The calculation is relied on the rational expectation hypothesis.
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diminishes during the following period. The expansion of government
expenditures impacts both the internal and external sides of a small-open
economy. Locally, domestic agents, such as households and domestic rms, would
suddenly adjust to the government-implemented shock. In contrast, export rms
will sensitively respond to external side variables, like the exchange rate and
export price. An increase in government expenditure shock represents a sudden
increase in government consumption and/or investment which is often
implemented during a crisis or economic downturn. Figure 1 illustrates the
impulse response function (IRF) of various macroeconomic variables, including
output of domestic rms, output of export rms, households consumption, and
households labour supply, etc. By comparing the output response of domestic
rms and export, the opposite direction of output is clearly noticed. In this case,
domestic rms facilitate government actions by producing more output when
scal shocks a¤ect the economy. Therefore, the output of domestic rms
increases over the rst period when the government increases its spending. All of
the domestic rms factors of production (labour, capital, and intermediate
goods) then rise. The higher domestic rmss production places a pressure on the
price of factors of production like real wages, which increase during the rst
period and then drop over time. Therefore, both domestic and export rms face
a rise in their total costs. Unlike domestic rms, export rms cannot raise the
price of their goods since a small-open economy is a price-taker. Those goods are
thus sold to the global market at world price. Hence, the prot of export rms
declines and their outputs fall in the rst period. In addition, with regard to the
market clearing condition, these factors of production are re-allocated from
export rms to domestic rms; thus, the factors of production of export rms
also drop. The decreasing of export rmsfactor of production leads to a fall in
the export rms output. The return on capital falls after the introduction of
government expenditure shocks. A decrease in the return on capital impacts the
wealth of households, an outcome referred to as a wealth e¤ect. The households
who perceive a lower income consume less than the previous period. The decline
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of private consumption a¢ rms a positive wealth e¤ect, which is a positive
relation between households income and private consumption. Nevertheless,
private consumption slightly decreases in the early stage because the model
adheres to habit-adjusted private consumption. Private consumption reaches its
bottom in the second period. In addition to the wealth e¤ect, the substitution
e¤ect is considerably noticed. When the real wage decreases, households move
away from consumption and begin to work more. As a result, the domestic rms
labour force rise. Private investment gradually falls in the rst period because of
an increase in the interest rate and a rise in the capital tax from automatic
stabilizers. The lowering of private investment shows a crowding out e¤ect from
an increase in government spending.
In addition to the internal side e¤ect, the expansion of government
expenditures also a¤ects the external stability of a small-open economy.
Externally, the shock from government expenditures causes the exchange rate to
appreciate in the rst period due to a rise in interest rates. An appreciation of
local currency reduces the export volume in the rst period when the shock
arrives at the economy, because the price of export goods in the foreign currency
increases. A decrease in exports and an increase in imports worsen a trade
balance. From the law of debt motion, foreign debt eventually increases when the
trade balance worsens. Under UIP conditions, an increase in the foreign debt also
contributes to a rise in the interest rate. When the impacts of both domestic
rms output and export rms output are combined, a national output surges in
the rst period after an increase in government spending, and a price lever
increases after scal shocks. An increase in government expenditures shifts the IS
curve to the right and induces more aggregate demand. Since LM curve does not
move, the new equilibrium has both a higher output and a higher price. An
increase in the price level brings an inationary pressure on the economy. The
central bank consequently increases the interest rate in response to an increase in
ination, an action called a contractionary monetary policy, to reduce
inationary pressure. The contractionary monetary policy eventually lowers the
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Figure 1: The impulse responses function of macroeconomic variables to a one
percent increasing in government expenditures
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production of domestic rms back to a steady-state level. All variables in the
supply side, such as a supply of labour, intermediate goods, and capital for
domestic rms also return to the pre-shock level. Subsequently, households
incomes revert to pre-shock levels because a real wage increase to the pre-shock
level. Thus, as a result of the wealth e¤ect, private consumption and private
investment rise to their initial values. Considering the duration of government
expenditure innovation, IRF shows that the positive impact of government
expenditure expansion to domestic output is nally eliminated within 4 periods,
or 1 year, on a quarterly basis after the shock is introduced.
The nding is consistent with the results of many studies on the DSGE model
, including Ratto et al. (2009) who investigated the impact of scal policy and
monetary policy on the Eurozone by using a DSGE model for an open economy
with Bayesian estimation techniques and Zubairy (2014) who employed a DSGE
model with fully scal policy elements and a channel of government expenditure
innovations to calculate the scal multipliers of various scal shocks. Both
studies conrm that an increase in government expenditure potentially leads to
an expansion in the domestic output. In addition, the observed crowding out
e¤ects of interest-sensitive variables are also along the lines of earlier studies by
Ratto et al. (2009) and Zubairy (2014) who nd a crowding out in private
investment after an increase in government expenditure, as well as Ratto et al.
(2009) and Forni et al. (2009) who present a fall in the private consumption of
Ricardian households as a result of the expansion of government spending. Forni
et al. (2009) evaluate the e¤ect on scal policy in the Eurozone by using DSGE
model featuring a fraction of Ricardian and non-Ricardian agents. Their results
illustrate a decrease in the private consumption of Ricardian households and an
increase in the private consumption of non-Ricardian households after
implementing a government spending expansion.
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2.4.2 Taxations Transmission
To examine the transmission of taxation, the taxation shocks, namely sales
tax shock, payroll tax shock, and capital tax shock, are introduced to the DSGE
model. A decrease of one percentage point of these taxation rates is introduced
to the small-open economy in period 1. These shocks follow the automatic
stabilizer process with a degree of tax innovation persistence at 0.9. Both the
internal and external economy are a¤ected by these innovations. The responses
of macroeconomic variables to each taxation shocks are examined as follows.
2.4.2.1 Sales tax shock
A sales tax is collected from consumption base, for example, a Value Added
Tax (VAT), which is imposed at a specic rate on every households
consumption. An increase in sales tax may directly a¤ect the purchasing power
of households and private consumption. Figure 2 presents the impulse response
function of a reduction in sales tax shock on the small-open economy. Similar to
government expenditure shock, there is a distinct di¤erence between domestic
rmsresponses and export rmsresponses, given the shock of a decrease in the
sales tax rate. A one percentage point lowering of the sales tax rate prompts
domestic rms to react with a moderate increase in their production during the
rst period. Later, the response in the domestic output to the tax shock
gradually increase, which contrasts with a surge in the rst period regarding the
response of the domestic output to the government expenditure shock. Domestic
output reaches its peak during the second quarter and a rise in domestic output
requires more factors of production; thus, domestic labour, domestic capital and
domestic intermediate goods are also increased. On the demand side, a lower
sales tax rate directly a¤ects private consumption, because, since an included tax
price of goods decreases, households agents have higher purchasing power. Such
agents can consume more goods with the same amount of income; thus, private
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consumption starts to rise. However, since a consumption habit persistently
lowers the consequences of tax reduction on consumption within the rst period,
a private consumption moderately adjusts and peaks during the second period.
The sales tax shock contributes to a positive wealth e¤ect. In the early stage of
the shock, the real wage and the real return on capital increase so that
households who have higher wealth can consume more goods. Nevertheless, in
the later period, a real wage sharply declines, while the real return on capital
considerably rises. In addition, the substitution e¤ect of sales tax shock is not
presented. The households do not substitute away from consumption to
supplying more labour. Sales tax shock also causes a crowding out e¤ect on
private investment, since private investment falls in the rst period as a result of
a rise in interest rate during the second period and an increase in the capital tax
from automatic stabilizers.
Although a reduction in the sales tax rate is designed to stimulate the domestic
side of the economy, an external side of the economy also responds to this shock. A
response by foreign exchange to the sales tax shock is di¤erent from the government
expenditure shock. The exchange rate depreciates in the rst period, because of
a decrease in the interest rate. In contrast, the exchange rate appreciates in the
second period when the interest rate increases. Responding to an adjustment of
the exchange rate, the export rmsoutput slightly rises in the rst period then
signicantly falls later. In contrast to the government expenditure shock, the
trade balance relatively improves during the rst period. However, it is clear that
a sales tax shock signicantly worsens a trade balance after this policy is fully
implemented. When combining a response in both domestic rmsoutput and
export rmsoutput, it is clear that a national output increases signicantly in
the rst period after a lowering of the sales tax rate. For the price level, after a
reduction in the sales tax, ination decreases because of a sudden drop in the price
of goods. However, ination signicantly increases within the second period after
an adjustment of aggregate demand. The central bank increases the interest rate
following an increase in ination and stabilizing the price level. The duration of
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Figure 2: The impulse responses function of macroeconomic variables to a one
percent decrease in sale tax rate
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sales tax shock impact is signicantly longer than the duration of the government
expenditure expansion shock. IRF shows that the positive impacts of the sales tax
shock on domestic output nally disappear within 7 periods, or almost 2 years, of
a quarterly basis after the shock is introduced.
2.4.2.2 Payroll tax shock
A payroll tax is based on the wage payment of the households labour
supply. An innovation of the payroll tax primarily a¤ects the labour supply of
households or employment. Figure 3 shows an impulse response function of
various macroeconomic variables when a one percentage point decrease in a
payroll tax shock hits the small-open economy. In contrast to a sales tax shock, a
payroll tax shock leads to a similar direction of the output response by domestic
rms and export rms. Both types of rms increase their production when facing
a lower payroll tax rate. A one percentage point lower payroll tax rate results in
a large increase in domestic rms production in the rst period and reaches its
peak during the second period. For export rms, the same shock also leads to a
rise in export rms production in the rst period. In order to enhance the
production, most of the factors of production of domestic rms and exports
expand, and only domestic capital lowers. The important role of payroll tax
shock is that a decrease in payroll tax rate substantially raises employment, with
total labour rising suddenly in the rst period and peaking in the second period.
Therefore, a payroll tax can be a useful government instrument for mitigating a
falling in employment during an economic downturn. Moreover, a payroll tax
shock signicantly causes a positive wealth e¤ect. Household agents substantially
increase their spending as a result of an increase in wealth from a higher return
on capital. Private consumption gradually rises in the rst period and reaches its
peak in the second period. This slowly increase in private consumption results
from a consumption habit persistence of household agents. Compared to a sales
tax shock, the impact of the payroll tax on wealth e¤ects is relatively large.
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Additionally, the substitution e¤ect of payroll tax shocks is not observed.
Households do not switch from consumption to supplying more labour.
Furthermore, private investment is denitely higher after a payroll tax shock is
introduced. This adjustment presents a noticeable crowding in from the e¤ect of
the payroll tax cut. Since an interest rate declines, rms can smoothly expand
their investments.
A payroll tax cut also impacts the external side of the economy. The exchange
rate depreciates during the rst period because of a decrease in the interest rate,
similarly to the response of a sales tax shock. This movement of the exchange
rate corresponds to a fall in interest rates. The depreciation of exchange rates
lead to a rise in export rmsoutputs. At the same time, an expansion of output
production gives an increase in the importation of intermediate goods. In contrast
to a sales tax shock, a payroll tax cut substantially improves the trade balance
because an increase in exports is higher than an increase in imports. Since both the
domestic rmsoutput and export rmsoutput are increased, a national output
considerably increases over the rst period after a lowering in the payroll tax rate.
Another interesting nding is that the impact of cutting the payroll tax rate lasts
longer than the impact of lowering the sales tax rate. It is apparent from the IRF
that these impacts nally dissolve within 24 to 30 periods, or 6 to 7.5 years, on a
quarterly basis, after the shock is rst introduced.
2.4.2.3 Return on capital tax shock
A return on capital of households is taxed by a capital tax, such as a capital
gain tax from security investments. An innovation of a capital income tax may
alter levels of capital and household consumption. Figure 4 demonstrates the
impulse response function of a one percentage point decrease in a capital tax rate
on the small-open economy. The result shows that there are some di¤erences
between an IRF of a capital tax shock and an IRF of previous tax shocks.
Similar to the sales tax shock, it is apparent that domestic rms and export rms
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Figure 3: The impulse responses function of macroeconomic variables to a one
percent decrease in payroll tax rate
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respond to a reduction of the capital tax rate in di¤erent positions. The nding
provides evidence that domestic rms react to a one percentage point lower
capital tax rate with an increase in production during the rst period. Then the
domestic output is gradually increased to its peak within 5 periods, or 1 year and
a quarter on a quarterly basis. This adjustment clearly contrasts with the
response of domestic output when facing a government expenditure shock, which
is a large surge in the rst period. As a consequence of rises in the domestic
output, all factors of production, such as domestic labour, domestic capital, and
domestic intermediate goods are increased. A lower capital tax rate directly
a¤ects the capital of both domestic and export. Since a lowering of the capital
tax rate can inuence householdsdecisions regarding the utilization of capital,
households gain extra returns on capital income after the capital tax rate is
lowered, and, hence, the supply of capital clearly increases during the rst
period. This nding highlights a wealth e¤ect of capital tax shock. A real return
on capital falls in the rst period while the real wage slightly increases. This can
lower householdsincomes and impact householdsspending. Although the IRF
of private consumption declines in the early stage of shock, it gradually rises
again after 12 periods. Moreover, the result shows a substitution e¤ect on
households, as households transition from consumption to supplying more labour
after the real return on capital falls. The capital tax shock also causes a crowding
in e¤ect, since private investment is higher in the rst period. The higher private
investment corresponds with the rise in capital.
On the external side, an innovation of capital tax impacts the nancial market.
Interestingly, in contrast with two prior tax shocks, a capital tax shock appreciates
the small-open economys exchange rate. The main inuence is a rise in interest
rates after the cutting of a payroll tax rate. In response to an appreciation of the
exchange rate, the export rms reduce their output in the rst period. Similar
to a government expenditure shock and a sales tax shock, a capital tax shock
worsens a trade balance, since an export declines while an import increases. A
lowering of capital tax also a¤ects price stability. When combined with a response
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Figure 4: The impulse responses function of macroeconomic variables to an one
percent decrease in capital tax rate
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of both the domestic rmsoutput and the export rmsoutput, a decrease in
the capital tax rate leads to an increase in national output in the medium term.
Considering price level, a reduction in the capital tax rate results in a fair rise in
ination. The duration of this policy impact is also longer than the duration of
the sales tax shock. The IRF presents that these impacts eventually vanish within
12 to 28 periods, or 3 to 7 years, on a quarterly basis after the shock is initially
implemented.
The nding of three tax shocks are consistent with ndings of past studies by
Forni et al. (2009), Faia, Lechthaler & Merkl (2010), Fernández-Villaverde (2010),
and Zubairy (2014) in various aspects. For example, a reduction of tax rates can
potentially lead to a medium-term increase in output, a impact of sale tax cut on
output growth is smaller than a impact of payroll tax cut (Fernández-Villaverde
2010), a reduction of payroll tax and capital tax shocks lead to a crowding in e¤ect
on private investment (Zubairy 2014), a reduction of payroll tax causes a crowding
in e¤ect on private consumption (Forni et al. 2009), and a reduction of capital tax
lead to a crowding out e¤ect of private consumption (Forni et al. 2009).
2.4.3 The Size of Fiscal Multipliers
The e¤ect of scal shocks on macroeconomic variables is usually calculated
in terms of multipliers. There are two general approaches for scal multiplier
calculation, with the rst being the impact multiplier, which is described as an
increase in the level of output, Y0 following a change in scal shock level when
a scal shock, F0, is introduced. An impact multiplier shows the e¤ect of scal
innovations on output in a short time period. An impact multiplier is dened as
Impact multiplier =
Y0
F0
(64)
In addition, the second approach for scal multiplier estimation is a present
value multiplier. The advantage of this method is that it can examine the size
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of scal impacts in a longer term horizon. The scal shocks impact in every
period is considered and totally summarized. An accumulative impact of scal
shock is presented at a given period, N . Moreover, a present value multiplier also
discounts the future e¤ect by multiplying with the interest rates discount factor.
The formula of present value multiplier is employed by the studies from Mountford
& Uhlig (2009) and Zubairy (2014).
Present value multiplier (in N period) =
Et
PN
j=0(1 +R)
 jYt+j
Et
PN
j=0(1 +R)
 j jFt+jj
(65)
Yt+j is the change of output from the steady-state value at time t + j and
Ft+j is the change of scal shock variable, such as government expenditure shock,
and taxation shock from the steady-state value at time t+j. The change of variable,
namely Yt+j and Ft+j; from the steady-state value can dened as follows:
Yt+j = %Yt+j  Y s (66)
Ft+j = %Ft+j  F s (67)
Where %Yt+j is a percentage deviation from the steady-state value of Y at time
t+ j , %Ft+j is a percentage deviation from a steady-state value of a scal shock
variable, such as a shock of government expenditure, and a shock of tax revenue at
time t+ j. Meanwhile, Y s and F s represent the steady-state values of output and
scal shock variables respectively. From the above denitions, an impact multiplier
is equal to a present value multiplier in the rst period, or quarter 1. Thus, the
results are reported as current value scal multipliers.
Table 3 shows the calculated present value of scal multipliers for the
domestic rmsoutput, the export rms output, and the national output. There
are two signs of present value scal multipliers, where the positive sign of present
value scal multipliers presents a stimulative e¤ect of scal shock on output and
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Table 3: The computed present value scal multipliers for domestic rm output,
export rm output, and national output
Present Value Fiscal Multipliers Quarter 1 1
2
Year 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years
Government Expenditure
Multiplier for
- Y D 0.88 0.68 0.49 0.25 -0.37
- Y X -0.63 -0.62 -0.43 -0.10 0.19
- Y N 0.25 0.06 0.06 0.14 -0.18
Sales tax Multiplier for
- Y D 0.03 0.27 0.32 0.22 -0.03
- Y X 0.05 -0.11 -0.21 -0.10 0.01
- Y N 0.08 0.17 0.11 0.12 -0.02
Payroll Tax Multiplier for
- Y D 0.09 0.26 0.37 0.44 0.46
- Y X 0.28 0.27 0.17 0.08 0.06
- Y N 0.37 0.52 0.54 0.52 0.52
Capital Tax Multiplier for
- Y D 0.18 0.16 0.22 0.28 0.16
- Y X -0.09 -0.08 -0.11 -0.11 0.20
- Y N 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.35
Where Y D is a domestic rm output, Y X is a export rm output, Y N is a national output
the negative sign of the present value scal multipliers presents either a
contractional e¤ect by the scal shock on output. The larger is the present value
scal multipliers, the higher is the stimulative e¤ect. This nding suggests that
the present value of the government expenditure multiplier for domestic rms
output, export rms output, and national output peak either in the rst period
or suddenly after the shock hits economy, which are 0.88, -0.63, and 0.25
respectively. These multipliers exponentially decay over the entire path.
Interestingly, the result reveals the signicant di¤erence of the present value
government expenditure multipliers between open and closed economies. The
nding indicates that the present value government expenditure multiplier for
the national output on the small-open economy is relatively small when
compared to results from closed economy studies, such as Blanchard & Perotti
(1999) and Zubairy (2014). The reason behind this di¤erence is that the
stimulative e¤ect of an increase in government expenditure is noticeably
mitigated by a sharp decline of the export rms output, which can be clearly
noticed from a negative present value government expenditure multiplier for
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export rms output. However, the nding shows some similarities with the
result from the closed economy model. As revealed in Table 3, a government
spending multiplier for Y D in this small-open economy is fairly similar (in both
of the magnitude and the adjustment of multipliers) to the government spending
multiplier for Y N in closed economy studies. These include studies by Blanchard
& Perotti (1999) and Furceri & Mourougane (2010), who examine the impact of
scal policy in Eurozone by using the DSGE scal model with endogenous
government bond yields, as well as Zubairy (2014). This similarity can imply
that the present small-open economy DSGE model includes the characteristics of
agents from the closed economy model.
In contrast to the present value government expenditure multiplier, the present
value taxation multipliers of all tax shocks, namely, sales tax shock, payroll tax
shock, and capital tax shock, improve over time. Most of the present value taxation
multipliers reach their peak within one year after taxation shocks are introduced,
except present value capital tax multipliers for the domestic rms output and
export rmsoutput, which slowly increase over time and reach their highest points
in two years. Moreover, the result highlights that the payroll tax had the most
stimulative e¤ect on national output, since the present value payroll multipliers for
national output is the largest among all taxation shocks. It reaches its peak at 0.54
within a year, a signicantly greater gure than the 0.35 and 0.17 of present value
multipliers associated with capital tax shocks and sales tax shocks, respectively.
The cause of a signicant high multiplier in the payroll tax shock is that both
domestic rms and export rms respond to taxation shock in the same direction,
which is a rise in their outputs. This outcome clearly contrasts with the e¤ects
of sales tax shock and capital tax shock, and both rms respond in the di¤erent
direction: domestic rms increase their output while export rms reduce their
output.
This result is consistent with ndings from past studies both in the structural
VAR literature and regarding the DSGE model within the closed economy
literature in many aspects. For example, a stimulative e¤ect of scal
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expansionary policies, such as an increase in government expenditure and a
decrease in taxation rate, on national output and a considerable large
government expenditure multiplier (close to 1.0), compared with a taxation
multiplier, are also found by Furceri & Mourougane (2010) and Zubairy (2014).
Furceri & Mourougane (2010) also found that a payroll tax rate shock has larger
taxation multiplier than one from a sales tax shock and a capital tax shock.
Furthermore, this nding is also along the lines of earlier studies by Furceri &
Mourougane (2010) and Zubairy (2014) nding a decay of the e¤ect of
government expenditure shocks over time and an accumulative e¤ect of taxation
shocks along the horizon. Lastly, the focus of this paper, the analysis of the
small-open economy country, is also investigated by Ilzetzki et al. (2013), who
employ a structural VAR approach for studying the impact of scal policies in 44
countries. They also concluded that scal multipliers in open economies are
smaller than scal multipliers in closed economies.
2.5 CONCLUSION
The present study has been designed to determine the e¤ect of scal policies,
including an increase in government expenditure shock and a reduction of various
tax rate shocks (sales tax, payroll tax, and capital tax), on macroeconomic
variables of small-open economies. The micro-founded medium-scale Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium model is employed for investigating the scal
policy impacts on a small-open economy, which is calibrated to Thailand
parameter. One of the more signicant ndings to emerge from this study is that
an increase in government expenditures has a signicantly positive impact on
domestic rms output. In contrast, export rms respond by lowering their
output, which is an export value. Thus, the national output of the small-open
economy increases moderately, which clearly contrasts with a number of cases
that have been studied by using the closed economy model. An increase in
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government expenditures, moreover, crowds out interest-sensitive variables, such
as the private investment and the private consumption. An external economic
stability also adjusts after the implementation of an increase in government
expenditure. Under exible exchange rates, the nding shows that an exchange
rate appreciates, while at the same time an export volume falls. This adjustment
leads to a decit in the trade balance. Most of the macroeconomic variables
instantly respond to an increase in government spending; however, the e¤ect
decays over time. These ndings enhance the understanding of the e¤ect of scal
policy on a small-open economy, which is an area that has been little discussed.
In addition, the reduction of the tax rate has a fair positive stimulative e¤ect
on domestic output and both positive and negative e¤ect on export rms,
depending on the type of tax. For example, a reduction of the payroll tax rate
stimulates an export rms output; in contrast, a reduction of the capital tax rate
worsens an export rms output. The results of this study indicate that a tax
innovation directly a¤ects households consumption decisions. Most of the
reductions of the tax rate, except a cutting of capital tax, result in a higher
private consumption. Moreover, most of the lower tax rate measures, except a
cutting of sales tax, lead to an increase in private investment. Similar to a
government spending shock, the evidence from this study suggests that a
taxation shock can also inuence the external stability of a small-open economy.
An exchange rate, export volume, and trade balance gradually respond to
taxation shocks. Several important results are found from the estimation of scal
multipliers. The impact multiplier of government spending on the national
output of the small-open economy is rather small (0.25); while impact multipliers
of sales tax, payroll tax, and capital tax are varied (0.08, 0.37, 0.09, respectively).
The result reveals that the stimulative impact of tax cut measure accumulates
over the horizon; in contrast, the impact of government spending continuously
decays. After one year of the scal policy implementing, the e¤ect of all
reductions of the tax rate surpasses the e¤ect of an increase in government
expenditures. Lastly, the present value of taxation multipliers examined by this
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study indicate that lowering the payroll tax is the most stimulative scal policy
for the small-open economy.
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Part 3
Optimal Taxes in a Small-Open
Economy with Imperfectly
Competitive Market and Habit
Formation Preferences.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This part studies the optimal taxation, namely the optimal capital income tax
and the optimal labour income tax, in a small-open economy with an imperfectly
competitive market and habit formation preferences. An imperfectly competitive
market arises from several factors, such as when rms invent a new product and
acquire patents or copyrights, when rms have increasing returns to the scale
production function, and when rms di¤erentiate their product (Judd 2002). In
this case, rms can inuence the price setting, rather than be price takers, and they
set a positive price mark-up over marginal costs. Since this condition can a¤ect
the rmsoptimization behaviour, it changes the optimal capital income tax rate.
Additionally, habit formation preferences are important in explaining consumers
behaviour (Ravn et al. 2006, Ljungqvist & Uhlig 2000). The households with
habit formation tend to smooth their consumption over the time and gradually
adjust their consumption when confronted with an income shock (Dynan 2000).
This type of preference obviously changes the householdsoptimization problem
and the dynamics of the demand facing the rms, which in turn changes rms
investment strategies. A change in the ways that rms behave can alter the optimal
tax policy, and this paper investigates this e¤ect.
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Early studies of optimal taxation consider a perfectly competitive market and
suggest that the optimal capital income tax on it is appeared to be zero (Chamley
1981, Judd 1985, Chamley 1986, Lucas 1990, Chari et al. 1991)8. Later, Judd
(1997) nd that the optimal capital income tax is negative in a closed economy with
an imperfectly competitive market, where production and investment are below the
competitive level and capital income subsidies can partly eliminate monopolistic
distortions. Guo & Lansing (1999) extends Judd (1997) s study by examining
the e¤ect of monopolistic power on the optimal capital income tax rate. They
assume that capital income gains should be taxed at the same rate as prot.
Their neoclassical growth model suggests that the optimal tax on capital can be
negative, positive or zero depending on two opposing e¤ects, namely an under-
investment e¤ect and a prot e¤ect. The under-investment e¤ect occurs when
rms invest less than the optimal level, since the interest rate is lower than the
marginal product of capital in an imperfectly competitive market, as in Judd
(1997), whereas the marginal product of capital is equal to the return on capital
in the perfectly competitive market. The prot e¤ect arises from the relatively
low distortion generated by the prot tax. The government can set a high prot
tax, because it does not a¤ect the households decision on whether to consume
or invest. They conclude that the sign of optimal capital tax depends on several
factors, such as the degree of imperfect competitiveness in the market and the size
of government spending. They nd that the optimal capital income taxes can be
in the range of -10 percent to 20 percent depending on the models parameters. A
positive capital income tax can be optimal in a model with heterogeneous agents,
as shown in Conesa, Kitao & Krueger (2009). They quantitatively analyze the
optimal capital income and labour tax by using an overlapping generation model.
Their results indicate considerable positive optimal capital income and labour taxes
at 36 percent and 23 percent, respectively.
It is interesting to see the e¤ect of economic openness on the optimal capital
8Lucas (1990) investigates the e¤ect of tax change on long-run economic growth by developing
the human capital accumulation and endogenous growth to model of Chamley (1986).
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income tax. In an open economy, the trade of goods and services can potentially
impact the exchange rates adjustment and interest rates response to scal
policies. Realizing the gap in the extant literature, more research is needed to
investigate the optimal capital income tax in small-open economy. This paper
seeks to address the following questions: i) Is optimal capital income tax in a
small-open economy with an imperfectly competitive market di¤erent from the
optimal capital income tax in a closed economy?, ii) Does it require the same
level of tax subsidy as in a closed economy?, and iii) How do habit formation
preferences a¤ect capital taxation?. According to Ravn et al. (2006), deep habits
preferences create a negative correlation between the price mark-up and economic
growth (countercyclical mark-up). The price mark-up is lower in an economic
boom, because rms have incentives to buy habits when aggregate demand is
high. Therefore, rms reduce their prices below the level that maximizes the
current prot in order to gain more market shares and generate higher prots in
the future. Hence, it is worthwhile to investigate the e¤ect of deep habit
preferences on optimal capital tax in an imperfectly competitive market.
This thesis employs a small-open economy framework adopted from Tanboon
(2008). The Ramsey problem is employed as the principle approach to
investigate an optimal capital income and labour taxes. The Ramsey problem
involves household utility maximization in an economy with several constraints
imposed by households behaviors, rms prot maximization and budget
implementability. This paper chooses Thailand, a small-open economy country
with an imperfectly competitive market for calibrating the models parameters.
In addition, this paper discusses the factors that a¤ect optimal taxation in a
small-open economy, including price mark-up, habit-formation, government debt,
and government expenditure.
The study is composed of two parts: model simulation and the analysis of the
results. In the rst part, the Ramsey problem is solved numerically in order to
calculate the optimal capital income and labour income taxes. The procedure
consists of maximizing the households utility subject to necessary constraints,
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deriving the rst-order conditions of the Lagrangian problem with respect to
involved variables, calculating steady-state equations, and solving for the optimal
capital income and labour tax rates. The model is parameterized by using
economic data on Thailand.
The analysis investigates the factors that inuence the simulations results
regarding optimal taxation. Several simplications are made to ensure the
tractability of the model, such as applying a zero investment adjustment cost and
a fully exible wage and price. The focusing factors are trade openness, an
imperfectly competitive market and habit preferences. There are three models in
the analytical section, which are i) a simple closed economy model with an
imperfectly competitive market, ii) a closed economy model with an imperfectly
competitive market and deep habit preferences, and iii) a small-open economy
model.
This study contributes to our knowledge by addressing three important
issues. Firstly, it discovers the optimal capital income and labour tax in a small,
open economy with an imperfectly competitive market and habit-formation. The
nding can be utilized as guidance by the scal policy-makers of a small-open
economy country, such as Thailand. Secondly, the result illustrates the role of an
imperfectly competitive market for the optimal capital income and labour tax
rates in a small, open economy. The optimal taxation can help to mitigate the
distortion in domestic rmsproduction and improve economic welfare. Lastly,
the present paper explores the e¤ect of habit formation, including deep habit
preferences, on optimal taxation.
The paper is divided into ve sections. Section 3.2 summarizes the relevant
economic literature. It thoroughly examines di¤erent types of economic model
assumptions that inuence the level of the optimal capital income tax rate. It
also reviews di¤erent approaches for estimating optimal tax design. Finally, it
revises the main ndings. Section 3.3 explains the structure of the small-open
economy model used for the numerical investigation. The model shares a number
of components with the rst part of this paper, which is an extension of Tanboon
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(2008). It includes habit-adjusted consumption, nominal and real rigidities in
wage and prices, the exporting sector and nancial frictions. The economic
behaviors of ve economic agents, namely, households, rms, lenders, government
and the central bank, are described. Moreover, the market clearing conditions,
the steady-state conditions, and the model parameterscalibration, which is the
best explanation of Thailands economy, are thoroughly presented. Section 3.3
also puts forward the Ramsey approach to optimal taxation. The approach is
composed of constructing the Ramsey problem, which involves householdsutility
maximization. This section also shows a steady-state equation and how to solve
for the optimal capital income tax, optimal labour tax and the Lagrange
multipliers by reducing the number of equations. Section 3.4 shows the
simulation results of the optimal capital income tax and labour income tax, as
well as the sensitivity analysis of the relationship between the domestic price
mark-up and the optimal capital income tax. Section 3.5 analyses the numerical
results by investigating a number of simplied models. It presents the analytical
results of the closed economy and small-open economy models. Section 3.6
concludes the study of optimal taxation in a small-open economy with an
imperfectly competitive market condition and habit-formation preferences.
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW
This section reviews the main literature on optimal taxation. Firstly, it
describes various economic theories used in the design of the tax code. It
explains the principle of optimal taxation, which will be a great value for
exploring the remaining chapters. Then, it provides a more focused review of the
optimal capital income tax literature.
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3.2.1 Theory of optimal taxation
Most forms of taxation distort the economy. Labour income taxes
disincentives workers, distort the labour market and eventually lead to an
ine¢ ciency in production. Sales taxes cause higher prices and discourage buyers
from purchasing goods and services. Capital income taxes potentially reduce
investment.
However, Pigou (1920) argues that some taxation improves welfare, as it can
reduce negative externalities by equalizing the private and social costs of economic
actions. Forms of taxation, such as the environmental pollution tax, can increase
e¢ ciency in resource allocation (Sandmo 1976). Another tax that does not distort
is a land value tax, which applies levies undeveloped land. This tax does not
distort the economy, because the land supply is not a¤ected by introducing this
land value tax; the land supply is typically xed. The estates owner cannot pass
on higher costs to tenants or consumers.
Setting an appropriate tax rate under a specic environment is an important
task for policymakers. As mistakes can be very expensive, policymakers usually
analyze the impact of new tax policies prior to implementation. The aggregate
welfare of the taxpayers and macroeconomic variables (taxpayersconsumption,
capital accumulation, and labour supply, for example) should be thoroughly
investigated in both the short-term and long-term (Hubbard, Judd, Hall &
Summers 1986). To minimize the distortion, an optimal tax theory is introduced.
The optimal taxation is the theory of planing the tax system that decreases
ine¢ ciency and distortions in the economy (Slemrod 1989). A distortion can
arise from taxation and increase the cost of production. The rise in cost leads to
a higher retail price, which a¤ects both rms and households. The objective of
optimal taxation is to minimize this distortion while maintaining su¢ cient funds
for government spending. The optimal tax theory suggests how the government
sets the level of tax rates that maximise the households utility, subject to
economic constraints. The economy constraints are composed of several
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optimization problems faced by economic agents, such as a decision on the labour
supplied by households, a decision on the production of rms, and a decision on
capital usage.
In some models, taxes are used for the e¢ cient redistribution of resources. For
example, in an economy with heterogeneous earnings, redistribution can improve
social welfare, as a small loss to the rich can generate a large gain to the poor in
terms of utility. This is because of the convexity of the householdspreferences
with respect to their consumption. In addition, a redistribution tax may improve
welfare, as it provides an insurance against illness or other losses of income that
are above the control of economic agents.
The least distorting taxes are collected in the form of lump-sums, which
means that the tax duty does not depend on economic activities. Because of this
characteristic, lump-sum taxes do not a¤ect the behaviour of consumers and
producers; therefore, they do not distort the economy (Sandmo 1976). However,
Sandmo (1976) explains that a lump-sum tax cannot be implemented for long
period in a heterogeneous economy, as a household with di¤erent earnings should
be subjected to di¤erent tax duties. In an economy that has an elasticity of total
tax to total income greater than one, rational households may change their
behavior on consumption or work after realizing that the current tax scheme is a
progressive tax scheme.
In 1972, the theory of optimal taxation was introduced by Frank P. Ramsey.
He proposes the theory for the optimal commodity sales tax that allows the
government to raise certain tax revenues while minimizing the loss to households
utility (Ramsey 1927). The result shows that the consumption tax rate should be
set in inverse relation to the sum of the price elasticities of demand and supply.
His study has become an extensive foundation for optimal taxation theory. There
are a number of notable studies built upon Ramsay, such as Diamond & Mirrlees
(1971), Chamley (1986), Lucas (1990) and Chari et al. (1991). This paper will
also use Ramseys approach in investigating the optimal capital income tax.
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3.2.2 Capital income tax
Depending on a models assumption, the optimal capital income tax can be
positive, negative, or zero. Chamley (1986) adopted neoclassical growth models
with innitely lived agents. He used a general form utility function to assess
e¢ ciency and concludes that the optimal capital income tax rate is zero in the
long run. Afterwards, a number of studies have expanded his ndings in several
models, such as a life-cycle model, an endogenous growth model with human capital
accumulation, and an open economymodel (Hubbard et al. 1986, Lucas 1990, Chari
et al. 1991, Razin & Sadka 1995). Their ndings indicate a zero optimal capital
income tax.
Hubbard et al. (1986) s study employs the life-cycle model with liquidity
constraints to investigate the impact of liquidity constraints on a taxpayers
consumption, saving, and labour supply in both the short-run and long-run.
Their result shows that a decrease in capital income taxation, which is nanced
by an increase in labor income taxation, contributes to an increase in taxpayer
welfare. In addition, the welfare gain is sensitive to a taxpayers saving and the
ability of taxpayers borrowing to nance rising labour income taxes. Another
well-known optimal capital taxation study is by Lucas (1990). He uses the
human capital accumulation and endogenous growth model to investigate the
e¤ect of tax changes on long-run economic growth. His model is based on the
innitely lived agent models by Chamley (1986). He argues that removing the
U.S. capital income tax can raise long-run capital stocks and long-run
consumption by around 35 and 7 percent, respectively. Moreover, when
translating into welfare gain, the eliminating of capital taxation can improve the
United Stateswelfare by about 1 percent. The explanation of his zero optimal
capital tax result is that, under the Ramsey taxation problem, policymakers
should tax identical goods equally. The value of current consumption equal to
the discounted value of the future consumption is converted from savings and
rewarded with the interest rate. Therefore, the net present value of savings is
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equal to the value of the current consumption. Since the capital income tax
targets the next periods consumption greater than the current periods
consumption, the capital income tax is not optimized for economy and should be
eliminated (Aiyagari 1995). Lucas (1990) s study has strongly inuenced the
standard view held by most economists in favour of abolishing the capital tax.
Friedman (2009) suggests that eliminating a corporate tax can be the most
essential and e¤ective measure for minimizing the rmsmonopolistic power. The
reform of tax laws is a necessary step.
The literature on optimal taxation has expanded to include the open economy
model, as seen in studies such as Gordon (1992), Razin & Sadka (1995), Correia
(1996) and Chari & Kehoe (1999). The open economy models main di¤erences in
comparison with others are that it allows international transaction between two
countries and includes a capital ow. Most of the literatures ndings on optimal
capital taxation in an open economy are not di¤erent from its ndings regarding
a closed economy. Most of the studiesresults present a zero optimal capital tax
in an open economy. Gordon (1992) studies the optimal capital income tax in a
small-open economy with the double taxation convention. His model nds a zero
optimal capital tax in a country without a dominant capital exporter. Razin &
Sadka (1995) follows the innitely lived agent model of Lucas (1990) in the analysis
of a small-open economy. Their result presents a zero optimal capital income tax in
a small-open economy in every period when capital is perfectly mobile. However,
introducing a zero optimal capital income tax in a steady-state and non-steady-
state may not satisfy a treasury and government in terms of revenue collection.
Correia (1996) studies the e¤ect of perfect capital mobility on optimal capital
taxation. She employs an innite horizontal model similar to Razin & Sadka
(1991). Her open economy model shows a similar result, a zero optimal capital
income tax, with the closed economy model. Chari et al. (1991) uses a primal
approach to calculate optimal taxation. Their approach describes how to plan
both scal policy and monetary policy in the long-run. The results show a high
optimal capital income tax in the rst period and a continually zero optimal capital
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income tax after the rst period. The optimal labour income tax is approximately
constant over the horizon.
By contrast, some recent studies suggest that setting a capital tax rate at
zero may not be optimal. Judd (1997), Guo & Lansing (1999) and Judd (2002)
nd a negative optimal capital income tax in an imperfectly competitive market.
Judd (1997) examines the optimal taxation problem in the closed economy with an
imperfectly competitive market. He nds that the most optimal capital income tax
is negative. Subsidies for purchasing capital goods help to reduce the distortion in
an imperfectly competitive market, which raises capital goodsprices higher than
their marginal costs. In addition, he suggests that the sectors with higher mark-
ups should receive more tax credits. For example, when equipment has a higher
tax mark-up than its construction. An investment tax credit should be provided
that is more than the equipments construction.
A study by Judd (1997) is extended by Guo & Lansing (1999). They
introduce the neoclassical growth model to investigate the e¤ect of monopolistic
power on the optimal capital income tax. They state that a monopoly fosters an
ine¢ cient market that has both less capital and output than a perfectly
competitive market. The results show that the steady-state optimal tax on
capital can be negative, positive or zero. The sign of optimal capital tax is
dependent on two opposing e¤ects, namely the under-investment e¤ect and the
prot e¤ect. The under-investment e¤ect causes a negative capital income tax.
This e¤ect occurs when rms invest less than the optimal level, because the
interest rate is lower than marginal product of capital in an imperfectly
competitive market. In contrast, the marginal product of capital is equal to the
return on capital in the perfectly competitive market. The prot e¤ect leads to a
positive capital income tax. The prot e¤ect arises when the monopolistic rms
generate prot. The government can tax all of these prots, because the prot of
monopolistic rms does not a¤ect the householdsdecisions. They conclude that
the signs of optimal capital tax depend on several factors, such as the degree of a
markets imperfect competitiveness, the level of tax on the monopolistic rms
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prots, and the size of government spending. Moreover, their empirical results
shows that optimal capital income taxes are in the range of -10 percent to 20
percent.
Additionally, Aiyagari (1995) and Conesa et al. (2009) indicate a positive
optimal capital income tax. Aiyagari (1995) uses the Bewley class of models,
including the incomplete insurance markets and borrowing constraints. He
suggests that an optimal tax rate on capital income is positive, even in the
long-run. Lowering the capital income tax to zero can worsen economic welfare.
Conesa et al. (2009) quantitatively applies the overlapping generations model to
nd the optimal capital and labour income taxes. Their model includes a tight
borrowing constraint subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk. Their
result shows a signicantly positive optimal tax on both capital income tax and
labour income tax at 36 percent and 23 percent respectively.
The diverse ndings on optimal capital income may arise from certain
assumptions in the model frameworks. The studies that presents a negative
capital income tax mostly include an imperfectly competitive market in their
model. The negative capital income tax may reduce the distortion in an
imperfectly competitive market by narrowing the prot gap between rms. On
the other hand, most of the positive optimal capital tax literature has two
important assumptions. The rst assumption is related to the households
borrowing constraints. According to Conesa et al. (2009), households desire to
accumulate capital stock under the incomplete insurance market. The households
may face borrowing constraints that inuence them to accumulate more capital
in the next period. This accumulation of capital brings a smaller pre-tax return
on capital than a rate of time preference. Therefore, to balance the rate of
pre-tax returns on capital and the rate of time preference, the positive capital tax
should be employed for eliminating a capital accumulation (Aiyagari 1995). The
second assumption is the type of calculated model. A number of the studies that
employ the life cycle models, also called the overlapping generations models,
mostly nd a positive optimal capital income tax. A further research on above
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assumptions will be useful and valuable for taxation analysis. This thesis aims to
discover the inuence the optimal capital income tax.
3.3 OPTIMAL TAXATION IN SMALL OPEN
ECONOMY
This section explains the procedure for deriving the optimal taxation in a
small-open economy. The optimal taxation model is same as the model presented
in the previous chapter, which is the extension of Tanboon (2008). Now, we assume
that the government maximizes a representative households welfare function by
choosing a payroll tax and a capital income tax. The government has a new
scal rule and budget constraint. All equations describing private behavior are
summarized in Appendix B.1. All equations except stated are presented in real
terms.
This section explains the procedure for deriving optimal taxation in a small-
open economy. The rst step is constructing the Ramsey problem. The households
utility is maximized subject to constraints imposed by the private sectors behavior.
The second step is nding the rst-order conditions of the Lagrangian problem with
respect to endogenous variables. This step provides several important equations
that are used to derive the optimal tax rate.
3.3.1 Ramsey problem
The governments problem is how to choose an optimal taxation system that
maximizes the discounted and expected lifetime household utility. In order to solve
for optimal taxation, the Ramsey problem is written in the Lagrangian form. This
equation aims to nd a tax rate that maximizes the householdswelfare by giving
the optimized behavior of households and rms.
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The Ramsey equilibrium requires solving the following problem
maxE0
1X
t=0
t
n
U( ~Ct) + V (Lt)
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(68)
, subject to the households decision constraint equation (5), (157), (160),
(161), (163), (164), (165), debt balance constraint equation (184), domestic rms
decision constraint equation (21), (30), (169), (170), (171), export rmsdecision
constraint equation (32), (175), (176), (177), banks decision constraint equation
(44), government constraint equation (182), (183), central bank constraint
equation (52), and market clearing condition constraint equation (53).
For clarity, the Lagrangian form of the Ramsey problem (L) is presented as
follows:
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, where L = L1+L2+L3; it for i = f1; 2; :::; 22g are the Lagrangian multipliers
from the i constraint.
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3.3.2 The rst-order condition
This step involves nding the rst-order conditions of the Lagrangian problem
(L) with respect to considered variables, which are C; dt; It; t; wt; LDt ; LXt ; rK ;
qDt ; q
K
t ; bt; b
G
t ; K
D
t ; K
X
t ; R
L; st; Y
D
t ; Y
X
t ; M
D
t ; M
X
t ; Gt; (1+Rt); 
k
t ; 
w
t : The detail
of 24 rst-order conditions of the Lagrangian problem are shown in Appendix B.3
.
3.3.3 The steady-state condition
This section illustrates how steady-state conditions are constructed. Firstly,
the growth rates for all variables in all agentsdecision equations and the Ramsey
problem equations are set at zero, which implies that a quantity of all variables
does not change over time. The steady-state of variable xt is expressed by
xt
xt 1
= : (72)
Where  = 1: xt denotes all model variables in current period and xt 1 denotes
all model variables in previous period.
Similarly, the change of the price level, namely ination, is also set to zero
(t = 1). This condition ensures that all variables must not explode or collapse.
Secondly, the steady-state equations are arranged by grouping and ordering the
 terms. This is useful for solving variables in the next section. In the present
model, there are 24 steady-state equations of the rst-order condition. The details
of all steady-state equations are described in Appendix B.4.
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3.4 SIMULATION RESULTS OF OPTIMAL
TAXES
This section explains the process of calculating the optimal capital income
tax and the payroll tax. In order to solve for optimal taxation, all unknown
variables of non-linear equations system have to be calculated. There are three
essential steps to determine all unknown variables. The rst step is nding the
steady-state value of all variables in the steady-state equations of the small-open
economy model (using Table 18). This procedure is similar to the one in the rst
part, as it includes reducing the number of equations by equation substitutions
and establishing a value for each parameter in the model. After reducing the
number of equations to four, the steady-state system can be simply solved by
using numerical computation software such as Matlab. The second step involves
compacting the system of steady-state equations of the Ramsey problems
rst-order condition. Similarly, the process of reducing the size of this model is
equation substitution. Since substituting 24 equations is a complicated task, a
symbolic mathematical computation programme, such as Wolfram Mathematica,
is used for reducing the number of equations. In the present paper, the number
of equations is decreased to 5 equations. The third step is solving for the 24
unknown variables (1;2;:::;22;  kt ; 
w
t+1). A numerical computation programme
(Matlab) is employed for solving the 5 equations model from the previous step.
The software determines the 5 unknown variables and calculates the value of all
24 variables.
The numerical result suggests that the optimal capital income tax is -7.97%.
The result is consistent with the ndings of Guo et al. (1995), Judd (1997), Judd
(2002), Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2006) and Koehne & Kuhn (2013), which
indicate a negative optimal capital income tax. The optimal capital income tax is
in the range of Guo & Lansing (1999) and Domeij (2005) ndings, as it is
between -10% to 20% and -8% to 8% respectively. The negative value of the
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optimal capital income tax shows that, at steady-state, the government has to
subsidize the taxation on the capital owner. However, interestingly, this result is
contrary to former study conducted by Chamley (1981), Judd (1985), Chamley
(1986), Hubbard et al. (1986), Lucas (1990), Chari et al. (1991) and Razin &
Sadka (1995), which conclude that the optimal capital income tax is zero. The
contrasting results may arise from the di¤erence between the models
characteristics and those of previous models. The studies that nd a negative
optimal capital income tax shares some similar features such as inherent
distortion. Their models allow an imperfectly competitive market in the economy
while the papers that found a zero optimal income tax study a perfectly
competitive market. The intuitive explanation is that, under the Ramsey
taxation problem, policymakers should tax identical goods equally in a perfectly
competitive market. According to Atkinson & Stiglitz (1976) and Lucas (1990),
the value of current consumption equal to the discounted value of the future
consumption. Saving is used as a channel to transfer consumption to the future.
If government use positive capital tax, the consumption in the next period will
bring a higher implied capital tax rate than the capital tax rate today, which is
not optimized for economy. Under the rst welfare theorem and iso-elastic utility,
it is optimal to set uniform commodity taxation and, hence, zero optimal capital
tax for the second best optimum. In contrast, the rst welfare theorem does not
hold in the imperfectly competitive market. Firms invest under the optimal level,
because the interest rate, which inuences lmsdecision on investment, is lower
than a marginal product of capital (Guo & Lansing 1999). Under-investment
directly leads to the ine¢ cient economy. The usage of capital is lower than in the
perfectly competitive market; therefore, the output decreases (Guo et al. 1995).
To remove the monopolistic distortion and restore production and investment,
the government has to subsidize the capital income tax, since subsidizing this tax
can stimulate investment by rms and eliminate the ine¢ cient in the production.
In addition, the present studys result shows that the optimal payroll tax is
13.32%. This implies that the government has to tax payroll income in order to
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Figure 5: Optimal tax rate over the range of the domestic price markup.
raise revenue, since the present model does not allow lump-sum taxation. In
contrast to capital income tax, which is used to correct the distortion of
monopolistic power in an imperfectly competitive market, the payroll tax is
employed for nancing most of the government spending. The nding is
consistent with those of previous studies by Guo et al. (1995) and Judd (1997).
They nd a positive optimal payroll tax under both an imperfectly competitive
market and a perfectly competitive market.
The e¤ect of a domestic price mark-up on the optimal taxation is shown in
gure 5. In the perfectly competitive market, where the domestic price markup
is equal to one, the result illustrates that the optimal capital income tax is zero.
This nding is consistent with the studies of Chamley (1986) and Lucas (1990).
In contrast, when the domestic price markup greater than 1, the optimal capital
income subsidy (negative tax) is higher, as the domestic price markup increases.
This result is consistent with the nding of Guo et al. (1995) and Domeij (2005)
in an imperfectly competitive market. Intuitively, the government has to provide
more subsidies when the rms have higher monopolistic power. This e¤ort tries
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to eliminate the distortion in an imperfectly competitive market.
With regard to the negative capital income tax result, it is important for
policymakers to interpret the numerical result with caution. The negative capital
income tax may satisfy an optimal taxation problem with an imperfectly
competitive market in theory but not a government revenue collection in
practice. In policy-making, policymakers (such as civil o¢ cers) and academics
may have di¤erent conclusions regarding the same problem, since they have
di¤erent assumptions and constraints. Learning from each other provides useful
interpretations when policy-making in the real world. Translating a theoretical
result to an e¤ective implementation is an important task. In addition, there are
several factors that support a positive capital income tax, such as tax avoidance.
A negative capital taxation can be used for tax avoidance. Implementing a
negative capital taxation will attract more rms to report their income as a
return on capital.
However, apart from an imperfectly competitive market, the factors that lead
to the negative optimal capital income tax may arise from other components. It is
interesting to deeply investigate the e¤ect of those parameters on optimal taxation.
A careful examination of the cause of negative optimal capital income taxation is
introduced in the next section, the analytical results.
3.5 ANALYTICAL RESULTS
This section thoroughly investigates the factors that cause a negative
optimal capital income taxation in a small-open economy, as indicated in the
previous section. Since the small-open economy model consists of a large number
of equations (counted for 48 equations), it is important to explore how each of
the assumptions a¤ects the size of the optimal income taxes. In order to analyze
the pure e¤ect of some distortions, the others are taken out of the model. For
example, we will examine the model without investment adjustment cost, wage
and price rigidities. In particular, we will analyze three factors that can
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potentially cause economic distortion: imperfect competition, the governments
need to implement a sustainable budget without lump-sum taxation and the
external e¤ect on prices due to economic openness.
This section is divided into two parts. The rst part analyzes the simple closed
economy. This part examines the e¤ect of openness of economy on the optimal tax.
The result will be compared to the small-open economy model. In addition, the
e¤ect of the amount of government debt is explored. The second part investigates
the simple small-open economy. The role of monopolistic power is considered here.
The e¤ect of domestic price markup on the optimal taxation is studied.
The main ndings can be summarized as follows. An optimal capital income
tax rate negatively depends on price mark-up (an inverse of real marginal cost)
in all models, which are 1) closed economy with an imperfectly competitive
market (D > 1) and budget constraint, 2) open economy with an imperfectly
competitive market and 3) closed economy with deep habit preferences. In the
case of constant price mark-up, D is not varied over the time, and the economy
has a tax smoothing. Both capital and labour income are smooth and do not
uctuate over the time horizon. In contrast, the closed economy with deep habit
preferences has a variable price markup, Dt , which can be vary with shocks such
as a productivity shock. Therefore, the optimal capital income tax is not
constant over time and it is not smooth. The details of these ndings are
described in the following section.
3.5.1 The simple closed economy model with an
imperfectly competitive market
In this section, the simple closed economy is constructed by setting the
following assumptions: domestic rms (without the export rms) are the
producers, there are no investment adjustment costs, there are no wage
adjustment costs, and there are no domestic price rigidities. The model is
reduced to the simple small model, which is composed of 10 equations. The
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model details are shown as follows.
The households budget constraint.
Ct+It+dt = [1 +Rt 1] dt 1
1
t
+(1 wt )wtLt+

1  (1  )  kt

rktKt+Y
D
t

1  1
D

(73)
The capital accumulation
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + It; (74)
The capital decision
1 = Et
Ct
Ct+1

1  (1  )  kt+1

rKt+1 + (1  )

(75)
The labour supply decision
(1  wt )wt = w'LLtCt (76)
The optimal deposit
1
Ct
= rt+1
1
Ct+1
(77)
The domestic rms production function
Y Dt = (AtL
D
t )
DL (KDt )
1 DL (78)
The domestic rms labour demand
DwtL
D
t = 
D
LY
D
t (79)
The domestic rms capital decision
DrKt K
D
t =
 
1  DL

Y Dt (80)
The market clearing condition for domestic output
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Y Dt = Ct + It +Gt (81)
The government budget constraint
dt = rtdt 1 +Gt   wt wtLt   (1  )  kt rKt Kt (82)
Equation 82 can be rewritten in the implementability constraint form as below
(See details in Appendix B.5).
 A0 =
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
'LL+1t Ct  
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
Ct +
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
 
D   1 (wtLt)
+
1X
t=0
t+1
1
Ct+1
 
D   1  rKt+1Kt+1 (83)
Where A0 is the initial wealth of consumer (A0 > 0) and assumed as
A0 =
1
C0
r0d 1 +
1
C0
 
(1  ) + (1  )  k0rK0 + D
 
rK0

K0 (84)
The Ramsey equilibrium requires solving the following problem
maxE0
1X
t=0
t fU(Ct) + V (Lt)g (85)
subject to the householdsdecision constraint equation (73), (74), (75), (76),
(77), the domestic rmsdecision constraint equation (78), (79), (80), government
constraint equation (82), and the market clearing condition constraint equation
(81).
The Lagrangian form of the Ramsey problem (Lc) and the rst-order conditions
of the Lagrangian problem (Lc) with respect to considered variables, which are Ct;
Lt; Kt+1; Yt; rt+1; r
k
t ; 
k
t+1; 
w
t ; wt; are presented in Appendix B.6. It is important
to realize that   of the implementability constraint is not dependent on time, which
is contrasted to t and   < 0 (optimality condition).
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At steady-state, the rst-order conditions of Kt and Lt are as follows:
0 = 

DrKt+1 + (1  )
 1+  D   1
D



DrKt+1  
Y
C
 
DrKt+1 + (1  )

+
Y
C

(86)
0 =  (1  wt ) + D +  ( + 1)(1  wt )   

Y
C
  1
 
D   1 (87)
The above equations show that some parameters and exogenous variables
may a¤ect the optimal tax rate, such as a domestic price markup (D), an
implementability constraint multiplier ( ); and a government debt level (d): The
next section explains the investigation of the e¤ect of those parameters and
exogenous variables on the optimal taxation.
3.5.1.1 The optimal taxation of the simple closed economy model with
an imperfectly competitive market
This section studies the e¤ect of a domestic price mark-up (D), an
implementability constraint multiplier ( ); and a government debt level (d) on
two types of economies: i) The closed economy with an imperfectly competitive
market ( > 1) and lump-sum transfers (  = 0); ii) the closed economy with
perfectly competitive market ( = 1). The details of the closed economy model
calculation and the optimal taxation results of each environment are shown as
follows.
1) The closed economy with an imperfectly competitive market and
lump-sum transfers
Proposition 1 In the closed economy with an imperfectly competitive market
(D > 1) as described above, if lump-sum transfers are allowed (government does
not concern to any costs of debt (  = 0), the implementability constraint
multiplier is equal to zero. It is optimal to subsidize both the labour tax and
capital income tax. Both tax rates are negative.
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Proof. When   = 0; equations (86) and (87) are reduced to
1

= Et
Ct
Ct+1

DrKt+1 + (1  )

(88)
wt = 1  D < 0 (89)
From equation (75)
1

= Et
Ct
Ct+1

1  (1  )  kt+1

rKt+1 + (1  )

Since the left-hand side of equation (75) and equation (88) are both equal to 1

; it
can show that
Et
Ct
Ct+1

1  (1  )  kt+1

rKt+1

= Et
Ct
Ct+1

DrKt+1

 kt+1 =
1  D
1   < 0 (90)
The calculation illustrates that, in a closed economy with an imperfectly
competitive market (D > 1) and lump-sum transfers (  = 0), both the optimal
labour tax and optimal capital income tax are negative. It is optimal for the
government to subsidize both taxes, since subsidizing the capital income tax can
mitigate the resulting distortion in an imperfectly competitive market. In
addition, the subsidy in the labour tax is available because the lump-sum tax is
allowed in this economy. The result also shows that the optimal taxation of the
closed economy with an imperfectly competitive market and lump-sum transfers
smooths over time. The optimal labour tax and capital income tax depend on
price mark-up, which does not change over time. The cost of government revenue
raising to nance a uctuation in the government expenditure is minimized.
2) The closed economy with perfectly competitive market
Proposition 2 In a closed economy with a perfectly competitive market ( =
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1) as described above, if lump-sum are not available (which is often a realistic
assumption), it is optimal to set the capital tax to zero and use the labour tax as a
debt sustainable measure.
Proof. When  = 1; equation (86) and (87) are reduced to
1

= rKt+1 + 1   (91)
wt = 1 
1
(1   ( + 1)) (92)
Since the optimality condition implies that   < 0, thus, wt > 0. From equation
(75)
1

= Et
Ct
Ct+1

1  (1  )  kt+1

rKt+1 + (1  )

Since the left hand side of equation (75) and equation (91) are both equal to 1

; it
can show that
Et
Ct
Ct+1

1  (1  )  kt+1

rKt+1 + (1  )

= rKt+1 + 1  
 kt+1 = 0 (93)
Hence, in a closed economy with a perfectly competitive market where D = 1
and lump-sum transfers are not available; the optimal capital income tax is zero
and the optimal labour tax is positive. In this case, it is optimal for the government
to set the capital income tax to zero and use the labour tax as a debt sustainable
policy.
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3.5.2 The simple closed economy model with an
imperfectly competitive market and deep habit
preferences
This model extends Judd (1997) s study on optimal capital income tax by
introducing deep habit formation preferences. The main di¤erence in deep habit
formation preferences and standard habit formation preferences, which is
employed in the rst paper, is that the deep habit formation preferences consider
the habit over individual varieties of goods while standard habit formation
preferences deal with a habit of aggregate goods. Agent forms deep habit over
particular categories of goods, for example, favorite travel place, preferred
automobile (Ravn et al. 2006). The deep habit formation preferences changes
rmsdecision as a future sale is depended on today sale. The empirical study of
Chintagunta, Kyriazidou & Perktold (2001) conrms that the consumers brand
choice in the past crucially inuences today consumers brand choice. According
to Ravn et al. (2006), a price mark-up and economic growth are negatively
correlated under deep habit formation preferences, or price markup is
counter-cyclical. Therefore, it can be expected that the optimal capital income
tax for a closed economy with an imperfectly competitive market and deep habit
preferences should be higher during economic growth and lower during
recessions. In order to test this hypothesis, the model is constructed as follows.
3.5.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of innitely-lived households, each of which consumes
a basket of continuum di¤erentiated goods, Ct(i); i 2 [0; 1]. Following Ravn et al.
(2006), this paper assumes that the value of the consumption basket, Xt; depends
on the depth of the household habits.
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X
 1

t =
1Z
0

Ct(i)  Ct 1(i)
  1
 di (94)
Where Ct 1(i) is an aggregate consumption in the previous period, which is
exogenously given.  and  2 [0; 1] is habit persistence and   . The parameter
 > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between goods indexed i. Ravn et al. (2006)
shows that the habit persistence implies the following aggregated demand function
for good i
Ct (i) =

pt (i)
Pt
  
Ct   

Ct 1

+


Ct 1 (i) (95)
, where pt (i) is the price for good i,
The aggregated price index, Pt; and the aggregated consumption, Ct; are
assumed as
Pt =
24 1Z
0
(pt (i))
1  di
351=(1 ) (96)
Ct =
1Z
0
[Ct(i)]
 1
 di (97)
The representative household maximizes the expected discounted sum of
instantaneous utilities.
E0
1X
t=0
t fU(Xt)  V (Lt)g (98)
Where  2 (0; 1) is the householdsdiscount factor and Lt is labour. Households
own the capital, Kt; which is rented to the producer. Households own the rms
and they can trade rmsequity shares st: The capital income net of depreciation
is taxed at the rate  kt : Hence, the representative households budget constant can
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be written as
Ct+It+Bt+qtst = Rt 1Bt 1+(1 wt )wtLt+

1   kt (1  )

RktKt+(qt + dt) st 1
(99)
, where It is investment, Bt is risk-free government bonds which pay the gross
interest Rt; Kt is the capital stock let to the productive rm at price Rkt ;  is the
depreciation rate, wt is the labour income tax rate, wt is the real wage, dt are
the dividends per share paid by the rms and qt is the share price. The capital
accumulation constraint is dened similarly as in equation (5).
Following Ravn et al. (2006), the investment process is subjected to deep habits
features and the demand for a particular investment good It(i) is given by
It (i) =

pt (i)
Pt
 
(It   It 1) + It 1 (i) (100)
The rst-order conditions of the household maximization of equation 98
(subject to constraints), equations 5, 94, and 99 are given by
t = U
0 (Xt) ; (101)
t = Ett+1

1   kt (1  )

Rkt + (1  )

; (102)
(1  wt )twt = V 0(Lt); (103)
t = RtEtt+1; (104)
tqt = Ett+1 (qt+1 + dt+1) ; (105)
where t is the Lagrange multiplier attached to the budget constraint in
equation 99. Modied Euler equations for bonds, equation 104, deliver the
stochastic discount factor Dt;t+j = 
jEt
t+1
t
: In equilibrium, the equity market is
cleared and st = 1:
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3.5.2.2 Firms
Firms employ the Cobb-Douglas technology and acquire resources for
producing goods. There are two factors of production, namely labour, Lt(i); and
capital, Kt(i): Production by rms also depends on labour-argumented
productivity, At. The production function can be described as follows:
Yt(i) = (AtLt(i))
1 (Kt(i)) (106)
where  < 1 is a capital income share and capital input share.
Firms choose labour and capital inputs in order to minimize the real costs
subject to the production possibility constraint, equation 106.
min
Lt(i);Kt(i)
wtLt(i) + r
k
tKt(i)  !t

(AtLt(i))
1 (Kt(i))   Yt(i)

:
, where !t denes a Lagrange multiplier.
The rst-order conditions of the cost-minimizing problem dene the demand
for inputs as follows:
wt = !t (1  ) Yt(i)
Lt(i)
(107)
rKt = !t
Yt(i)
Kt(i)
(108)
Combining equation (107) with equation (108), the Lagrange multiplier !t
represents the economy-wide marginal cost.
mct = !t (109)
The deep habits assumption implies that the demand function faced by the
individual producer depends on the past sales.
Yt (i) =

pt (i)
Pt
 
(Yt   Yt 1) + Yt 1 (i) (110)
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Firms set prices to maximize the present discounted value of the future stream
of real prots
	t(i) = max
pt(i);Yt(i)
E0
1X
t=0
t
t
0

pt (i)
Pt
Yt (i) mctYt (i)

taking into account the persistence of demand, equation (110), which is implied
by the deep habits feature. The rst-order conditions for the rm optimization
problem are
@	t(i)
@pt (i)
=
pt (i)
Pt
Yt (i)  t

pt (i)
Pt
 
(Yt   Yt 1) (111)
@	t(i)
@Yt (i)
Yt (i) =
pt (i)
Pt
Yt (i) mctYt (i)  tYt (i) + t+1t+1
t
Yt (i) = 0
(112)
, where t is the Lagrange multiplier to the constraint, equation (110).
In equilibrium, all rms choose optimal price and output as follows:
pt (i)
Pt
= 1 (113)
Yt (i)
Yt
= 1 (114)
Therefore, the rst-order conditions deliver the following dynamics for the real
marginal cost.
mct =
   1

  1


Yt=Yt 1    + Et
1


t+1
t
Yt+1=Yt
Yt+1=Yt   : (115)
In cases when habits are not deep,  = 0; the price mark-up is constant over
time:  = 
 1 : Equation 115 shows that the real marginal cost, mct; increases
with the growth rate of output Yt=Yt 1. Hence, the price mark-up, t = 1=mct is
negatively correlated with output growth, which explains why it moves
counter-cyclically. This equation is a crucial nding, since it presents a negative
relationship between price mark-up and economic growth. As discussed in Ravn
et al. (2006), the mark-up declines, because rms reduce prices below the
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instantaneous prot maximization level in order to invest in habits that they will
exploit in the future. The volatility of a price mark-up over the business cycle
tends to initiate a non-smooth and counter-cyclical behavior in the optimal
capital income tax rate.
The resource constraint implies that
Yt = Ct + It +Gt: (116)
Where Gt is exogenously given government spending.
3.5.2.3 Implementability constraint
The government can only use distortionary taxes to nance its budget.
Following Chari & Kehoe (1999), the implementability constraint is derived by
integrating forward the household budget constraint, equation 99, which is
multiplied by the stochastic discount factor st+s. In the Appendix B.7, it is
combined with household behavior conditions and proves proposition 3.
Proposition 3 The debt sustainability assumption is imposed by the
implementability constraint for the government budget which is equivalent to
restriction,
E0
1X
t=0
ttCt   E0
1X
t=0
tV 0(Lt)Lt = 0A0 (117)
, where Ao is the initial households wealth assumed as
A0 =

1   k0 (1  )

Rk0 + (1  )

K0 +R 1B 1 + q0 + d0 (118)
Proposition 3 derives the implementability constraint for a model with deep
habits that appears very similar to the standard formula as in Christiano,
Eichenbaum & Evans (1999). The only di¤erence is discount factors. In an
economy without habit formations,  = 0; the discount factor becomes t =
U 0(Ct); and the constraint equation (117) gets a familiar presentation
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E0
P1
t=0 
tU 0(Ct)Ct   E0
P1
t=0 
tV 0(Lt)Lt = U 0(C0)A0; as in Christiano et al.
(1999).
3.5.2.4 Optimal income tax rate
Consider a Ramsey policy maker who sets tax rates to maximize the
households utility, equation (98), subject to households decisions and the
constraints equation (5), (94), (101), (102), (103), (104); rmsdecisions equation
(106), (107), (108), the resource constraint equation (116), and the budget
implementability constraint equation (117). The optimal Ramsey tax policy rate
is given in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 The optimal labour and capital income tax rates are assumed as
 kt =
1
(1  ) (1  t) (119)
wt = 1 
1  (1  ) 
1 + (1 + v)  
t (120)
where  =  U
00(Xt)Xt
U 0(Xt) > 0, v =
V 00(Lt)Lt
V 0(Lt) > 0;   is a shadow price for the
governments implementability constraint equation (117), and t is the markup,
t =
1
mct
> 1; where mct follows the dynamics equation (115). In an economy
where lump-sum taxes are available and the implementability constraint is not
binding,   = 0; it is optimal to subsidize labour, wt = 1  t < 0:
Proof. See the Appendix B.8
The proposition 4 establishes that the optimal capital income tax is negative.
Capital tax subsidies are required to o¤set the price markup imposed by
monopolistic rms. This outcome is consistent with the results of Judd (1997)
and Judd (2002). Similarly, the optimal capital income subsidy rate converges to
zero as an economy becomes more competitive, (t ! 1). However, in an
economy with deep habits, the mark-up is not xed and can be volatile over
time; consequently, tax smoothing is not optimal. Since the optimal taxes are
negatively correlated with the markup, it is optimal to increase the taxes when
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the economy grows and reduce them during a recession. Therefore, the closed
economy with an imperfectly competitive market and deep habit preferences
should move capital income tax in phase with the growth of real output. This
means that a deep habits framework provides very strong support for the scal
policys counter-cyclicality.
3.5.3 The simple small-open economy model
In this part, the simple small-open economy is formulated by setting the
following assumptions: no investment adjustment costs are present, no wage
adjustment cost are present, no aboard borrowing occurs (bG = d), export rms
receive zero prots in a perfectly competitive global market, no domestic price
rigidities exist, and a zero trade balance persists. The model is reduced to a
simple small model which is composed of 24 equations. The model details are
shown as follows.
The households budget constraint.
Ct + It + dt = Rt 1dt 1 + (1  wt )wt
 
LDt + L
X
t

+

1  (1  )  kt

rkt
 
KDt +K
X
t

+ pDY Dt

1  1


(121)
The capital accumulation
KDt+1 +K
X
t+1 = (1  )
 
KDt +K
X
t

+ It; (122)
The capital decision
1 = Et
Ct
Ct+1

1  (1  )  kt+1

rKt+1 + (1  )

(123)
The labour supply decision
(1  wt )wt = 'L
 
LDt + L
X
t

Ct (124)
106
3.5. ANALYTICAL RESULTS
The optimal deposit
1
Ct
= Rt
1
Ct+1
(125)
The domestic rms production function
Y Dt = (AtL
D
t )
DL (KDt )
1 DL (126)
The domestic rms labour demand
DwtL
D
t = 
D
LY
D
t (127)
The domestic rms capital decision
DrKt K
D
t =
 
1  DL

Y Dt (128)
The export rms production function
Y Xt = (AtL
X
t )
XL (KXt )
1 XL (129)
The export rms labour demand
XwtL
X
t = 
X
L p
XY Xt (130)
The export rms capital decision
XrKt K
X
t =
 
1  XL

pXY Xt (131)
The aggregate consumption
Ct =
 
CDt

+
 
CMt

(132)
The aggregate investment
107
3.5. ANALYTICAL RESULTS
It =
 
IDt

+
 
IMt

(133)
The aggregate price
 
pD
  
1  +
 
pM
  
1  = 1 (134)
The aggregate government expenditure
Gt =
 
GDt

+
 
GMt

(135)
The domestic consumption
CDt = C
 
pD
  1
1  (136)
The domestic investment
IDt = It;
 
pD
  1
1  (137)
The domestic government expenditure
GDt = Gt;
 
pD
  1
1  (138)
The import consumption
CMt = C (sp
m
t )
  1
1  (139)
The import investment
IMt = It
 
spMt
  1
1  (140)
The import government expenditure
GMt = Gt
 
spMt
  1
1  (141)
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The market clearing condition for domestic output
Y Dt = C
D
t + I
D
t +G
D
t
Y Dt = (Ct + It +Gt)
 
pD
  1
1  (142)
The market clearing condition for export output (zero trade balance)
pXY Xt = p
M
 
GMt + C
M
t + I
M
t

pXY Xt = s
 1
1  (C + It +Gt;)
 
pMt
  
1  (143)
The equation substitution of this model is shown in Appendix B.9.
The government budget constraint
dt = rtdt 1 +Gt   wt wtLt   (1  )  kt rKt Kt: (144)
Equation (121) can rewrite in the implementability constraint form as below
(See details in Appendix B.10)
A0   1
1   + E0
1X
t=0
t'L
 
LDt + L
X
t
+1
+ E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
pDY Dt

1  1


+E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
pXY X

1  1


= 0; (145)
where A0 = 1C0R 1d 1 +
1
C0
 
1  (1  )  k0

rk0    (1  )
  
KD1 +K
X
1

:
The Lagrangian form of the Ramsey problem (Lo) and the rst-order conditions
of the Lagrangian problem (Lo) with respect to considered variables, which areKDt ,
Y Dt , Ct; and L
D
t are presented in Appendix B.11.
The rst-order condition with respect to LDt shows that
  =
1
( + 1)
"
1  1;t
D
L (AtL
D
t )
DL (KDt )
1 DL
'L (LDt + L
X
t )

LDt
#
: (146)
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1) The small-open economy with perfectly competitive market
Proposition 5 In the small-open economy with a perfectly competitive market
(D = 1) and lump-sum transfers (the government does not concern to any costs
of debt (  = 0)), it is optimal to set the capital tax to zero and use the labour tax
as a debt sustainable measure.
Proof. See Appendix B.12
 kt+1 = 0 (147)
wt = 0 (148)
The calculation illustrates that in a small-open economy with a perfectly
competitive market (D = 1) with the lump-sum transfer (  = 0), the optimal
capital income tax and optimal labour tax are zero. In this case, the government
does not have to correct the distortion in the perfectly competitive market;
therefore, it is optimal for the government to set the zero capital income tax. In
addition, the lump-sum transfer allows the government to use the zero payroll
income tax.
2) The small-open economy with an imperfectly competitive market and
lump-sum transfers
Proposition 6 In the small-open economy with an imperfectly competitive market
(D > 1) and lump-sum transfers (the government does not concern to any costs of
debt (  = 0)), it is optimal to subsidize both the labour tax and the capital income
tax. Both tax rates are negative.
 kt+1 =
1  D
(1  ) < 0 (149)
wt = 1  D (150)
Proof. See Appendix B.13
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The calculation shows that in a small-open economy with an imperfectly
competitive market (D > 1) and lump-sum transfers (  = 0), both the optimal
labour tax and the capital income tax are negative. The government can
optimally subsidize capital income taxes, since doing so helps to mitigate the
distortion in an imperfectly competitive market. Moreover, they can subsidize
the labour income tax because the lump-sum tax is allowed in this type of
economy.
3.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter investigates the optimal capital tax and the optimal labour
income tax in a small-open economy. The model parameter is adopted from
economic data of Thailand, which is a small-open country in South East Asia.
The Ramsey problem is constructed in order to examine the optimal capital
income and labour taxes. The present model also includes imperfectly
competitive market conditions. The following conclusions can be drawn from the
present study. Firstly, the optimal capital income tax in a small-open economy
with an imperfectly competitive market is negative. The optimal capital income
tax of Thailand is -7.97%, which is consistent with the results of past studies by
Guo et al. (1995), Guo & Lansing (1999), Judd (1997), Judd (2002), Domeij
(2005), Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2006) and Koehne & Kuhn (2013). The
government has to subsidize capital income tax for eliminating the monopolistic
distortion, because subsidizing the capital income tax can stimulate investment
by rms. In addition, the sensitivity analysis shows that the optimal capital
income tax is increasingly negative as the domestic price mark-up increases. This
nding is clearly contrary to the former study, which concluded that the optimal
capital income tax is zero. Secondly, the optimal payroll tax in a small-open
economy with an imperfectly competitive market is positive, equal to 13.32% for
Thailands economy. Since the present model includes government constraints
and does not allow lump-sum taxation, the government has to apply a levy on
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payroll income in order to raise its revenue. The nding of a negative optimal
capital income tax can enhance understandings of the optimal taxation in a
small-open economy with an imperfectly competitive market, which is an area
that has been little discussed.
This paper also illustrates the analytical result by considering a number of
simple models, namely the simple closed economy model with an imperfectly
competitive market and deep habit preferences and the simple small-open
economy model with an imperfectly competitive market. Some assumptions are
simplied; for example, there are no investment adjustment costs, no wage
adjustment costs, and no domestic price rigidities. The simple model can
investigate the e¤ect of some parameters to optimal taxation.
The following conclusions can be drawn from the simple closed economy.
Firstly, in the closed economy with an imperfectly competitive market, if
lump-sum transfers are allowed, it is optimal to subsidize both the labour tax
and the capital income tax. Both optimal tax rates are negative. Secondly, in the
closed economy with a perfectly competitive market, if the lump-sum is not
available (which is a common realistic assumption), it is optimal to set the
capital tax to zero and use the labour tax as a debt sustainable measure.
Thirdly, in a closed economy with an imperfectly competitive market and deep
habit preferences, the optimal capital income tax is negative and should be
adjusted in phase with the growth of the real output, because the price mark-up
is counter-cyclical under a deep habit preferences economy. For the small-open
economy, the analytical result can lead to the conclusion that when the
lump-sum transfers are allowed to implement the budget, the optimal capital tax
and the optimal labour tax are the same as in a closed economy. They are
negative and are used to o¤set the monopolistic mark-up.
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Part 4
Government Spending on Health
and Economic Growth
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This part studies the impact of government health spending on economic
growth by analyzing the improvement of the national health condition.
Worldwide health data reveal that the global populations life expectancy at
birth has signicantly risen by approximately 20 years over the last ve decades
(Becker, Philipson & Soares 2005, Oster et al. 2013). This improvement of global
health provides an immense benet in worldwide welfare. Assuming that this
historical trend continues, life expectancy at birth will increase to 100 years by
2060 for developed countries (such as the United States) and by 2300 for the
majority of countries (Oeppen & Vaupel 2002, Nations 2004, Olshansky
et al. 2005). The factors that mainly contribute to increases in life expectancy
are composed of development of more e¤ective medications, nutrition and public
health care. The state has important role in improving national health through
providing, for example, inclusive access to health care and nutrition services,
reducing health gaps between di¤erent population groups and ensuring
sustainable public health nancing.
The e¤ectiveness of government spending on national health can be measured
by improvements in nation health status, such as decreases in infant or child
mortality rates. However, many studies nd that the e¤ect of government
spending on nation health is positive and small, (Filmer & Pritchett 1999, Gupta
et al. 2002). Filmer & Pritchett (1999) conclude that the impact of government
spending on the mortality rate is relatively small when compared with other
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independent variables such as per capita income, income distribution and female
education. Similarly, Gupta et al. (2002) use cross-sectional data of 50 countries
to investigate the relationship between government spending on health and infant
and child mortality rates. Their ndings show a weak relationship between
government spending on health and mortality rates. In contrast, a study that
employs a di¤erent approach nds another result. Baldacci et al. (2003) utilizes a
latent variable model to analyze developing country data. Its ndings shows a
more robust result than the traditional techniques. An increase in government
spending on health signicantly leads to a decrease in mortality rates. Therefore,
the impact of government spending on health on mortality rate, as discussed by
these studies, is ambiguous. More research needs to be done to investigate the
e¤ectiveness of government spending on national health.
In addition, the previous literature reviews show that most studies disregard the
role of private spending on health, because the data is unavailable or because of the
existence of insu¢ cient sample sizes. Private health spending also has an essential
role in improving national health. Due to the presence of governmental budget
constraints, private health spending can substitute public spending on health when
the states revenue is limited. Both private and public health spending can promote
healthy life of population. Psacharopoulos & Nguyen (1997) study the importance
of private health spending and address its benets. High participation by private
sector in health can increase the e¢ ciency of the health service market. Health
providers try to reduce their service costs to be more competitive and to meet
customersneeds. Realizing this gap in the literature, this paper includes private
health spending in its model and estimates the total e¤ect of private spending on
national health.
Improvement in national health is believed to contribute to economic growth
by increasing human capital in the form of health. Healthy employees can be more
productive and e¤ective when working and have fewer health problems during work
hours (Bloom et al. 2004). Gary S. Becker, who has received the 1992 Nobel Prize
in economic science, states that investment in human capital is as important as
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investment in construction and equipment. A healthy person who has a longer
life expectancy tries to train more often and has a higher ability than those have
shorter life expectancies (Becker 1993). Barro & Lee (1994) and Oster et al. (2013)
conrm that a longer life expectancy promotes human capital investments such as
skills training and enhance workershabits. In addition, a number of empirical
studies support the positive e¤ect of health and economic, such as Barro et al.
(1996), Bloom et al. (2004), Well (2007), Baldacci, Clements, Gupta & Cui (2008)
and Aghion, Howitt & Murtin (2010). Instead of using mortality rates, Barro et al.
(1996) use a log of life expectancy at birth to measure the overall health status
of the countries. The paper illustrates a strong linkage between an increase in
national health and economic growth. A one-standard deviation improvement in
life expectancy contributes to a 1.5 percent rise in a countrys economic growth
rate. Furthermore, a young and healthy population can gain more human capital
through schooling (Weil et al. 2013). However, some recent studies conclude that
national health has a small impact on economic growth. Acemoglu & Johnson
(2007) uses mortality rate as a health indicator and argues that the impact of
increased life expectancy on output is considerable small. Therefore, more research
needs to be done to examine the impact of improvement in national health on
economic growth.
Apart from traditional health indicators (life expectancy and mortality rates),
non-medical determinants of health have been recently introduced as indicators,
such as tobacco consumption, alcohol consumption, sugar supply and total fat
supply. In developed countries, the health gap between di¤erent population groups
is low. Most of population have healthy lives, long life expectancies and low
mortality rates. The traditional health indicators may not clearly portray the
nations health and lifestyles. Therefore, non-medical determinants of health can
reveal individual routine activities and lifestyles in developed countries (Larson
& Mercer 2004). This paper contributes to the literature by using non-medical
determinants of health to estimate the production functions and test whether non-
medical determinants of health are appropriate indicators for human capital in the
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form of health of developed countries or not.
This paper aims to nd the impact of government health spending on
economic growth by analyzing the improvement of the national health condition.
The study composed of two parts. The model is estimated from panel data,
which is the most up-to-date and includes observations of over 200 countries
(including both developed and developing countries). The rst part examines the
e¤ect of government health spending on national health by choosing life
expectancy, which has been disregarded in previous studies on government
spending on health, as a dependent variable. Moreover, two types of mortality
rates, namely infant mortality and under-ve mortality, are also used as
dependent variables in order to compare the models results with those of
previous studies. The regression is estimated by using the two-stage least-squares
approach (2SLS), which is applied for dealing with the reserve causality problem.
For example, an increase in government spending on health may cause an
increase in life expectancy, but higher demand for better health, as indicated by
a higher life expectancy, may lead to a push for higher government spending on
health (Gupta et al. 2002). The instruments of the two-stage least-squares
approach are government spending on defense, government spending on
education, government spending on public service and total government
spending. Two types of models are constructed (the xed-e¤ectes model and
random e¤ects model) in order to nd suitable regressions for representing health
status. Moreover, in order to fulll the gap in previous studies on government
spending on health, this paper introduces private health spending as a new
independent variable in order to explain the cross-country variation of health
status. The role of the private sector in national health will be revealed. Other
independent variables are GDP per capita and improvement in sanitation
facilities.
The second part investigates the e¤ect of health on economic growth by
estimating the production function models. This sections research question is
"Does improving in national health, such as longer life expectancy, contribute to
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an economic growth?". The models are constructed by using three data sets
(global data, developed countries data, and developing data) in order to compare
the e¤ect of di¤erence countries incomes on national health and economic
growth. Life expectancy is used to represent the nations health status.
Additionally, the present paper introduces a new health status variable, namely
non-medical determinants of health. The selected non-medical determinants of
health variables are tobacco consumption, alcohol consumption, sugar supply and
total fat supply. This model measures the role of non-medical determinants of
health on economic growth.
This papers contributions are useful for planning future expenditures by
governments on health and maintaining sustainable economic growth in the long
term. This studys ndings will provide an understanding of how government
spending on health impacts human capital in the form of health and economic
growth in developed and developing countries. The ndings of the impact of
private spending on health can be valuable for annual government budget
planning. The government can reallocate certain types of unnecessary
government health spending that are similar to private health expenditures for
other necessary categories, such as education. In addition, the new nding of the
e¤ect of non-medical determinants of health on economic growth can be used for
improving health policy planning in developed countries. Government can choose
which health policies e¢ ciently promote both national health and economic
growth, by deciding, for example, between seeking to reduce tobacco or alcohol
consumption.
This article is divided into 5 sections. Section 4.2 reviews the literature on
the impact of public health spending on national health status and the e¤ect
of gains in national health status on economic growth. The consequences for
economic growth by boosting health status are described. Moreover, the e¤ect of
the composition of government expenditures on output is explained. Section 4.3
explains the main structure of the health model and the production function model.
The denitions and sources of the data are described and explained. Section 4.4
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shows the empirical results of these models. Each model is composed of several
regressions conducted through di¤erent estimation approaches, such as the xed-
e¤ects model, the random e¤ects model, the two-stage least-squares method, and
the mean group estimator. Section 4.5 concludes by providing the ndings and
policy recommendations for governments.
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW
This section is composed of two parts. The rst part explains the concept of
a composition of government expenditure and output. The second part reviews
various related academic research from recent and inuential journals. This part
also compares methodologies and models of each study and reveals the advantage
and disadvantage of each well-known papers. Henceforth, the most suitable
methodologies for estimating the impact of government health spending on
economic growth can be determined.
4.2.1 A composition of government expenditure
This part explains how the composition of government expenditures a¤ects
output. Government spending is composed of several types of expenditures that
are based on areas including defense, education and health. The e¤ects of each
type of government spending on economic growth may be considerably di¤erent.
Devarajan, Swaroop & Zou (1996) introduces a theoretical framework for
explaining the impact of di¤erent types of government expenditure on long term
economic growth. The paper argues that the correct composition of capital and
current expenditures can positively a¤ect economic growth. It separates
government expenditures into two types of imperfectly substitutable and
complementary components: (g1) and (g2). There are three factors of
production: private capital (k); productive expenditure and unproductive
118
4.2. LITERATURE REVIEW
expenditure. The production function form is the constant elasticity of
substitution (CES).
Y = (K  + g 1 + g
 
2 )
  1
 (151)
Y denotes the output of the CES production function, K is capital stock, and
; ; and  are factors of the production coe¢ cient that are greater than 0. Where
 +  +  = 1 and  > 0; and  > ; it can say that expenditure g1 is more
productive than g2: The relative productivity,
@Y=@g1
@Y=@g2
= 

g
 (+1)
1
g
 (+1)
2
; should be 1 at the
optimum level of output, given that both expenditures have the same costs for the
budget.
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g2
=



 1
+1
<


(152)
Condition 152 illustrates that an optimal steady-state growth rate is achieved
when the shares of government spending are distributed more evenly than their
contributions to production. Based on this they argue that the governments of
some developing countries invest too heavily into capital expenditure and too little
into areas like education and health.
4.2.2 Related Research
The empirical literature on the impact of health on economic growth has
developed signicantly over the past two decades. An early study from Barro
et al. (1996) uses a log of life expectancy at birth to measure the countrys overall
health status. He nds a noticeable linkage between an increase in national health
status and economic growth. The coe¢ cient of life expectancy at birth is 0.042,
showing a signicantly positive e¤ect of life expectancy at birth on per capita
growth rate. After Barro et al. (1996)s study, the literature of national health on
economic development has been broadened to include various concepts, for example
Barro & Lee (1994), Zhang, Zhang & Lee (2003), Bloom et al. (2004), Well (2007),
Baldacci et al. (2008), and Aghion et al. (2010). Most ndings conrm the positive
e¤ect of health status on output level.
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Barro & Lee (1994) investigates the source of growth of 116 countries from
1965 to 1985. Five factors are used to isolate the di¤erence between a high
growth country and low growth country, including, for example, the ratio of real
per-capita to initial human capital level on education and health, the ratio of
investment to GDP, size of government, market distortion from governmental
policy and political uncertainty. They nd a signicant e¤ect of life expectancy
on economic growth. An increase in life expectancy on standard deviation leads
to a 1.5 percent increase in the annual economic growth rate. Bloom et al. (2004)
uses a production function that consists of household health and labour
experience to investigate aggregate economic growth. Their production function
is composed of three factors of production: physical capital, labour and human
capital. Human capital covers three important dimensions, which are education,
working experience and health. The panel data is collected from 1960 to 1990.
Their results show that excellent health has a large, positive e¤ect on aggregate
output. For example, the aggregate output can increase by 4 percent when
national life expectancy increases for one year. They also conclude that the
impact of life expectancy on aggregate output growth is caused by a labor
productivity e¤ect, not an increasing work experience e¤ect. Well (2007) expands
on the e¤ect of human capital in the form of health to the microeconomic level.
He estimates the impact of individual health on their income to formulate a
macroeconomic estimate of the e¤ect of national health on per capita aggregate
output. The return on health is determined from cross-country factors of
individual health, such as height and survival rate. He nds that removing the
national health gap among countries can benet from lowering a variance of
output per worker by 9.9 percent and decreasing output per worker from 20.5 to
17.9 or the 90th percentile to the 10th percentile. Similarly, Baldacci et al.
(2008) conrms that government spending on health has a positive and sizable
e¤ect on human capital in the form of health, and, hence, government spending
on health can indirectly encourage the growth of the aggregate output. They
broaden the observations scope by using a data series of 118 developing
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countries from 1971 to 2000. The baseline model is a xed-e¤ect model. Their
results illustrate that a 1 percentage increase of government health spending to
GDP can raise the under-ve survival rate and annual GDP per capita growth by
0.6 percent and 0.5 percent respectively. These positive e¤ects are immediate.
However, the quality of government has a crucial role in the advantage of
government spending on health. In the case of a country with decient
governance, the positive impact of government health spending can fully vanish.
They also show that government spending on health has a diminishing return,
especially for countries with high levels of healthcare spending.
The literature on the e¤ect of human capital in the form of health has expanded
to study the di¤erences between developed and developing countries. Accounting
for the impact of human capital in the form of health can explain the limited
growth rate of GDP in high income countries, such as OECD countries. Aghion
et al. (2010) investigates the relationship between the growth rate of aggregate
output and national health by using a modern endogenous growth theory. The
panel data covers the period from 1960 to 2000. Their results show that, in OECD
countries, only lowering the under-40 mortality rate increases the productivity of
output, while other health indicators do not have a signicant impact on economic
growth. Aghion et al. (2010) s result conrms the positive long-term e¤ect of a
healthier youth population on labour productivity. In a microeconomic framework,
workers who have good health when they were young tended to gain more skills,
hence their individual rates of productivity were enhanced. Aísa, Pueyo et al.
(2004) explains that lengthening life expectancy in a developed country, which
usually has a long life expectancy, is a di¢ cult and expensive e¤ort. Consequently,
improving health in a developed country may result in a negative e¤ect on economic
growth in the long-term.
Better health can have a positive e¤ect on economic growth via improving the
education and skill of people. Oster et al. (2013) examines human capital theory
by analyzing the behaviour of limited life expectancy individuals who are at risk for
Huntington disease (HD). This inherited genetic disease shortens life expectancy
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to near 60. Their nding shows that changes in life expectancy potentially a¤ect
human capital investment. A limited life expectancy person is likely to have less
education and skill training. They measure the e¤ect of lower life expectancy on
education by calculating a demand elasticity for school completion with respect to
life expectancy. This elasticity is close to 1.0. Life expectancy can describe roughly
20 percent of di¤erences in school completion among country samples. Moreover,
limited life expectancy has an impact on individual behaviour regarding health
related activities, such as smoking and participating in cancer screenings.
In addition, health and social welfare are close connected. Better health, as
represented by longevity, promotes welfare by improving the quality of life (Becker
et al. 2005). The study of Becker et al. (2005) examines a full economic growth
rate that includes advantages from health related issues. Their ndings show that
a longer life expectancy signicantly contributes to enhancing global welfare with
data from 1960 to 2000. This study illustrates interesting results that contrast
with traditional ndings. In low income countries, health accounts for 40 percent
of the total welfare gains, while health only accounts for 15 percent of the total
welfare gains in high income countries.
Another approach for estimating the impact of health on economic growth is
the overlapping generations model. Zhang et al. (2003) employs the overlapping
generations model to evaluate the impact of decreasing adult mortality on economic
growth. Their result illustrates a net positive e¤ect of lowering adult mortality on
economic growth. In contrast, lowering the adult mortality rate in an industrialized
country, which normally has a moderately low adult mortality rate, has a negative
e¤ect on economic growth.
The linkage of improvements in national health and increases in economic
growth is explained in the literature of human capital and health in many
aspects. The notable study of Gary S. Becker, an early pioneer of human
behavior analysis and recipient of the 1992 Nobel Prize in economic science,
explains that investment in human capital is as important as investment in
construction and equipment (Becker 1993). Individuals who have higher life
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expectancies tend to gain more training and working ability than those who have
lower life expectancies. Barro & Lee (1994) and Oster et al. (2013) a¢ rm that
longer life expectancy induces human capital investment from skill training and
improves workerswork practices.
An increase in human capital expands economic growth. Zhang et al. (2003)
explains the three channels that improve of health e¤ects the economic growth.
Firstly, healthy people who live longer tend to save more money for consumption
after retirement. The increase in saving leads to increases in the rate of physical
capital accumulation. Secondly, in low-longevity countries, better health may
cause median voters to increase tax for education spending. However, in
high-longevity countries, median voters tend to decrease tax for education
spending, thus human capital nally drops in the later stage. Thirdly, higher
longevity, which is associated with better health, may lower accidental bequest.
Therefore, investment and the rate of physical capital accumulation decrease.
Aísa et al. (2004) also conrms the linkage of longer life expectancy and higher
saving. They construct a theoretical model to examine the linkage of longer life
expectancy and increase in economic growth over various linkages. Moreover, they
describe a linkage between longer life expectancy and labour market. The size of
the workforce increases from higher life expectancy, and, hence, aggregate output
is stimulated. Nevertheless, improvements in health and economic growth compete
for the same limited resources. Apart from life expectancy, mortality rate can be
used to describe the relationship between health and economic growth. In high
mortality rate countries, such as most developing countries, governments require
less resources for lowering mortality rates. Therefore, investing in health is likely
to be a favorable measure for developing countries. At the same time, a country
with a low mortality rate, such as a developed country, may gain less benet from
lowering the mortality rate and its economy may even slow down as a result.
Lorentzen, McMillan & Wacziarg (2008) illustrates that high mortality rate
a¤ects economic activity by shortening the individual time horizon. In high adult
mortality rate areas, individuals usually engages in high risk tasks and do not
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accumulate both physical capital and human capital, thus lowering private
investment. A rise in mortality by one standard deviation leads to a fall in
economic growth by between 8 to 14 percent. This can be a main source of a
global poverty trap.
By contrast, some recent studies claim that health may have a small impact
on economic growth. Acemoglu & Johnson (2007) argues that the impact of life
expectancy on GDP is relatively small. The predicted mortality rate, which is
collected from several diseases of global intervention, is used as a model instrument.
They nd no evidence that links life expectancy and income per capita. However,
their model shows that a one percent increase in life expectancy raises population
by between 1.7 and 2 percent. In addition, life expectancy itself may not be an
appropriate demographic indicator for analyzing the impact of health on economic
growth. Life expectancy can represent aspects of human health condition but not
a complete picture of the populations health. Additional variables are useful for
examining alongside life expectancy and have more potential to investigate the
e¤ect on economic growth, such as the share of the population aged over 65 and
dependency ratios (An & Jeon 2006).
The impact of government spending on health to health status is investigated
in a number of studies, such as Filmer & Pritchett (1999), Gupta et al. (2002),
and Baldacci et al. (2003). Most studies use life expectancy and child mortality
to present health status. The literature on the impact of government spending on
health reveal ambiguous results.
Gupta et al. (2002) examines the e¤ectiveness of government expenditure on
education and health in 50 developing countries. They use both infant mortality
rate and child mortality rate as a social indicator to measure the e¤ect of
government spending on health. They claim that allocating government spending
to productive spending can signicantly reduce corruption. The nding shows
that an increase in public spending on health care leads to a decrease in the
infant mortality rate and child mortality rate. The health regression includes a
number of control variables, like per capital income, adult illiteracy rate, access
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to sanitation and urbanization. However, their study disregards important
control variables, such as private spending towards health, because of an
insu¢ cient sample. Psacharopoulos & Nguyen (1997) raises the important role of
private spending for health. They claim that spending by private entities on
health can promote economic growth and tackle poverty. Both government
spending and private spending on health complement each other when developing
human capital. An increase in the private sectors participation, such as through
planning and nancing health, can increase the markets e¢ ciency. Providers try
to reduce their cost in order to better compete and meet the needs of their
customers. Moreover, private sector involvement can induce more government
spending for an omitted sector like health because the associated scal burden is
lifted. Another di¤erent approach is presented by Baldacci et al. (2003). Their
study applies a latent variable model to developing countries. Unobserved health
status is presented by social indicators. The model yields a more robust result
than the traditional technique. The results signicantly show a positive impact of
government spending on health. An increase in government spending on health
leads to a decrease in the mortality rate.
In contrast, Filmer & Pritchett (1999) nd that the impact of government
spending on health and health status is relatively small and insignicant. They
use cross-country data to examine the impact of government spending on health,
the infant mortality rate and the under-ve mortality rate. The result reveals
that government spending on health can explain only a seventh of 1 percent of a
variation in mortality rate across countries, while per capita income, education of
women, income inequality, ethnic fragmentation and majority religion can explain
more than 95 percent of variations in mortality rate.
Apart from the literature on the e¤ect of government health spending on
health status, a few studies examine the overall e¤ect of government spending on
health for economic growth, such as Aisa & Pueyo (2006). They use the
endogenous longevity model to investigate a linkage between government
spending on health and economic growth. The result suggests that government
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spending on health has two opposite e¤ects on economic growth. Firstly, an
increase in government spending on health raises life expectancy. Consumers
with higher life expectancy save more for the future. Higher saving encourages
economic growth. Secondly, increasing government spending on health a¤ects
resource allocation. It undermines capital accumulation and thus weakens
economic growth. In developing countries, where life expectancy is low and the
impact of government spending on health status is high, the former e¤ect
dominates the negative e¤ect. An increase in government spending on health
results in longer life expectancy and enhancing economic growth. On the other
hand, the second e¤ect is larger in a developed country. An increase in
government spending on health not only impairs productive government spending
but also lowers economic growth in developed countries.
4.3 MODEL AND DATA
This section describes two regression models: 1) the health model of
government and private spending on health and 2) the production function
model of aggregate output growth, including health indicators such as life
expectancy and mortality rate. The rst model shares several techniques with
Gupta et al. (2002) , such as employing a two-stage least square estimation for
dealing with causality problem. The main di¤erences in this paper and Gupta
et al. (2002) are 1) in addition to mortality rates, this paper selects a life
expectancy as a new alternative health indicator while Gupta et al. (2002)
employs infant mortality and child mortality as health indicators, 2) this paper
uses four estimation techniques, which are xed-e¤ects model, random-e¤ects
model, two-stage least-squares within an estimator, and two-stage least-squares
random-e¤ects estimators while Gupta et al. (2002) estimates regressions from
two estimation techniques (Ordinary least squares and two-stage least-squares),
3) private spending on health variable, which is disregarded in the study of
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Gupta et al. (2002), is added in the health regression. 4) the sample of this paper
is acquired from global data (over 200 countries), in contrast, Gupta et al. (2002)
study 50 developing and transition countries.
The second model employs a production function with human capital from
Bloom et al. (2004). The relation of the growth of the level of input and the
aggregate output growth are examined. The main di¤erences in this paper and
Bloom et al. (2004) are 1) this paper adds new health indicator, namely, non-
medical determinants of health such as tobacco consumption, alcohol consumption,
sugar supply, and total fat supply, which may better reects life-style and health
of developed countries, 2) this paper separate data in to three groups, which are
global data, developing countries, and developed countries, in order to compare the
impact of human capital in the form of health among di¤erent countries groups
while Bloom et al. (2004) uses single data set, 3) three estimation techniques,
which are xed-e¤ects model, random-e¤ects model, and augmented mean group
estimator, are used while Bloom et al. (2004) employs nonlinear two-stage least-
squares estimators.
The details of each model are explained as follows:
4.3.1 The health model
The health model investigates the role of government and private spending on
health through heath status indicators, such as life expectancy, infant mortality
rate and under-ve mortality rate. The health model can be expressed as follows:
Hit = f(Git; Xit) (153)
, where Hit is health status of population in country i at time t , including life
expectancy, infant mortality rate and under-ve mortality rate. Git is
government spending on health as percentage of GDP in country i at time t. Xit
is a vector of socioeconomic independent variables in country i at time t,
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including GDP per capita, improved sanitation facilities (% of population with
access) and private spending on health as a percentage of GDP. These
independent variables are selected in order to compare with previous studies on
government spending on health. The socioeconomic independent variables are
taken from o¢ cial and credible sources, such as OECD.Stat 9, The Databank of
the World Bank 10, Global health expenditure database of World Health
Organization (WHO)11, IMF Data12, Reuter datastream and Penn World
Table13.
The panel data is the most up-to-date and has been observed in over 200
countries14 (including developed countries and developing countries) from 1980 to
2014. List of developed countries are presented in Appendix C.4.
The national health status is proxied by life expectancy at birth, infant
mortality rate and under-ve mortality rate. Life expectancy measures the
human populations average expected lifespan. It is commonly measured from
birth or a specic age. Life expectancy is used as a health indicator in many
studies on health, such as Bloom et al. (2004), and Aghion et al. (2010).
According to Murray & Chen (1992) and Crimmins, Hayward & Saito (1994),
better health (low morbidity rate) is accompanied with longer lives. Figure 6
shows life expectancy from 1960 to 2014. Global life expectancy signicantly
9OECD.Stat provides data and metadata for OECD countries and chosen non-member OECD
countries. The OECD.Stat URL is https://stats.oecd.org
10The Databank of the World Bank includes the important world development indicators.
Various economic and social indicators are provided with an analysis and visualization tool.
The Databank of the World Bank URL is http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx
11Global health expenditure database of WHO provides international health expenditures and
various health indicators.
The Global health expenditure database URL is http://apps.who.int/nha/database/Home/Index/en
12The IMF Data is the online database of international monetary fund which provides world
macroeconomic and nancial data. In additional, the database has a variety of government sector
indicators.
The IMF Data URL is http://http://data.imf.org
13Penn World Table, version 9.0 is available on www.ggdc.net/pwt. The website also shows
how these data were constructed and the di¤erent collection concepts. Further details: Feenstra,
Robert C., Robert Inklaar and Marcel P. Timmer (2015), "The Next Generation of the Penn
World Table" American Economic Review, 105(10), 3150-3182
14Due to the limitation of certain variables, the number of country in each regressions are
varied upon group of data.
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Figure 6: The world life expectancy during 1960 - 2014
increases from 53.96 years in 1960 to 71.55 years in 2014. The global population
has lived 17.6 years longer over the last ve decades. However, increases in life
expectancy are di¤erent among countries. The increase in life expectancy for
developed countries is relatively lower than the increase in life expectancy for
developing countries, as improvement in the United States and Japan are 9.17
years and 15.92 years respectively, while the increase Thailands life expectancy
is 19.72 years over the last 54 years (See gure 6). In 2014, the country with the
highest life expectancy is Hong Kong, at 83.98 years. In contrast, the country
with the lowest life expectancy in 2014 is Swaziland, at 48.94 years.
Apart from life expectancy, mortality rate is employed as a proxy health
indicator. The results of the mortality regression can be compared with the
result of the life expectancy regression. Mortality rate measures the number of
deaths compare to the total population by a specic cause or during a certain
period. Mortality rate is commonly presented as the number of deaths per 1,000
members of the population in a year. The present paper employs two types of
mortality rates, which are infant mortality rate and under-ve mortality rate.
Infant mortality rate shows a number of deaths of infants (age 0-1 year(s)) per
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Figure 7: The world infant mortality during 1970 - 2015
1,000 newborns. Under-ve mortality rate expresses the number of deaths (0-5
years of age) per 1,000 newborn. Mortality rate is employed as a health indicator
in several studies on health, such as Filmer & Pritchett (1999) and Gupta et al.
(2002). Figure 7 and 8 shows the infant mortality rate, alongside the global
under-ve mortality rate, of the United States, Japan, and Thailand in the 1970
to 2015 period. The world infant mortality and under-ve mortality rates have
signicantly fallen over the last 45 years, dropping from 86.5 and 130.9 to 24.0
and 31.9 respectively. The mortality rate in developed countries tends to be
lower than in developing countries, suggesting that mortality rate may be
associated with economic development to some extent. The present paper also
investigates this relationship. The di¤erence in mortality rate between developed
countries and developing countries has decreased considerably over the past ve
decades (see gure 7 and 8). In 2015, the country that had the lowest infant
mortality rate and under-ve mortality rate was Luxembourg at 1.5 and 1.9
respectively. Meanwhile, Angola had the highest infant mortality rate and
under-ve mortality rate at 96.0 and 156.9, respectively.
Government expenditures are expressed in percent to GDP for comparing
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Figure 8: The world under-ve mortality during 1970 - 2015
between countries. Government expenditures are classied by function, such as
expenditures on education, social protection, health, defense and general public
services. The source on government expenditures is the Government Finance
Statistic (GFS) and IMF Data, which contain detailed data on the government
sector.
The scatter plot of government spending on health and health status (life
expectancy, infant mortality rate, and under-5 mortality rate) is shown in Figure
9. The gure shows a positive relation between life expectancy and government
spending on health and a negative relation between both mortality rates and
government spending on health.
The independent variables of health regression is composed of the following:
Per capita income present income level of households. It is calculated from
real GDP at chained purchasing power parity (PPP) (in mil. 2011US$) dividing
by population. The source of real GDP and population is the Penn World Table.
According to Filmer & Pritchett (1999) and Gupta et al. (2002), an increase in
per capita income signicantly improves health.
Sanitary and safe water facilities are proxied by improved sanitation facilities.
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Figure 9: The scatter plot of life expectancy, infant mortality rate, under-5
mortality rate, and government spending on health in 2012
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Safe water facilities are important for child development. Poor access to safe
water facilities causes several fatal diseases, including diarrhoea, soil-transmitted
nematode infections, guinea-worm disease and malnutrition (Huttly 1990).
Moreover, previous studies nd that increases in access to sanitation are
associated with better health (Huttly (1990) and Kim & Moody (1992)).
Improved sanitation facilities are expressed as a ratio of the population with
access to sanitation facilities to the total population.
Private spending on health is a socioeconomic variable that may be associated
with health. Private spending on health can substitute or complement a
governments spending on health. Increases in private spending on health create
more human capital related to health (Psacharopoulos & Nguyen 1997). Private
spending on health is expressed as a percent to GDP. Since the data on private
health spending is limited, previous studies have not included this variable in
their regressions (Gupta et al. 2002).
The health model is estimated by using four estimation techniques, which are
xed-e¤ects model (FE), random-e¤ects model (RE), two-stage least-squares
within an estimator (2SLS FE), and two-stage least-squares random-e¤ects
estimators (2SLS RE). The two-stage least-squares estimator is employed in
order to deal with endogeneity problem, which is emerged from the correlation
between the independent variable and the residual term. The causes of
endogeneity problem can be a lack of some independent variable and a dynamic
panel data model with lagged dependent variables (Generalized method of
moments, GMM, should be applied with a dynamic panel data model). The
two-stage least-squares technique introduces additional instrumental variables
regression in the model to control an endogenous regressor.
The results of FE and RE model are compared by employing a Hausman test.
The Hausman test is used to decide whether a xed-e¤ects model or a random-
e¤ects model is preferable. The null hypothesis is
H0 : the di¤erence in coe¢ cients not systematic
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which indicates that the preferred model is a random e¤ects model.
4.3.2 The production function model
The production function model examines the role of human capital in the form
of health on aggregate output growth . Human health capital is proxied by the
life expectancy and mortality rates. The production function model adapts from
Bloom et al. (2004)s study. The production function has two source of growth,
namely factor of input and total factor productivity (TFP). The factor of input is
composed of labour, physical capital and human capital. The production function
is expressed as follows:
Yit = AitK

itL

ite
1Hit+2NHit (154)
, where Y is aggregate output. A is total factor productivity, K is physical
capital, L is a number of labour and H is average level of health status, which
is represented by life expectancy. Apart from health status, the present paper
introduces a new variable: non-medical determinants of health; NHit. This study
will examine the role of non-medical determinants of health on human capital in
the form of health. The selected non-medical determinants of health variables are
composed of tobacco consumption, alcohol consumption, sugar supply and total fat
supply. These variable are essential health indicators that can reveal individual
routine activities and lifestyles in developed countries (Larson & Mercer 2004).
The human capital in the form of health is dened in exponential term because it
can properly present a microeconomic foundation, such as a logarithm of wage that
depends on the level of national health status (Bloom et al. 2004).  is a capital
income share, and  is labour income share, while 1 and 1 are coe¢ cients of health
status and non-medical determinants of health, respectively. In order to estimate
the regression model, the production function is divided by total population and
transformed to a logarithm function. Using per capita terms can exclude the e¤ect
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of population growth. The logarithmic form of production function is
yit = ait + kit + lit + 1Hit + 2NHit (155)
, where yit; kit; and lit are logarithms of the per capita terms of Yit; Kit; Lit
respectively. ait is a constant term that represents total factor productivity.
Equation (155) is transformed into a growth equation as follows:
yit = ai + kit + lit + 1Hit + 1NHit (156)
Equation (156) represents the source of aggregate output growth, which is
composed of three components, namely growth of TFP, growth of the input factor
and growth of human capital in the form of health. The variables are obtained from
o¢ cial sources, such as the Penn World Table, Reuter datastream and OECD.Stat.
However, the global data on non-medical determinants of health variables are
limited, because the data are only available for OECD countries. The production
function model is estimated by using two estimation techniques, which are the
xed-e¤ects model (FE), the random-e¤ects model (RE).
The aggregate output, labour force, and capital stock are expressed in per
capita term and obtained from the Penn World Table. The non-medical
determinants of health variables are composed of tobacco consumption, alcohol
consumption, sugar supply, and total fat supply, which are received from
OECD.Stat. According to OECD.Stat, tobacco consumption refers to the annual
consumption of tobacco items, such as cigarettes, snus, and cigars, per person
aged 15 years and above. The tobacco consumption unit of measurement is
grams per person. The amount of tobacco contained in a cigarette and cigar is
approximately 1 gram and 2 grams, respectively. Alcohol consumption is annual
consumption of pure alcohol per person aged 15 years and above. The conversion
ratio of alcoholic drinks to pure alcohol is as follows (% pure alcohol equivalent):
40% for spirits, 11-16% for wines, and 4-5% for beers. The alcoholic consumption
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Figure 10: The scatter plot of life expectancy and GDP per capita (in logarithm
form) of the world, developed countries, and developing countries in 2014
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unit of measurement is litres per person. The sugar supply is all forms of sugar
and sweeteners consumed in a year. The sugar supply unit of measurement is
kilos per person. Total fat supply is all types of fat consumed in a day. The fat
supply unit of measurement is grams per person. The primary source of sugar
supply and fat supply data is the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO)15.
The scatter plot of life expectancy and GDP per capita (in logarithm form)
of the world, developed countries, and developing countries in 2014 are shown in
Figure 10. The gure shows a positive relation between life expectancy and GDP
per capita for all data sets.
15FAOSTAT, Food Balance Sheets: Food supply quantity.
http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FBS
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4.3.3 Data labels and sources
The source of variables of two models are listed in Table 4. The descriptive
statistics of all variables are presented in Appendix C.3.
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4.4. EMPIRICAL RESULT
4.4 EMPIRICAL RESULT
This section explains the empirical results of two models: the health model
and the production function model. Before estimation, all variables are analyzed
through performing a panel-data unit root test for checking the stationary process.
The present paper employs the Fisher-type unit root test (See Choi (2001) for more
details). The null hypothesis of the Fisher-type unit root test is that all the panels
contain a unit root. The results of the Fisher-type unit root test are present in
Appendix C.1 and C.2. The non-stationary variable is transformed by applying
the rst di¤erence before estimating the model. The models are estimated by
using the xed-e¤ects model (FE), the random-e¤ects model (RE), the two-stage
least-squares within estimator (2SLS FE), and the two-stage least-squares random-
e¤ects estimator (2SLS RE).
The two-stage least-square approach is applied when dealing with a reserve
causality problem. According to Gupta et al. (2002), the reverse causality problem
can arise in the relationship of government spending on health and health status.
The increase in government spending on health may lead to an increase in life
expectancy. At the same time, greater demand for better health, as represented
by higher life expectancy, may lead to a push for higher government spending
on health. However, the two-stage least-square approach can eliminate this error
correlation problem. When an error term is correlated with a regressor variable,
the ordinary least squares (OLS) technique may produce an inconsistent coe¢ cient.
4.4.1 The health models
The empirical results of the health model are produced from three models,
depending on the selected dependent variables. These models are a life
expectancy regression, an infant mortality regression and an under-ve mortality
regression. In order to compare the results, each regression is estimated through
four approaches, namely FE, RE, 2SLS FE and 2SLS RE. The instruments of
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Table 5: The correlation of government spending by function of government in
2010-2014
Variable gov govhealth govdef govedu govpub
gov 1.000
govhealth 0.704 1.000
govdef 0.348 -0.147 1.000
govedu 0.549 0.557 -0.062 1.000
govpub 0.285 0.204 -0.078 0.233 1.000
two-stage least-squares approach are adapted from Gupta et al. (2002). They
suggest that, according to the studies of Looney Robert E (1996) and Gbesemete
& Gerdtham (1992), the share of government spending on defense may dene the
di¤erence in the share of government spending on health across countries. In
order to verify this relation, the correlation of government spending by the
function of government is estimated. Table 5 present the correlation of
government spending by government function (percentage to GDP), which are
listed gov; govhealth; govdef; govedu; govpub: Government spending on health,
total government spending and government spending on education are all high
correlated. The defence expenditure is negatively correlated with government
spending on health, education and general public services. This result is
consistent with the study of Looney Robert E (1996) that nds a negative
correlation between defence expenditure and socioeconomic expenditure.
Therefore, the present paper selects gov; govdef; govedu; govpub as instruments
for govhealth:
Life expectancy, infant mortality, and under-ve mortality regression are
reported in Table 6, 7, and 8, respectively16. The explanatory variables can
explain 70-80% of cross-country variation in the health status. The F-Statistic of
all regressions, which shows the models overall signicance, is signicant at the
1% level. This value implies that the chance for all regression parameters to
equal zero is less than 1%.
In addition, all regressions are diagnosed for cross-sectional dependence and
16In order to deal with heteroskedasticity, the robust standard errors is used for x e¤ect model
and random e¤ect model. The robust standard errors relaxes the main assumption of OLS that
the error term are both independent and identically distributed.
140
4.4. EMPIRICAL RESULT
heteroskedasticity. The problem of cross-sectional dependence usually occurs for
a macroeconomic panel data with a time period of over 20 years. The
cross-sectional dependence is a cause-of-bias estimator in regression
(Torres-Reyna 2007). The Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence is employed
to test for cross-sectional dependence17. The null hypothesis of this test is that
no correlation exists among residuals across entities. The test result show that
there is no cross-sectional dependence in the life expectancy regression, the infant
mortality regression and the under-ve mortality regression because of a small
number of common observations across panels. The heteroskedasticity test is
conducted for all FE models. The modied wald statistic for group-wise
heteroskedasticity is calculated18. The null hypothesis of this test is
homoskedasticity (constant variance) in the variable. The results show a presence
of heteroskedasticity in all xed-e¤ect models . Therefore, the regression is
re-estimated by using the robust command in order to obtain
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors as recommended by Torres-Reyna
(2007).
The Fisher-type unit root test in Appendix C.1 shows that govhealth has a
unit root in life expectancy regression. Therefore, two additional models, namely
the xed-e¤ects model with d:govhealth (the rst di¤erence of govhealth) (FE(2))
and the random-e¤ects model with d:govhealth (RE(2)), have been used and
calculated from. The Hausman test indicates that life expectancy regression
prefers the FE, RE(2), and 2SLS FE models; while both mortality regressions
prefer the FE model19.
Government spending on health is statistically signicant in all two-stage least-
squares models, but not for all FE and RE models. The coe¢ cient of government
spending on health is positive for life expectancy regression. A one percentage
17The Breusch-Pagan LM test for cross-sectional correlation in xed-e¤ects model can be
obtained by using the command xttest2 in STATA program.
18The modied wald statistic for groupwise heteroskedasticity in the xed-e¤ects model can
be estimated by using the command xttest3 in STATA program.
19"N/A" implies that the model tted on these data fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions
of the Hausman test since chi2<0
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Table 6: The results of life expectancy regressions
Life Expectancy FE RE FE(2) RE(2) 2SLS FE 2SLS RE
govhealth 0.23 0.22 0.53 0.47
(1.45) (1.45) (5.45) (5.09)
govhealth -0.05 -.07
(-1.01) ( -1.49)
gdpcap 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.19
(5.78) (6.01) (5.53) (5.82) (23.25) (22.88)
sani 0.32 0.29 0.34 0.30 0.32 0.28
(4.93) (5.66) (6.02) (6.30) (21.03) (21.29)
phealthgdp 0.46 0.45 0.52 0.49 0.25 0.27
(2.20) (2.36) (2.19) (2.22) (2.39) (2.82)
Constant 38.56 42.13 38.05 42.03 37.99 42.63
(6.67) (10.20) (7.76) (10.96) (26.85) (35.23)
R-squared 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.72 0.77 0.76
No. of observations 860 860 783 783 847 847
F-Statistic/Wald chi2 33.25 173.23 30.67 150.74 104.82 1791.32
Hausman test (chi2) 63.18 63.18 4.72 4.72 128.63 128.63
t  statistics (FE model), and z (RE model) are shown in parentheses.
F-Statistic is shown for xed-e¤ects model.
Wald chi2 is shown for random-e¤ects model.
The instruments of 2SLS FE and 2SLS RE are total government expenditure,
government expenditure on defense, government expenditure on education,
government expenditure on general public services- all variables are percent to GDP.
 Indicates signicance at the 10% level.
 Indicates signicance at the 5% level.
   Indicates signicance at the 1% level.
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Table 7: The results of infant mortality regressions
Infant mortality FE RE 2SLS FE 2SLS RE
govhealth -0.34 -0.20 -1.04 -0.99
(-2.06) (-0.84) (-3.10) (-3.11)
gdpcap -0.23 -0.20 -0.21 -0.15
(-2.16) (-2.43) (-5.86) (-4.25)
sani -1.39 -0.86 -1.44 -0.78
(-8.58) (-6.95) (-21.35) (-15.97)
phealthgdp -0.31 -0.19 0.04 0.09
(-0.44) (-0.35) (0.10) (0.25)
Constant 146.14 96.58 151.81 89.85
(9.70) (9.55) (23.70) (20.67)
R-squared 0.71 0.71 0.79 0.80
Number of observations 333 333 327 327
F-Statistic/Wald chi2 33.02 130.02 35.47 472.06
Hausman test (chi2) 169.82 169.82 N/A N/A
t  statistics (FE model), and z (RE model) are shown in parentheses.
F-Statistic is shown for xed-e¤ects model.
Wald chi2 is shown for random-e¤ects model.
The instruments of 2SLS FE and 2SLS RE are total government expenditure,
government expenditure on defense, government expenditure on education,
government expenditure on general public services- all variables are percent
to GDP.
 Indicates signicance at the 10% level.
 Indicates signicance at the 5% level.
   Indicates signicance at the 1% level.
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Table 8: The results of under-ve mortality regressions
Under-ve mortality FE RE 2SLS FE 2SLS RE
govhealth -0.54 -0.24 -1.58 -1.31
(-1.72) (-0.67) (-3.33) (-2.97)
gdpcap -0.25 -0.21 -0.22 -0.14
(-1.97) (-2.20) (-4.35) (-2.89)
sani -2.00 -1.15 -2.07 -1.04
(-7.43) (-6.57) (-21.66) (-15.44)
phealthgdp -0.40 -0.24 0.13 0.12
(-0.43) (-0.33) (0.23) (0.24)
Constant 205.41 124.96 214.07 116.45
(8.17) (8.69) (23.58) (19.70)
R-squared 0.70 0.70 0.79 0.79
Number of observations 333 333 327 327
F-Statistic/Wald chi2 21.56 104.39 30.51 416.72
Hausman test (chi2) 202.08 202.08 N/A N/A
t  statistics (FE model), and z (RE model) are shown in parentheses.
F-Statistic is shown for xed-e¤ects model.
Wald chi2 is shown for random-e¤ects model.
The instruments of 2SLS FE and 2SLS RE are total government expenditure
government expenditure on defense, government expenditure on education,
government expenditure on general public services- all variables are percent
to GDP.
 Indicates signicance at the 10% level.
 Indicates signicance at the 5% level.
   Indicates signicance at the 1% level.
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increase in government spending on health to GDP leads to approximately a half
year increase in life expectancy across the countries analyzed. The results of the
mortality regressions show a negative relation between government spending on
health and both mortality rates that is consistent with Gupta et al. (2002) and
Baldacci et al. (2003)s ndings. A one percentage increase in government spending
on health to GDP statistically lowers the infant mortality rate and the under-ve
mortality rate by 1 to 1.1 and 1.3 to 1.6, respectively. This contrast with the
nding from Filmer & Pritchett (1999) that government spending on health is not
a powerful determinant of mortality.
Per capita income is signicant for all regressions. The result shows that a
higher per capita income is associated with a longer life expectancy and lowers
both mortality rates across the countries analyzed, which is consistent with
Gupta et al. (2002)s ndings. A one thousand 2011US$/person increase in per
capita income improves the populations health through raising the life
expectancy between 0.18 and 0.20 year, lowering the infant mortality rate
between 0.15 and 0.23 (per thousand live births) and decreasing the under-ve
mortality rate between 0.14 and 0.25 (per thousand live births). Moreover,
improved sanitation facilities are signicant at the 1% level for all regressions.
Improved sanitation facilities are considered to be strong predictors of the
populations health status. This result is in line with earlier literature from
Huttly (1990) and Kim & Moody (1992) that nd a positive relation between an
increase in access to sanitation and an improvement of health status. However,
interestingly, this is contrary to a study from Gupta et al. (2002) that
investigates the relation of access to sanitation with the mortality rate. Most of
their regressions show an insignicant relationship between access to sanitation
and mortality rate. Private spending on health is signicant for the life
expectancy regression but not for both mortality regressions. These results may
imply that most amounts spent by private entities on health are allocated for
improving longevity but not for reducing child mortality. The private health
spending coe¢ cient in the 2SLS model is half of the coe¢ cient corresponding
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with government spending on health (in the range 0.25-0.27). A one percentage
increase in private spending on health to GDP contributes to approximately a
quarter year increase in life expectancy cross-country. Knowledge of the
relationship between private spending on health and health status is important
for budgetary planning by governments. Private spending on health can
e¤ectively substitute a governments spending on health in improving longevity.
Therefore, the government can allocate extra government spending to other
productive areas such as education, which can increase human capital and
promote economic growth in the long term.
The worlds government spending on health, as well as by selected countries
and private entities, from 1995-2014 is shown in Figure 11. It is apparent from
this gure that the relationship between government and private spending on
health is mixed, as it is both substituting and complementary. The worlds
government spending on health and the worlds private spending on health are
complementary, since both amounts have increased over the last 20 years period.
The share of the worlds government spending on health to total health spending
increased from 59 percent in 1995 to 60.3 percent in 2014. This shows additional
government e¤orts to improve the global health. In contrast, the share of the
worlds private health spending to total health spending falls during that period.
In some developed countries, for example, the United states and Japan, the
governments spending on health and private spending on health are
complementary. However, the roles of the government and private entities in
these countries healthcare systems are totally di¤erent. In the United states,
private spending on health is larger than the governments expenditures on
health. Healthcare costs in the United States are the highest in the world,
measured by per capita and as percentages to GDP. According to the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)20, the United States total health
20CMS provides historical data of the national health expenditure accounts (NHEA) of the
United States. NHEA presents annual U.S. expenditures for health care goods and services,
public health activities, government administration, the health insurance, and health care
investment.
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spending is $9,990 per person or 17.8 percent of GDP in 2015. Anderson,
Reinhardt, Hussey & Petrosyan (2003) suggests that the U.S. governments
spending on health is not signicantly di¤erent from OECD countries, but the
countrys private spending on health is very high compared to this group. They
conclude that a higher price of healthcare goods and services in the U.S.
contributes to the highest amount of total healthcare spending in the world.
The largest part of the U.S.s healthcare spending goes to hospital care and
physician and clinical services, which accounted for 32 and 20 percent shares in
2015, respectively. The U.S.s private spending on health is mainly composed
of private health insurance and out-of-pocket health spending. On the contrary,
Japans private spending on health is relatively low, compared to its government
spending on health. Japan has a universal health care insurance system, which
prioritizes a relative equality of access. The government sets the level of patients
participation in medical fees by considering their ages and their familiesincomes.
For example, patients make a co-payment of 30% of medical fees for curative
service, 20% of medical fees for pre-school children and those aged 70-74 years,
and 10% of medical fees for those over 75 years (WHO 2012). Some developed
countries have a substitution between government spending on health and private
spending on health, such as the Netherlands. The Dutch governments spending
on health has constantly increased over the last decade, while the Netherlands
private spending on health has fallen from 2.9 percent of GDP in 2005 to 1.4
percent of GDP in 2006. In Europe, the Netherlandshealthcare is ranked in rst
place by the Euro Health Consumer Index (EHCI)21. In 2006, the Netherlands
introduced a new healthcare insurance system based on risk equalization through
a risk equalization pool. Its insurance premiums are not related to health status
or age. The entire population can purchase compulsory insurance at a reasonable
price without risk assessing by the insurer.
Although government and private spending on health in most countries are
21EHCI is a healthcare index that is calculated based on waiting times, outcomes, and
generosity. It was introduced in 2005.
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complement, several developing countries, such as Thailand and Bangladesh, have
a substitution. Thailands private spending on health continuously falls; whereas
its government spending on health constantly rises (see Figure 11). The important
advance in Thailands healthcare is the introduction of a universal coverage scheme,
namely the 30 Baht project, in 2001. All Thais who join this program are allowed
to access health services by paying a small co-payment. This program signicantly
improves the health of middle to low income households that are not covered
by the civil service welfare system and the social security program. These two
former programs were designed for civil servants and private employees. After
implementing the universal coverage scheme, Thailands government spending on
health substantial increased in 2002; while its private spending on health has
gradually fallen. In spite of improvements in national health, the substitution
between government and private spending on health of Thailand raises a concern
of long-term scal debt. For a small-open economy, a higher scal debt directly
a¤ects the nancial sector and trade sector via exchange rate adjustments.
The healthcare of Bangladesh contrasts with Thailands. Its private spending
on health has increased since 1997, but its government spending on health has
slowly fallen. This process transfers the responsibility for healthcare from the
government to the private sector, and it may allow more government spending
for other productive sectors, such as education. The World Bank data show that
Bangladeshs government spending on education has increased from 1.95 percent
of GDP in 1997 to 2.18 percent of GDP in 2012.
4.4.2 The production function model
The production function models are investigated by using three data sets:
global data, developed countries data, and developing countries data. The
empirical results can be compared and examined for the role of health on
economic growth in di¤erent environments. The regressions estimation employs
a xed-e¤ect (FE) model and a random e¤ect (RE) model. The FE model and
RE model employ time-xed e¤ect to test whether the dummies for all years are
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Figure 11: Government spending on health and private spending on health by the
world and selected countries during 1995 - 2014
Source: World Health Organization. The global health expenditure data base
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Table 9: The correlation of GDP and independent variables in production function
mode in 1950-2014
Variable gdp capital labour life
gdp 1.00
capital 0.92 1.0
labour 0.36 0.28 1.00
life 0.81 0.76 0.35 1.00
equal to zero or not. The coe¢ cients of the time dummy are not presented due
to a large number of coe¢ cients. Table 9 presents the correlation of GDP and
independent variables in the production function model, which are capital,
labour and life expectancy. All variable have a positive correlation. The
dependent variable, gdp, has a high correlation with capital and life: Among
independent variables, only capital and life are highly correlated. All variables
are diagnosed for unit root. The results of the Fisher-type unit root test are
present in Appendix C.2. The unit root test results show that all variables do
not have unit roots.
Moreover, all production function regressions are diagnosed for cross-sectional
dependence and heteroskedasticity. The cross-sectional dependence can emerge
from spatial e¤ect, spillover e¤ect, or unobserved common factors. The
cross-sectional dependence problem cause a considerable distortion in estimators
(Baltagi & Hashem Pesaran 2007). The cross-sectional dependence is tested by
using the Pasaran CD test, since the Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence is
not available for this model 22. The null hypothesis of the Pasaran CD test of
independence is independence among residuals across entities. The result of
Pasaran CD test shows that there are cross-sectional dependences in the global
model, developed countries and developing countries. Cross-sectional dependence
can be caused by common shocks (such as recession) or spillover e¤ects. Since
the FE model and RE model assume cross-sectional independence, the results
may show imprecise estimators. Hence, the mean group estimator approach is
introduced in order to deal with this problem. The foundation procedures for the
22The Pasaran CD test for cross-sectional dependence in xed-e¤ects model can be obtained
by using the command "xtcsd, pesaran abs" in STATA program.
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mean group estimator approach are adding cross-sectional averages of both
dependent variables and regressors to the regression, evaluating the regression of
all specic groups and averaging the coe¢ cients of all specic groups (Eberhardt
et al. 2012). There are several types of mean group estimators in the literature.
This paper chooses the augmented mean group estimator (AMG), including
group-specic trend-terms, which is developed by Eberhardt & Teal (2010).
AMG is commonly employed for estimating a production function23. It can
capture a common dynamic process or an evolution of an unobservable TFP over
time (See Eberhardt & Teal (2010) for details).
The heteroskedasticity test is conducted for all FE models. The modied Wald
statistic for groupwise heteroskedasticity is calculated. The results show a presence
of heteroskedasticity in all xed-e¤ect models. Therefore, the regression is re-
estimated by using a robust command in order to obtain heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors. The robust standard errors relax the main assumption of
OLS that the erroneous term are both independent and identically distributed.
The production function with life expectancy models are reported in Table
10. The explanatory variables can explain 62-64% of cross-country variations in
the output of global models and developing country models and 31% of cross-
country variation in the output of developed country models. The F-Statistic of
all regression, which shows overall signicance of the model, is signicant at the 1%
level24. This value implies that the chance for all regression parameters to equal
zero is less than 1%. The Hausman test indicates that the production function
with health status prefers the RE model for global, developed and developing
models. Both the capital and labour coe¢ cients are signicant at the 1% level for
all models and data sets. The capital income share in the global and developing
countriesmodels is larger than the capital income share in the developed countries
models (in the range of 0.51-0.73 and 0.46-0.53 respectively). In contrast, the share
23The augmented mean group estimator can be estimated by using the command "xtmg" in
STATA program.
24Some regressions do not show the F-Statstic (N/A), because the computation software
(STATA) is concerned with the misleading data. There is nothing necessarily wrong wihth
the model.
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of labour income in the global and developing countriesmodels is smaller than
the share of labour income in the developed countriesmodels (in the range of
0.28-0.47 and 0.60-0.63 respectively). The global and developing countriesmodels
show a decreasing return to scale property since the sum of the factors of the input
coe¢ cients is less than one; while, developed countries have an increasing return
to scale.
The life expectancy is positively signicant in the global and developing
countriesmodels in the FE and RE approaches. The life expectancy coe¢ cients
of these models are close to 0.01, indicating that a one-year increase in life
expectancy leads to a one percent increase in output. The result conrms that
improving life expectancy in developing countries and the world contributes to a
higher human capital in the form of health, leading to economic growth. The
positive e¤ect of life expectancy on output nding is consistent with the studies
by Barro et al. (1996), Bloom & Williamson (1998), Bloom & Canning (2000)
and Bloom et al. (2004). Their life expectancy coe¢ cient is in the range of
0.04-0.06. These studies indicate that an improvement in health leads to an
increase in human capital, which results in a higher labour productivity. Apart
from improving in human capital, longer life expectancy a¤ect saving decision.
People who have longer life expectancy tend to save more in order to consume in
the future, lead to a capital accumulation and enhancing economic growth
(Zhang et al. 2003, Aísa et al. 2004, Lorentzen et al. 2008). Moreover, Acemoglu
& Johnson (2007) nds that a longer life expectancy creates a higher population,
resulting in more labour for goods production because the birth rate does not
decrease enough to o¤set the longer life expectancy.
Conversely, the developed countries life expectancy coe¢ cient is not
signicant. The nding shows that improving life expectancy in a developed
country may not contribute to economic growth. A possible reason is that the
health status in a developed country is substantially higher than in a developing
country, which is shown by the longer average life expectancy of people living in
a developed country. The average life expectancy for the populations of
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developed countries is 79.9 years in 2014, comparing to 68.9 years for the
populations of developing countries. Therefore, increasing human capital in the
form of health of a developed country requires more resource than for a
developing country and can take resources from more productive sectors,
ultimately slowing down the economy.
While the results from the FE and RE models are in line with the literature on
life expectancy, the result of the AMG models show the insignicance of the life
expectancy coe¢ cient in the global, developed countries, and developing countries
models. The AMG is used to deal with the cross-sectional dependence which
usually arises in macroeconomics data with long duration series (over 20-30 years).
This suggests that the result of the FE and REmodels may present bias estimators,
and the result should be interpreted with caution.
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4.4. EMPIRICAL RESULT
The production functions regressions, with non-medical determinants of
health like tobacco consumption, total fat supply, alcohol consumption and sugar
supply, are reported in Table 11. Due to the limitation of including non-medical
variables, only OECD country data is available. The non-medical determinants
of health model can explain 60-77% of cross-country variations in the output of
OECD countries. All non-medical determinants of health regressions have higher
R-squared results than life expectancy regressions (1). This suggests that
non-medical determinants can represent cross-country variations in the output of
OECD countries better than life expectancy. The F-Statistic of all regressions,
which shows overall signicance of the model, is signicant at the 1% level 25.
The Hausman test indicates that all production functions with non-medical
determinants prefer the RE model. Capital and labour coe¢ cients are signicant
for all models. However, life expectancy coe¢ cient is not statistically signicant
in regression (1), which is similar to the developed country regression in Table
10. The regression (2) shows a small, positive and signicant coe¢ cient of
tobacco consumption at 10% level, which contrasts with common expectations.
Tobacco use causes several diseases and signicantly reduces the life expectancy
of smokers (Olshansky et al. 2005). Valkonen & Van Poppel (1997) studies the
e¤ects of smoking on life expectancy in Europe countries, such as Denmark,
Finland, Norway, Sweden and The Netherlands. The paper found that the
estimated decrease of life expectancy from age 35 attributable to smoking was
between 1.2-3.7 years from 1985 to 1989. The loss of life expectancy among
males is signicantly higher than among females. Hence, an increase in tobacco
consumption clearly decrease the nations human capital in the form of health.
So, what causes a positive e¤ect from tobacco use on the economy?
According to Bloom et al. (2004), the tobacco industry claims that tobacco is
important for economic activities and nation scal health, thereby disregarding
physical health problems resulting from tobacco use. Sales of tobacco products
25Some regressions do not show the F-Statstic (N/A), because the computation software
(STATA) is concerned with the misleading data. There is nothing necessarily wrong with the
model.
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generate tax revenue and jobs related to tobacco manufacturing in farming,
production, wholesale, transportation and retail. The United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA) reported that U.S. consumer expenditures on tobacco in
1997 were worth $52.6 billion. Manufacturing received 43% of consumer
expenditures on tobacco or $26.1 billion; whereas, farmers received a smaller
share of this spending, only 6% of consumer expenditures on tobacco or $2.9
billion. However, the amount of U.S. tobacco farmers was relatively large, and
roughly 90,000 farms grew tobacco leaf in 1998. The U.S. tobacco consumption
generated $13.5 billion in excise tax for the Federal, State and local branches of
government in 1997 (H. Frederick Gale, Foreman & Capehart 2000). Hence,
higher demand for tobacco may lead to an economic expansion in The United
States and tobacco-dependent countries.
Similarly, alcohol is positively signicant at the 5% level. The coe¢ cient of
alcohol consumption is 0.006, which implies that a one litre per capita increase in
alcohol consumption leads to a 0.6% increase in economic growth. This positive
e¤ect does not increase, higher human capital in the form of health, because
alcohol consumption raises not only a risk of alcohol-related diseases but also
numbers of accidents and violent incidents. Blanchard & Perotti (1999) study the
impact of alcohol on life expectancy and describe alcohol-related mortality by
cause of death in Finland. The paper shows that loss of life expectancy from age
15 years attributable to alcohol-related mortality is 2 years for men and 0.4 years
for women. In addition, this paper also reviews the e¤ect of alcohol consumption
on life expectancy (see details in Appendix C.5). The nding shows that alcohol
consumption and life expectancy are signicantly negatively correlated. One liter
per capita increases in alcohol consumption over a year lead to a shortening of
0.12 to 0.13 years in life expectancy across the OECD countries.
How does alcohol bring economic benet to society? Economic benets from
alcohol can be directly measured through examining alcohol sales generated that
are transferred to the government as excise tax revenue, as well as the number of
jobs related to alcohol consumption. According to HM Revenue and Customs,
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the alcohol duty receipt has almost tripled over the last three decades, and it is
worth £ 11 billion in 2016 (1.9% of total HMRC receipts and 0.6% of the U.K.s
GDP). The U.K.s average taxes on wine and spirits are 56% and 77%,
respectively(WSTA 2016). The alcohol duty receipt can be used to nance
general government expenditures and specic sectors that are undermined by
alcohol consumption, such as healthcare. The Wine and Spirit Trade Association
(WSTA) claimed that alcohol manufacturing and retail sales employed more than
588,000 people in 2016. Therefore, an increase in alcohol consumption can create
higher jobs and labour income, leading to economic growth. The results indicate
that alcohols economic benet is greater than its cost in OECD countries
(disregarding the social cost).
Fat and sugar are not statistically signicant in all models. The nding shows
that the consumption of fat and sugar does not contribute to economic growth
or contraction. However, fat and sugar consumption are the important health
indicators. High fat and sugar consumption are associated with the development
of chronic diseases such as type 2 diabetes and cardiovascular disease (Malik,
Popkin, Bray, Després, Willett & Hu 2010, Franco, Steyerberg, Hu, Mackenbach
& Nusselder 2007, Hu, Stampfer, Manson, Rimm, Colditz, Rosner, Hennekens &
Willett 1997). Malik et al. (2010) study the risk of attaining metabolic syndrome
and type 2 diabetes by consuming sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs). They nd
that individuals who consume SSBs (1-2 servings per day) have a 26% higher risk
of developing type 2 diabetes than those who consume SSBs less than 1 serving per
month. This disease is clearly associated with lower life expectancy. According
to Franco et al. (2007), people with diabetes have a higher risk of developing
cardiovascular disease (CVD) and their life expectancy signicantly decreases by
7.5 years on average for men and 8.2 years for women.
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4.5. CONCLUSION
4.5 CONCLUSION
The chapter studies the role of public health spending on economic growth
by analysing improvement in national health, which is represented by life
expectancy and the mortality rate. The study is composed of two models,
namely the health model and the production function with human capital model.
The model data is panel data, which is the most up-to-date with observations
from over 200 countries (including developed countries and developing countries).
The health model is estimated by using the xed-e¤ects model, the random e¤ect
model, and the two-stage least-squares approach, which is applied for dealing
with the reserve causality problem. The instruments of the two-stage
least-squares approach are government spending on defense, government
spending on education, government spending on public service and total
government spending. Moreover, this paper examines the private sectors role in
health, which is not considered in the previous literature on health due to a lack
of data (Gupta et al. 2002). Other independent variables are GDP per capita
and improvement in sanitation facilities. The result show that the e¤ect of
government spending on health is positively signicant in all two-stage
least-squares models. A one percentage of GDP increase in government spending
on health leads to approximately a half year increase in life expectancy across the
countries analyzed. The result of the mortality regressions show a negative
relation between government spending on health and both mortality rates. This
is consistent with Gupta et al. (2002) and Baldacci et al. (2003)s ndings. A one
percentage of GDP increase in government spending on health to statistically
lowers the infant mortality rate and the under-ve mortality rate by 1 to 1.1 and
1.3 to 1.6, respectively. This contrasts with Filmer & Pritchett (1999) s nding
that government spending on health is not a powerful determinant of mortality.
Interestingly, private spending on health has a signicant positive e¤ect on life
expectancy, but it does not have a signicant e¤ect on either mortality rate. This
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nding implies that most amounts spent by private entities on health is allocated
for improving longevity but not for reducing child mortality. The private health
spending coe¢ cient of 2SLS model is half of the coe¢ cient of government
spending on health, as it is in the range of 0.25-0.27. This result is useful for
government budgetary planning. Private spending on health can e¤ectively
substitute a governments spending on health on improving longevity. Therefore,
governments can allocate extra spending to other productive areas, such as
education, which can increase human capital and promote economic growth in
the long term.
The production function with human capital is estimated by using the
xed-e¤ects model, the random e¤ects model, and the mean group estimator,
which is used to deal with a cross-sectional dependence problem . The national
health status is represented by life expectancy. In order to compare the e¤ect of
di¤erent countries incomes on health and economic growth, the models are
estimated by using three data sets, which are global data, developed countries
data and developing countries data. The results show that life expectancy is
positively signicant for global and developing countries models by using the
xed-e¤ects and random e¤ects approaches. The life expectancy coe¢ cients of
these models are close to 0.01, which implies that a one year increase in life
expectancy leads to a one percent increase in output. The nding is consistent
with the studies by Barro et al. (1996), Bloom & Williamson (1998), Bloom &
Canning (2000) and Bloom et al. (2004). Their life expectancy coe¢ cients are in
the range of 0.04-0.06. However, an increase in life expectancy in a developed
country may not contribute to economic growth, since developed countries
requires more resource to improve health status than in developing countries. In
contrast, the mean group estimator shows the insignicance of the life
expectancy coe¢ cient in both developed countries and developing countries
models. This suggests that the result of the xed-e¤ects and random e¤ect
models should be interpreted with caution.
Moreover, non-medical determinants of health, such as tobacco consumption,
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alcohol consumption, sugar supply, and total fat supply, are used as a proxy for
health indicators in developed countries. Since most populations in developed
countries have a high life expectancies, using life expectancy as a health indicator
may not reect the national health and the lifestyle of the population (Larson &
Mercer 2004). The data for this analysis is obtained from OECD countries. The
ndings suggest that only tobacco and alcohol consumption have signicantly
positive relations (at 10% level) with economic growth, which contrasts with the
expectation. Both tobacco and alcohol consumption shorten life expectancy,
(Olshansky et al. 2005), (Valkonen & Van Poppel 1997), and (Bloom et al. 2004),
so they should decrease human capital in the form of health in production
function as well. The positive e¤ect of higher tobacco and alcohol consumption
on economic growth can arise from an increase in economic activities and
improvement in the nations scal health. A higher demand for tobacco and
alcohol products generates more tax revenue, which supports scal health and
creates jobs related to manufacturing in farming, production, wholesale,
transportation and retail. This result implies that the tobacco and alcohol
business is signicantly important for the economy of OECD countries. When
promoting a health campaign, such as a smoke-free program, the government can
balance the trade-o¤ between the benet of a healthier population and the loss of
tobacco-related economic activity.
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CONCLUSION
Fiscal policy is an important governmental tool for stabilizing and
maintaining economic growth, especially during an economic crisis. The impacts
of scal policy on economies are extensively investigated in numerous closed
economy studies, such as Fernández-Villaverde (2010), Eggertsson (2011), and
Zubairy (2014). However, the estimation of a scal multiplier in closed economy
models may be su¢ ciently di¤erent from the estimation of one in a small-open
economy, because trading in the goods and services sector can be important, and
trade can potentially impact the exchange rates adjustment and interest rates
response to scal policies. The purpose of this thesis is examining the
e¤ectiveness of expansionary scal policy shocks, such as an increase in
government spending or a decrease in sales tax, payroll tax, and capital tax
shocks, on macroeconomic variables in a small-open economy. The study employs
a medium-scale DSGE model, calibrated to Thailands parameters. The models
foundation is adopted from The Bank of Thailands Structural Model (DSGE
model), which is introduced by Tanboon (2008). This thesis extends the DSGE
model and introduces a rich scal block for analyzing the e¤ect of scal policy.
The most important nding is that an increase in government expenditures has
a signicantly positive impact on the domestic rmsoutput, whereas exporting
rms respond by lowering their production. This is because wage and capital rent
are raised, which leads to higher costs for the export sector. Hence, the total
e¤ect of an increase in government spending is smaller in a small-open economy
as compared to a closed economy. In addition, the reduction of the tax rate has
a fairly positive e¤ect on domestic output. However, depending on the tax base,
it can have a positive or negative e¤ect on exporting rms. This can possibly be
explained by the di¤erence in the market structure of the domestic and exporting
rms. It is assumed that the export sector is perfectly competitive, while the
163
domestic rms price their goods with a positive mark-up. Moreover, the results
show that the impact multiplier of government spending on the national output is
0.25, and the impact multipliers of sales tax, payroll tax, and capital tax are 0.08,
0.37 and 0.09, respectively. In long-term, the impact of government spending is
smaller than the impact of the tax cut. Lastly, comparing on three taxes, lowering
the payroll tax can be the most e¤ective means in the long-term.
The second paper studies the optimal taxes in a small-open economy with an
imperfectly competitive market and habit preferences. Under imperfectly
competitive market, rms can inuence the price setting, rather than be price
takers. They can set a positive price mark-up over marginal costs. Since this
condition can alter the rms optimization behaviour, it changes the optimal
capital income tax rate. Moreover, habit formation preferences are important in
analyzing consumers behaviour (Ravn et al. 2006, Ljungqvist & Uhlig 2000).
The households with habit formation tend to smooth their consumption over the
time and gradually adjust their consumption when confronted with an income
shock (Dynan 2000). The habit preference can change the households
optimization problem and the dynamics of the demand facing the rms, which in
turn changes rmsinvestment strategies and alter the optimal tax policy. This
paper uses both numerical estimates and analytical investigation to study
optimal capital income and labour income tax in a small-open economy. The
numerical approach solves the Ramsey problem. The economic model follows the
DSGE model in the rst paper and is parameterized to Thailands data. The
numerical result shows that the optimal capital income tax appears to be
negative, which is consistent with Judd (1997) s results. In order to understand
the e¤ect of models distortions, such as a monopolistic distortion, on the
numerical result, the analytical investigation is employed. The model is
simplied by using a zero investment adjustment cost and exible wages and
prices. The analytical investigation highlights three important ndings. Firstly,
the optimal capital income tax in a small-open economy with a perfectly
competitive market is not di¤erent from the optimal capital income tax in closed
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economy, and it equals to zero as in Chamley (1981), Judd (1985), Chamley
(1986), Lucas (1990) and Chari et al. (1991). Secondly, the optimal capital
income tax in a small-open economy with an imperfectly competitive market is
negative and negatively related to price mark-up. This analytical result ensures
the nding regarding optimal capital income tax in numerical estimates. Thirdly,
the most interesting result, deep habit preferences create a volatile and
counter-cyclical mark-up. Hence, capital income tax is not smooth and volatile
over the horizon as a response to the price mark-ups adjustment. The optimal
capital income tax rate should be increased during an economic boom period and
lowered during recessions.
The second paper contributes to the literature in the following way. This study
extends the Judd (1997) results for the optimal capital income tax and estimates
optimal tax rates in a small-open economy with an imperfectly competitive market
and habit persistence The result suggests that governments should subsidize capital
income taxes to o¤set gaps between the price and the marginal cost. Hence, the
capital income tax is negatively related to the mark-up. The labour income tax is
set to maintain the implementability of the government budget.
The third paper examines the impact of the government spending on health
on economic growth by analyzing improvement in the national health condition.
The government has an important role in improving national health through
providing, for example, inclusive access to health care and nutrition services,
reducing health gaps between di¤erent population groups and ensuring
sustainable public health nancing. However, the literature on the e¤ectiveness
of government spending on national health nds ambiguous results. The third
paper has two objectives. The rst one investigates the e¤ect of the governments
spending on health on the improvement of national health indicators, such as life
expectancy, infant mortality and under-ve mortality. The health model is
estimated by using the xed-e¤ects model, the random e¤ect model, and the
two-stage least-squares approach. The global panel data, observed over 200
countries, is used for the study. In addition, the private health spending, which
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has not been considered in the literature on health due to a lack of data (Gupta
et al. 2002), is included in the health model. The results reveal that a
government spending on health has a signicantly positive e¤ect on health status
by improving life expectancy at birth, infant mortality, and the under-ve
mortality rate. Interestingly, private spending on health has a signicant positive
e¤ect on life expectancy, but it does not have the signicant e¤ect on mortality
rates. This gives rise to the implication of government budget allocation on
health. Private spending on health can e¤ectively substitute government
spending on health for improving longevity.
The second objective of the third paper is examining the importance of
human capital in the form of health for productivity and economic growth.
Three panel estimations are implemented: the xed-e¤ect model, the
random-e¤ect model, and the mean group estimator, which is used to deal with a
cross-sectional dependence problem. The models are estimated with three
data-sets: global data, developed countriesdata, and developing countriesdata.
Moreover, non-medical determinants of health, such as tobacco consumption,
alcohol consumption, sugar supply, and total fat supply, are used as proxies for
health indicators in developed countries. The results show that an increase in life
expectancy has a positive e¤ect on output in developing countries. The model
predicts that a one-year increase in life expectancy can raise output by one
percent. However, an increase in life expectancy does not have a signicant e¤ect
in developed countries. Since most developed countries have signicantly longer
life expectancies and lower mortality rates than developing countries, more
resources are required to improve health in a developed country than in a
developing country. Additionally, the result of non-medical determinants of
health indicates that tobacco and alcohol consumption have a signicantly (at
10% level) positive e¤ect on economic growth in OECD countries. This may be
surprising, but tobacco and alcohol consumption may have two o¤setting e¤ects
on economic growth. On the one hand, tobacco and alcohol consumption
certainly lower human capital in the form of health, because they shorten the
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consumers life expectancy (Olshansky et al. 2005, Valkonen &
Van Poppel 1997, Bloom et al. 2004). On the other hand, higher tobacco and
alcohol consumption lead to higher demand, which may increase economic
activities and economic growth, create jobs related to manufacturing (in the
farming, industrial production, wholesale, transportation and retail sectors, for
example) and generate additional tax revenue. Most importantly, a higher tax
revenue can be used to support the scal health.
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Part 6
APPENDIX
A APPENDIX: Fiscal Policy on Small-Open
Economy
A.1 The householdsand rmsintertemporal problems
Intertemporal problem that householdsface is
L = E0
1X
t=0
t
(
(1  ) log ~Ct   'L L
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t
1 + 
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
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The households budget constraint is assumed as follows:
[1 +Rt 1]Dt 1 + (1  wt )WtLt + (1   kt )RKt Kt +
X
j
j
= (1 +  st)(1  )PDt ~Ct + (1 +  st)PDt ht + PDt It +Dt
The consumption-decision is acquired from deriving the rst-order condition
by applying @L
@ ~Ct
= 0:
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The capital decision is acquired from deriving the rst-order condition by
applying @L
@Kt+1
= 0:
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The investment decision is acquired from deriving the rst-order condition by
applying @L
@It
= 0:
@L
@It
=  ttPDt + ttQKt
@F (It; It 1)
@It
+ t+1t+1Q
K
t+1
@F (It+1; It)
@It
= 0
QKt
PDt
=
1
F1(It; It 1)

1  Ett+1
t
QKt+1
PDt
F2(It+1; It)

QKt
PDt
=
1
1  I It
It 1

It
It 1
  (1 + )

  I
2

It
It 1
  (1 + )
2

"
1  IEtt+1
t
QKt+1
PDt

It+1
It
2It+1
It
  (1 + )
#
The labour supply decision is acquired from deriving the rst-order condition
by applying @L
@Lt
= 0:
@L
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The saving and borrowing decision is acquired from deriving the rst-order
condition by applying @L
@Dt
= 0:
@L
@Dt
=  tt + t+1t+1 [1 +Rt] = 0
t = t+1 [1 +Rt]
The production function of domestic rms.
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The domestic rms minimize their cost of production with subject to
production function constraint. The Lagrangian function is
LD =  1 +RLt WtLDt +PMt MDt +RKt KDt +QDt hY Dt   (AtLDt )DL (MDt )DM (KDt )1 DL DMi
The labour demand decision is acquired from deriving the rst-order condition
by applying @L
D
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The raw imported material demand decision is acquired from deriving the rst-
order condition by applying @L
D
@MDt
= 0:
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The capital service decision is acquired from deriving the rst-order condition
by applying @L
D
@KDt
= 0:
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The price markup is acquired from deriving the rst-order condition by
applying @L
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Domestic rms try to minimization problem of price setting.
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The solution is
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The production function of foreign rms is calculated through
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Export rms minimize their cost of production with subject to a production
function constraint. The Lagrangian function is
LX = WtLXt + PMt MXt +RKt KXt +QXt
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The labour demand decision for export rms is acquired from deriving the
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rst-order condition by applying @L
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The raw imported material demand decision is acquired from deriving the rst-
order condition by applying @L
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The capital service decision is acquired from deriving the rst-order condition
by applying @L
X
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A.2 Log-Linearized Equations
This section illustrates how Log-Linearlized Equations are employed. A Log-
Linearlized estimation is a simple approximation technique for studying a range
of economic problems. There are a number of steps for estimating Log-Linearlized
Equations. Firstly, a percentage deviation from a steady state of variable x is
dened as follows:
bxt = xt   x
x
bxt is the percentage deviation of xt from steady state x: x or x (both without
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subscript t) is a steady state value of xt: Secondly, the Taylors theorem is applied
for evaluating a dynamic equation. Let us consider a univariate function, f(x).
The basic version of Taylors theorem can be presented by
f(x) = f(x)+
f
0
(x)
1!
(xt x)+ f
00
(x)
2!
(xt x)2+:::+ f
(k)
(x)
k!
(xt x)k+hk(x)(xt x)k:
f
0
(x) is the rst derivative of f with respect to x, calculated at the value of x:
f
00
(x) is the second derivative of f with respect to x, calculated at the value of x:
The continuum of the derivative term continues until k terms, which is also called
the k order of Taylors theorem. hk(x) is the remainder of Taylors theorem. In this
present research, the rst-order of Taylors approximation is used since the most
equation is continuous. The rst-order of Taylor approximation can be shortened
as follows:
f(x; y)  f(x; y) + fx(x; y)xbxt + fy(x; y)ybyt
The rst order of Taylor approximation of each economic sector are shown as
follows:
A.2.1 Households Sector
The household sectors behavior equations are summarized in Table 12.
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Where qKt =
Qt
PDt
; rKt =
RKt
PDt
; wt =
Wt
PDt
; t =
PDt
PDt 1
; st = St
PMFt
PDt
; bt =
Bt
PDt
; and it is
assumed that  = 1;  = 0;
A.2.2 Firms Sector
The rms sectors behavior equations are summarized in Table 13.
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Table 14: The list of aggregation equations
Non-linear equations Linearized equations Descriptions
1A Y Nt = Y
D
t + Y
X
t
dY Nt = Y DY D+Y X cY Dt + Y XY D+Y XdY Xt National output
2A Kt = KDt +K
X
t
cKt = KDKD+KXdKDt + KXKD+KXdKXt Capital
3A Lt = LDt + L
X
t
bLt = LDLD+LX cLDt + LXLD+LX cLXt Labour
4A Mt =MDt +M
X
t
cMt = MDMD+MX dMDt + MXMD+MX dMXt Intermediate good
5A Y Dt = Ct + It +Gt
cY Dt = CY D bCt + IY D bIt + GY D bGt Market clearance
, where pMt =
PMt
PDt
; pDt =
PDt
PDt
; pXt =
PXt
PDt
; fDt = DtpDt ; fXt = XtpDt
A.2.3 Aggregation
The aggregation equations are summarized in Table 14.
A.2.4 Fiscal Policy and Monetary Policy Sector
The scal policy and monetary policy equations are summarized in Table 15.
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Where twt =
Twt
PDt
; tst =
T st
PDt
; tkt =
Tkt
PDt
;
A.2.5 International externalities
The international externalities equations are summarized in Table 16.
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B. APPENDIX : OPTIMAL TAXES IN A SMALL-OPEN ECONOMY
B APPENDIX : Optimal Taxes in a Small-Open
Economy
B.1 The small-open economy model for optimal taxation
B.1.1 Households sector
A small-open economy is populated with a number of innitely lived
households. Households are identical and homogeneous . At period t, they
consume the amount Ct of goods: The household utility function, U(:), is in the
Von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences form. U(:) is uniformly identical over a
households lifetime and is an innitely consumption series. It is a strictly
increasing and concave function. The most important characteristic of a
households preference is its persistence as a habit. Koehne & Kuhn (2013)
claims that the habits persistence can a¤ect the calculation of the optimal
taxation by wealth e¤ect, the complementary e¤ect and the future incentive
e¤ect. Habit-adjusted consumption, ~Ct is assumed as equation (2). The
continuum of the expected lifetime of the householdsutility is the same as in the
rst sections equation (1). The households utility function is subject to
householdsbudgeting constraints as follows:
Ct + It + dt =
(1 +Rt 1)
t
dt 1 + (1  wt )wtLt +

1  (1  )  kt

rKt Kt +
X
j=D;X
ejt
(157)
The householdsbudget constraints are presented in real terms by normalizing
with PDt . The householdsexpenditures, the left-hand side of budget constraints
equation, are composed of three parts: consumption (Ct), investment (It); and
deposit (Dt): On the right-hand side of the budget constraints, four sources of
householdsincomes derive from previous periodssavings, and they include the
interest rate, the labour supply return, the capital return, and the prot from
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the rmsoperations. Rt; wt; rKt denotes a nominal interest rate for the deposit,
which is similar to the policy interest rate, real wage rate, and the real price of
capital, respectively. Householdsincomes are taxed at a payroll tax rate (wt ) and
a capital tax rate ( kt ).  is a rate of depreciation, and Kt is capital at the current
period. Households who are owners of rms receive the operation prot ejt , whereeDt is the domestic rmsprots, and eXt is the export rmsprots. A capital
accumulation and an investment adjustments costs are presented in equation (5)
and (6).
For the households intertemporal problem, the Lagrangian formulation is
presented as follows:
L = E0
1X
t=0
t
(
(1  ) log ~Ct   'L L
1+
t
1 + 
+ t

(1 +Rt 1)Dt 1 + (1  wt )wtLt +

1  (1  ) kt

rKt Kt
+
X
j=D;X
ejt   (1  ) ~Ct   ht   It  Dt
35 +tqKt [(1  )Kt + F (It; It 1) Kt+1]	 (158)
, where ht represents habits and is taken by the households as an exogenous
variable, while qKt is a shadow price of capital. The householdsdecision is the
maximizing of a habits persistence utility subject to budget constraints and
capital accumulation. In order to determine the households decision, the
rst-order condition with respect to macroeconomic variables is derived. The
details of the rst-order condition are as follows:
The rst-order condition with respect to ~Ct, @L@ ~Ct = 0
t =
1
~Ct
(159)
The rst-order condition with respect to Kt+1, @L@Kt+1 = 0
qKt = Et
t+1
t

1  (1  )  kt+1

rKt+1 + q
K
t+1 (1  )

(160)
194
B. APPENDIX : OPTIMAL TAXES IN A SMALL-OPEN ECONOMY
The rst-order condition with respect to It; @L@It = 0
qKt =
1
1  I It
It 1

It
It 1
  (1 + )

  I
2

It
It 1
  (1 + )
2

"
1  IEtt+1
t
qKt+1

It+1
It
2It+1
It
  (1 + )
#
(161)
The rst-order condition with respect to Lt, @L@Lt = 0
(1  wt )twt = 'LLt (162)
The rst-order condition with respect to Dt, @L@Dt = 0
t = t+1(1 +Rt) (163)
For the price of labour, wage is rigid. The real wage setting for a real wage
rigidity is assumed as follows:
wt = w

t + 
W [  (4wt  4wt 1) +  (4wt+1  4wt)] (164)
, where wt = 
wwt would be the wage if there are no wage rigidities, 
W is a
wages stickiness, and 4wt 1 aggregates wage ination in previous period. w > 1
is wage mark up. The wage depends on two terms. Firstly, it directly relies on
the optimal wage in a wage-exible environment. Secondly, the wage depends on
rigidity term, which is a di¤erent between wage ination, 4wt , and wage ination
of previous period,4wt 1.
The capital market is open, and foreign investors can nance the domestic
economy. bt is foreign debt in a foreign currency: The spread between the
domestic interest rate, Rt, and the foreign interest rate, Rt , depends on an
expected change in the nominal exchange rate, Et

st+1
st

; and an additional risk
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premium proportional to a foreign debt to national income ratio:
(1 +Rt)
(1 +Rt )
= Et

st+1
st

bt
2 Y Nt
B
t (165)
, where st is a real exchange rate, and 
B is an elasticity of interest rate premium
on foreign debt holdings. Y Nt is a national output, and bt is a foreign bond in
domestic currency. t denotes a transition cost, since there is a spread between
the domestic interest rate and the foreign interest rate. The term in brackets
shows the risk premium, which the ratio of local debt to nominal GDP is bt
Y Nt
,
and  is the average foreign debt to GDP the ratio. The risk premium reects the
sustainability of the foreign debt.
, where st is a real exchange rate, 
B is an elasticity of interest rate premium
on foreign debt holdings. Y Nt is a national output, bt is a foreign bond in domestic
currency. t denotes a transaction costs.
B.1.2 Firms sector
The most important function of the rms is to produce goods for the economy.
In this model, there are two type of rms, namely domestic rms and export rms.
Their names dene the destination market of the goods, as domestic rms only
produce goods for the domestic market, and export rms only produce goods for
trading abroad. The specic characteristics of each rm are explained as follows:
Domestic Firms Domestic rms have a Cobb-Douglas production function that
is similar to the production function in the rst part, namely equation (21).
A domestic rms real total cost is
tcDt =
 
1 +RLt

wtL
D
t + p
M
t M
D
t + r
K
t K
D
t (166)
, where tcDt is the domestic rms real total cost, which is derived from costs
of labour, intermediate goods and capital service. A cost of labour is the sum of
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a wage payment and an interest rate payment at a labour loan interest rate, RLt ,
since the main assumption is that only domestic rms borrow money from the
bank. pMt is a raw imported material price.
A real prot of the domestic rm, eDt ; is a real total domestic rms revenue
less a real total cost of production. The expression of the domestic rms real
prot is eDt = Y Dt   (1 +RLt )wtLDt   pMt MDt   rKt KDt  (167)
The objective of a domestic rm is maximizing prot subject to a production
function constraint. The domestic rmsdecisions are composed of the amount of
labour input, LDt ; a capital service input, K
D
t , and an intermediate goods input,
MDt . The Lagrangian function is
LD = Y Dt    1 +RLt wtLDt   pMt MDt   rKt KDt  qDt hY Dt   (AtLDt )DL (MDt )DM (KDt )1 DL DM i
(168)
In order to determine the rms decision, the rst-order condition with respect
to macroeconomic variables is derived. The details of the rst-order condition are
as follows:
The rst-order condition with respect to LDt ,
@LD
@LDt
= 0
 
1 +RLt

wtL
D
t = 
D
L q
D
t Y
D
t (169)
The rst-order condition with respect to MDt ,
@LD
@MDt
= 0
pMt M
D
t = 
D
Mq
D
t Y
D
t (170)
The rst-order condition with respect to KDt ,
@LD
@KDt
= 0
rKt K
D
t =
 
1  DL   DM

qDt Y
D
t (171)
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Domestic rms can set the price of goods, since they have a monopolistic power
by di¤erentiating their products. However, there is a rigidity in the domestic rms
price. The price adjustment is sticky when responding to the shock. The domestic
rmsprice setting, a given domestic price, and a domestic price markup are similar
to the situation described in equation (30), (31), (28), respectively.
Export Firms Export rms also have a Cobb-Douglas production function,
which is similar to the production function described in equation (32).
The export rmstotal cost, tcXt ; contrasts with the domestic rmstotal cost.
This thesis assumes that export rms have large capital investments, so they do
not borrow money for labour payments from banks. Thus, there is no labour cost
loan term in the export rmsreal total cost function. A real cost of the export
rms production, tcXt ; is assumed as follows:
tcXt = wtL
X
t + p
M
t M
X
t + r
K
t K
X
t (172)
Furthermore, a real export rms prot, eXt ; is a total export rms revenue
less a total cost of production, and it is assumed as follows:
eXt = pXt Y Xt   wtLXt   pMt MXt   rKt KXt (173)
, where pXt is the price of the export rmsgoods in terms of the local currency,
which is equal to the global price. The export rmsprot is presented in real
terms through normalizing with PDt :
The objective of export rms is maximizing prot subject to a production
function constraint. The export rmsdecisions are composed of the amount of a
labour input, LXt ; a capital service input, K
X
t , and an intermediate goods input,
MXt . The Lagrangian function is
LX = pXt Y Xt   wtLXt   pMt MXt   rKt KXt  qXt hY Xt   (AtLXt )XL (MXt )XM (KXt )1 XL XMi
(174)
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The rst-order condition with respect to LXt ,
@LX
@LXt
= 0
wtL
X
t = 
X
L q
X
t Y
X
t (175)
The rst-order condition with respect to MXt ,
@LX
@MXt
= 0
pMt M
X
t = 
X
Mq
X
t Y
X
t (176)
The rst-order condition with respect to KXt ,
@LX
@KXt
= 0
rKt K
X
t =
 
1  XL   XM

qXt Y
X
t (177)
The price setting of the export rms is di¤erent from the price setting of the
domestic rms. Since export rms goods are sold in a perfectly competitive
market, the export rms receive a global price for their price setting. At an
equilibrium, the export rms price is
qXt = p
X
t (178)
, where qXt is the export rmsshadow price.
pXt is the product of the real exchange rate, st; and the price of export goods
in a foreign currency, pXft . The price of the export rms is assumed as follows:
pXt = stp
Xf
t (179)
Similarly, pMt denotes a domestic import price, which is the product of the
foreign import price, PMFt , and the nominal exchange rate, St: The import rms
price is assumed as follows:
pMt = StP
MF
t = st (180)
The national output or Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Y Nt , is the sum of the
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domestic rmsand export rmsoutputs. The national output is
Y Nt = Y
D
t + Y
X
t (181)
B.1.3 Banks Sector
The lending spread varies over time. During an economic expansion, the
lending spread decreases. In contrast, it increases during recessions. The labour
loan interest rate and the deposits lent out to the rm ratio are similar equations
(44) and (45). The households face an incomplete asset market, since they
cannot hedge against undesirable outcomes in the future. The incomplete asset
market is an important assumption in several studies on optimal taxation, such
as Aiyagari (1995), Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent & Seppälä (2002) and
Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2004). The households can only allocate their incomes
to deposits and earn deposit interest rates.
B.1.4 Government sector
This part explains the role of government in a small-open economy,
including a scal rule, a government expenditure, taxation, and a government
budget constraint. The main roles of government are consuming and providing
sustainable economic growth. To maintain these objectives, governments use a
simple scal rule for planning spending. A scal rule can be assumed as follows:
Gt = 
GGt 1
Dt
+
 
1  GY Nt (182)
, where Gt is real government spending. Government spending is adjusted
according to the level of the previous periods government spending and the
national output. G is the persistence of government spending.  is a ratio of
government spending to output. Government spending is set to  percentage of
national output for supporting sustainable economic growth. This study uses the
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government budget constraint developed in Zubairy (2014)s study. Her DSGE
model includes a comprehensive scal policy block. There are two types of taxes,
namely a payroll tax and a capital tax. The governments budget constraint is
bGt = (1 +Rt 1)b
G
t 1 +Gt   wt wtLt   (1  )  kt rKt Kt (183)
, where bGt is a real government bond. Governments issue bonds for nancing
spending. Private agents (households, domestic rms and foreign rms) can buy
bonds. In the governments budget constraint, a bond has two main components.
Firstly, it depends on the last periods government bond, particularly its interest
rate payment. Secondly, a bond depends on the governments primary decit,
which is a di¤erence between the latters spending and total revenue. The
governments total revenue consists of payroll tax revenue and capital income tax
revenue.
In the credit market, a debt balance equation is assumed as follows:
bGt + wtL
D
t = dt + bt (184)
The above equation simply presents the total loan that is required in the
economy. The sum of the government bond and domestic rmsborrowing, which
is on the left hand side of the debt balance equation, is equal to the total
available credit in the economy, which is composed of the householdssaving and
foreign borrowing.
B.1.5 Central Bank Sector
The central banks objective is maintaining the economys price stability. In
order to reach this objective, the central bank introduces monetary policies by
announcing the policy interest rate as a benchmark for banks. The central bank
adjusts the policy interest rate as a response to ination and output. The principle
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of the Taylor rule is used as a monetary policy in the present model. The Taylor
rule is similar to equation (52).
B.1.6 Market Clearing Condition
The market clearing condition requires a equality of the supply and demand
of output. The price of goods also adjusts until reaching a market clearing price
at the market clearing condition. The adjustment of price and quantity of output
freely moves toward that condition. The market clearing condition for domestic
output, foreign output, labour, import, capital and banks is similar to equation
(53), (54), (55), (56), (57) and (58), respectively.
B.1.7 Steady State Condition
The steady state condition is the condition where all variables do not change.
For example, the quantity is at the same level or grows at the steady growth
rate. In order to prevent an explosion or a collapse of macroeconomic variables, a
growth rate of these variables is set as a constant (Tanboon 2008). In the present
model, the growth rate of all variables is zero. The change in the price level or
ination is also set to zero (t = 1). The step of the steady state estimation of
the small-economy model is similar to the procedure in the rst part. The steady
state labour tax and capital income tax, w and  k; are obtained from Thailands
labour tax and capital income in 2017. The details of steady state equations are
presented in Appendix B.2.
B.1.8 Model Parameters Calibration
The present model uses the same calibration parameter as provided in the rst
part. The parameters are calibrated for representing Thailands economy. Data are
obtained from several sources, such as the bank of Thailands structural model for
policy analysis (Tanboon 2008), the bank of Thailands macroeconometric model,
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the O¢ ce of the National Economic and Social Development Boards website26,
the Fiscal Policy O¢ ce, the Ministry of Finance, and the revenue department .
The details of the calibration parameters are presented in Table 17 and 17. A
description of all parameter has been provided in the rst section of this paper.
Table 17: The model parameters
Symbol Parameter Value
 Discount Factor 0.9926
 Consumption Habit Persistence Factor 0.85
'L Scaling Parameter of Labour Disutility Function 1
 Inverse of Frisch Elasticity 3.0303
I The Elasticity of Investment Adjustment Cost 0.9
 Productivity Growth Rate 0
 Depreciation Rate 0.0072
W Wage Markup 1.05
W The Elasticity of Wage Adjustment Cost 9
R Foreign Interest Rate 0.0036
B The Elasticity of Interest Rate Premium
on Foreign Debt Holdings 0.35
 The Foreign Debt-to-GDP Ratio at Steady-State 0.299
 The Gap between Domestic and Foreign Interest Rate 0.0025
DL Labour Income Share of Domestic Firms 0.76
DM Imported Input Income Share of Domestic Firms 0.12
D The Elasticity of Price Rigidities 9
D Domestic Price Markup 1.02
XL Labour Income Share of Foreign Firms 0.72
XM Imported Input Income Share of Foreign Firms 0.14
 The Degree of Bank Willingness to Lend subject to
the Relative GDP Growth rate 0.6
G The Degree of Government Expenditure Persistency 0.85
 The Specic Ratio of Government Expenditure to GDP 0.149
R The Degree of Interest Rate Policy Persistency 0.9
 The Sensitivity of Interest Rate Policy to Ination 20
PD Domestic Price of Consumption and Investment Goods 1.0
PXF Foreign Export Price 1.0
PMF Foreign Import Price 1.0
B.2 The steady-state condition of the optimal taxes in a
small-open economy
The details of all steady-state equation are as follows:
26http://www.nesdb.go.th/
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Table 17: The model parameters (continued)
Symbol Parameter Value
w Payroll Tax 0.131
 k Return on Capital Tax 0.1
Table 18: The steady-state condition of the optimal taxes in a small-open economy
Steady-state equations
1ss ~C = C
2ss K = F (I;I)
+
3ss F (It; It 1) = I
4ss  = 1~C
5ss qK = [
1 (1 )k]
(1 (1 )) r
K
6ss qK = 1
7ss w = '
L ~CL
(1 w)
8ss w = w
9ss 1 +R = 

10ss (1+R)
1+R =
 



B

b
2 Y N
B

11ss bG + wLD = d+ b
12ss Y D = (ALD)
D
L (MD)
D
M (KD)1 
D
L DM
13ss
 
1 +RL

wLD = DL
1
D
Y D
14ss SpMFMD = DM
1
D
Y D
15ss rKKD =
 
1  DL   DM

1
D
Y D
16ss PD = PD
17ss 1 = DqD
18ss Y X = (ALX)
X
L (MX)
X
M (KX)1 
X
L XM
19ss wLX = XL p
XY X
20ss SpMFMX = XMp
XY X
21ss rKKX =
 
1  XL   XM

pXY X
22ss QX = PX
23ss PX = SPXf
24ss Y N = Y D + Y X
25ss LN = D
26ss  = 1
27ss RL = R
28ss Gt = G

Gt 1
Dt

+
 
1  G  yNt 
Continued on the next page
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Table 18: The steady-state condition of the optimal taxes in a small-open economy
(continued)
Steady-state equations
29ss R = Rss
30ss L = LD + LX
31ss M =MD +MX
32ss K = KD +KX
33ss Y D = C + I +G
34ss Y X = X
35ss B = SB
36ss PM = SPMF
37ss d = 1
(1  1 )
h
(1  w)wL+ 1  (1  )  k rKK + eD + eX  C   Ii
38ss bG = 1
(1  1 )

G  wwL  (1  )  krKK
39ss eD = Y D   (1 +RLt )wLD   pMMD   rKKD
40ss eX = pXY X   wLX   pMMX   rKKX
B.3 The rst-order condition of the Ramsey problem
This step involves nding the rst-order conditions of the Lagrangian problem
(L) with respect to considered variables, which are C; dt; It; t; wt; LDt ; LXt ; rK ;
qDt ; q
K
t ; bt; b
G
t ; K
D
t ; K
X
t ; R
L; st; Y
D
t ; Y
X
t ; M
D
t ; M
X
t ; Gt; (1+Rt); 
k
t ; 
w
t : The detail
of all 24 rst-order conditions of the Lagrangian problem are shown as follows:
The rst-order condition with respect to Ct27
dL
dCt
=
(1  )
Ct   Ct 1   1t(1 + 
s
t) + 5t(1 + 
s
t)
w'L
 
LDt + L
X
t

+6t

(1 +  st+1)t+1+ (1 + 
s
t) [1 +Rt]

+ 19t   20t st
  (1  )
Ct+1   Ct   5t+1(1 + 
s
t+1)
w'L
 
LDt+1 + L
X
t+1

 6t+1(1 +  st+1) [1 +Rt+1]   16t 1(1 +  st)t (185)
The rst-order condition with respect to dt
dL
ddt
=  1t + 1t+1

(1 +Rt)
t+1

  8t (186)
27Di¤erentiate Logarithm : if y = ln x then dydx =
1
x : if y = ln f(x) then
dy
dx =
f
0
(x)
f(x) :
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The rst-order condition with respect to It
dL
dIt
= 1t( 1) + 2t
"
1  
I
2

It
It 1
  1
2
It
It 1
  I

It
It 1
  1

It
It 1
#
+2t+1
 
I

I
t+1
It
  1
 
 I
2
t+1
I2t
!!
+4t
 
I
It 1

2
It
It 1
  1 +

It
It 1
  1

qKt (1 +Rt) + 
I It+1
I2t
"
3

It+1
It
2
  2

It+1
It
#
Etq
K
t+1t+1
!
 4t+1I
It+1
I2t

2
It+1
It
  1 +

It+1
It
  1

qKt+1 (1 +Rt+1)
  14t 1IEt 1qKt t

3
I2
t
I3t 1
  2 It
I2t 1

+ 19t (187)
The rst-order condition with respect to t
dL
dt
= 1t

  [1 +Rt 1]
2t
dt 1

+  13t 1
  
1  (1  )  kt

rKt + q
K
t (1  )

+ 14t 1
 
 IEt 1qKt

It
It 1
2
It
It 1
  1
!
+5t

  wt
wt 1

(1  wt )W [1 + ]

+15t+1

(1  wt+1)W
wt
wt 1

+  15t 1

(1  wt 1)W
wt
wt 1

+ 16t 1 [ (1 +  st) (Ct   Ct 1)]
+ 17t 1
24 1 +Rt 1Et 1 stst 1 1t


 
bt 1
2 
 
Y Dt 1 + Y
X
t 1
!B t 1
35
 12tD [1 + ] + 12t+1D + 12t 1D   17tG

Gt 1
2t

+18t
 
[1 +Rt]
 
1  R  1t + 20t (1 +Rt 1)bGt 12t

(188)
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The rst-order condition with respect to wt
dL
dwt
= 1t

(1  wt )(LDt + LXt )  (1 +RLt )LDt   LXt

+5t(1  wt )

 1 + W

  (1 + ) t
wt 1
  wt+1
w2t
t+1

+5t+1

(1  wt+1)W

wt+1
w2t
t+1 (1 + ) +
1
wt 1
t

+25t+2

 (1  wt+2)W

wt+1
w2t
t+1

+5t 1

(1  wt 1)W
1
wt 1
t

+8tL
D
t
+9t
    1 +RLt LDt + 13t   LXt + 20t   wt (LDt + LXt ) (189)
The rst-order condition with respect to LDt
dL
dLDt
=  'L(LDt + LXt )   1t

wt +R
L
t )

wt
+5t(1 + 
s
t) (Ct   Ct 1)w'L
 
LDt + L
X
t
 1
+8twt
 9t
 
1 +RLt

wt
 20twt wt + 22tDLY Dt =LDt (190)
The rst-order condition with respect to LXt
dL
dLXt
=  'L(LDt + LXt )   1twtwt + 5t(1 +  st) (Ct   Ct 1)w'L
 
LDt + L
X
t
 1
 13twt   20twt wt + 21tXL
Y Xt
LXt
(191)
The rst-order condition with respect to rKt
dL
drKt
=  1t(KDt +KXt ) (1  )  k +  13t 1
 
1  (1  )  kt 1

t
 11tKDt   15tKXt   20t (1  )  kt (KDt +KXt ) (192)
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The rst-order condition with respect to qDt
dL
dqDt
= 12t
D (193)
The rst-order condition with respect to qKt
dL
dqKt
=  3t [1 +Rt] +  13t 1t (1  )
 4t
"
1  I It
It 1

It
It 1
  1

  
I
2

It
It 1
  1
2#
(1 +Rt)
  14t 1It

It
It 1
2
It
It 1
  1

(194)
The rst-order condition with respect to bt
dL
dbt
= t7t
"
(1 +Rt )Et
B

st+1
st
t+1
t+1

1
((Y Dt + Y
X
t ) 2 
B
(bt)
B 1 t
#
 t8t
= 7t (1 +Rt) 
B 1
bt
  8t (195)
The rst-order condition with respect to bGt
dL
dbGt
= 8t   20t + 20t+1(1 +Rt) 1
t+1
(196)
The rst-order condition with respect to KDt
dL
dKDt
=  1trKt (1  )  kt ) + 2t (1  )   12t 1
 11trKt   20t (1  )  kt rKt
+22t
 
1  DL   DM
 Y Dt
KDt
(197)
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The rst-order condition with respect to KXt
dL
dKXt
=  1trKt (1  )  kt ) + 2t (1  )   12t 1
 15trKt   20t (1  )  kt rKt
+21t
 
1  XL   XM
 Y Xt
KXt
(198)
The rst-order condition with respect to RLt
dL
dRLt
=  1twtLDt   9twtLDt   16t

Y Dt
Y Dt 1

(199)
The rst-order condition with respect to st
dL
dst
= 1t

Y Xt  
PMFt
PXFt
 
MDt +M
X
t

+

 7t [(1 +Rt) =st] +  17t 1 [(1 +Rt 1) =st]
 10t

PMFt
PXFt
MDt

+ 13t
 
XL Y
X
t

+15t
 
1  XL   XM

Y Xt (200)
The rst-order condition with respect to Y Dt
dL
dY Dt
= 1t + 7t
h
(1 +Rt)
  B  Y Dt + Y Xt  1i
+9t
D
L
1
D
+ 10t
D
M
1
D
+ 11t
 
1  DL   DM
 1
D
 16t
(1 +RLt )(
Y Dt
Y Dt 1
) 1
Y Dt 1
  16t+1( 1 RLt )
Y Dt (
Y Dt
Y Dt 1
) 1
(Y Dt 1)2
+ 17t
 
1  G
 19t   22t (201)
The rst-order condition with respect to Y Xt
dL
dY Xt
= 1tst + 7t
h
(1 +Rt)
  B  Y Dt + Y Xt  1i
+13t
X
L st + 14t
  XM+ 15t  1  XL   XM st
+17t
  
1  G  21t (202)
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The rst-order condition with respect to MDt
dL
dMDt
= 1t

 stP
MF
t
PXFt

+ 10t

 stP
MF
t
PXFt

+ 22t
D
M
Y Dt
MDt
(203)
The rst-order condition with respect to MXt
dL
dMXt
=
PMFt
PXFt
( 1tst   14t) + 21tXM
Y Xt
MXt
(204)
The rst-order condition with respect to Gt
dL
dGt
=  17t + 17t+1G Gt
t+1
+ 19t + 20t (205)
The rst-order condition with respect to (1 +Rt)
@L
@(1 +Rt)
= 1t+1
dt
t+1
  3tqKt
+4t
 
1 
"
1  I It
It 1

It
It 1
  1

  
I
2

It
It 1
  1
2#
qKt
!
+6t(1 + 
s
t) (Ct   Ct 1)  7t + 16t
 18t + 18t+1 [1 +Rt+1]
1 +Rt
R + 20t+1
bGt
Dt+1
(206)
The rst-order condition with respect to  kt
dL
d kt
=  1t (1  ) rKt (KDt +KXt )  3t (1  ) rKt+1t+1
 20t (1  ) rKt (KDt +KXt ) (207)
The rst-order condition with respect to wt
dL
dwt
=  1twt(LDt + LXt )
+5t

wt + 
W

wt
wt 1
t   wt 1
wt 2
t 1

  W

wt+1
wt
t+1   wt
wt 1
t

 20twt(LDt + LXt ) (208)
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All of the above rst-order condition equations are used for deriving a steady-
state condition in the next step.
B.4 Steady state equations of the rst-order condition of
the Ramsey problem
The steady-state equations of the rst-order condition with respect to Ct
0 =
1
C
(1  )  1 + 5w'L
 
LD + LX

(1  )
+6

+  [1 +R]   [1 +R]  


+ 19 (209)
The steady-state equations of the rst-order condition with respect to dt
8 = 0 (210)
The steady-state equations of the rst-order condition with respect to It
0 =  1 + 2 + 19 + (1  ) 4 
I
I
qK

(1 +R)  


(211)
The steady-state equations of the rst-order condition with respect to t
0 = 1

  [1 +R]
2
d

+  13
  
1  (1  )  k rK + qK (1  )
+ 16 [  (1  )]C
+ 17
"
(1 +R)

1
t

b
2 (Y D + Y X)
B#
+17

 G G
2

+ 18
 
[1 +R]
 
1  R  1+ 20 (1 +R)bG
2

(212)
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The steady-state equations of the rst-order condition with respect to wt
0 = 1

(1  w)(LD + LX)  (1 +RL)LD   LX  5(1  w) + 8LD
+9
    1 +RLLD+ 13   LX+ 20   w(LD + LX) (213)
The steady-state equations of the rst-order condition with respect to LDt
0 =  'L(LD + LX)   1

w +RL

w
+5 (1  )Cw'L
 
LDt + L
X
t
 1
+ 8twt
 9
 
1 +RL

w   20ww + 22DL
Y D
LD
(214)
The steady-state equations of the rst-order condition with respect to LXt
0 =  'L(LD + LX)   1ww + 5 (1  )Cw'L
 
LD + LX
 1
 13w   20ww + 21XL
Y X
LX
(215)
The steady-state equations of the rst-order condition with respect to rKt
0 =  1(KD +KX) (1  )  k +  13
 
1  (1  )  k 
 11KD   15KX   20 (1  )  k(KD +KX) (216)
The steady-state equations of the rst-order condition with respect to qDt
12 = 0 (217)
The steady-state equations of the rst-order condition with respect to qKt
0 =  3 [1 +R] + 3 (1  )  4 (1 +R) (218)
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The steady-state equations of the rst-order condition with respect to bt
0 = 7 (1 +R) 
B 1
b
  8 (219)
The steady-state equations of the rst-order condition with respect to bGt
0 = 8 + 20

 1 + (1 +R)


(220)
The steady-state equations of the rst-order condition with respect to KDt
0 =  1rK (1  )  k + 2
 
(1  )   1  11rK   20 (1  )  krK
+22
 
1  DL   DM
 Y D
KD
(221)
The steady-state equations of the rst-order condition with respect to KXt
0 =  1rK (1  )  k + 2
 
(1  )   1  15rK   20 (1  )  krK
+21
 
1  XL   XM
 Y X
KX
(222)
The steady-state equations of the rst-order condition with respect to RL
0 =  1wLD   9wLD   16

Y Dt
Y Dt 1

(223)
The steady-state equations of the rst-order condition with respect to st
0 = 1

Y X   P
MF
PXF
 
MD +MX

+ 7 (1 +R)
(1  )
s
 10

PMF
PXF
MD

+ 13
 
XL Y
X

+ 15
 
1  XL   XM

Y X (224)
The steady-state equations of the rst-order condition with respect to Y Dt
0 = 1   7 (1 +Rt) 
B
(Y D + Y X)
+ 9
D
L
1
D
+ 10t
D
M
1
D
+ 11
 
1  DL   DM
 1
D
 16(1 +RL)
 
Y D
 1
(1  ) + 17
 
1  G   19   22 (225)
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The steady-state equations of the rst-order condition with respect to Y Xt
0 = 1s+ 7
h
(1 +R)
  B  Y D + Y X 1i+ 13XL s
+14
  XM+ 15  1  XL   XM s+ 17  1  G   21 (226)
The steady-state equations of the rst-order condition with respect to MDt
0 =

s
PMF
PXF

( 1   10) + 22DM
Y D
MD
(227)
The steady-state equations of the rst-order condition with respect to MXt
0 =
PMF
PXF
( 1s  14) + 21XM
Y X
MX
(228)
The steady-state equations of the rst-order condition with respect to Gt
0 = 17

G
1

  1

+ 19 + 20 (229)
The steady-state equations of the rst-order condition with respect to  kt
0 =  1(KD +KX)  3   20(KD +KX) (230)
The steady-state equations of the rst-order condition with respect to wt
0 =  1(LD + LX) + 5   20(LD + LX) (231)
The steady-state equations of the rst-order condition with respect to (1+Rt)
0 = 1
dt
1 +R
  3 + 6C (1  ) + 16t   18
 
1  R+ 20 bG
1 +R
(232)
Equation (210), (217), and (219) show that 7 = 8 = 12 = 0: The above
steady state equations are in the form of a non-linear equations system that is
composed of 24 unknown variables (1;2;:::;22;  kt ; 
w
t+1) and 24 equations. Thus,
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mathematically, all unknown variables of the non-linear equations system can be
solved.
B.5 Implementability constraint of the closed economy
model
The government budget constraint
dt = rtdt 1 +Gt   wt wtLt   (1  )  kt rKt Kt (233)
Rewritten in discounted form as below
1X
t=0
tdt
1
Ct
=
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
rtdt 1 +
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
Gt  
1X
t=0
twt
1
Ct
wtLt
 
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
(1  )  kt rKt Kt (234)
From
1
Ct
= Et
1
Ct+1

1  (1  )  kt+1

rKt+1 + (1  )

Et
1
Ct+1
(1  )  kt+1rKt+1Kt+1 = Et
1
Ct+1
 
1   + rKt+1

Kt+1   1
Ct
Kt+1 (235)
Substituted
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
(1  )  kt rKt Kt =
1
C0
(1  )  k0rK0 K0 +
1X
t=0
Et
1
Ct+1
(1  )  kt+1rKt+1Kt+1
to the government budget constraint.
1X
t=0
tdt
1
Ct
=
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
rtdt 1 +
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
Gt  
1X
t=0
twt
1
Ct
wtLt
+
1
C0
(1  )  k0rK0 K0  
1X
t=0
t+1Et
1
Ct+1
 
1   + rKt+1

Kt+1 +
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
Kt+1
(236)
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From the Euler equation
1
Ct
= rt+1
1
Ct+1
(237)
The rst term on the right hand side of the government budget constraint is
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
rtdt 1 =
1
C0
r0d 1 +
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct+1
rt+1dt
=
1
C0
r0d 1 +
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
dt (238)
Substituted to the government budget constraint
1X
t=0
tdt
1
Ct
=
1
C0
r0d 1 +
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
dt +
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
Gt  
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
wt wtLt
1
C0
(1  )  k0rK0 K0  
1X
t=0
t+1Et
1
Ct+1
 
1   + rKt+1

Kt+1 +
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
Kt+1
(239)
From labour supply
(1  wt )wt = 'LLtCt
wt wt = wt   'LLtCt (240)
Substituted to the government budget constraint
0 =
1
C0
r0d 1 +
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
Gt  
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
 
wt   'LLtCt

Lt
+
1
C0
(1  )  k0rK0 K0  
1X
t=0
t+1Et
1
Ct+1
 
1   + rKt+1

Kt+1 +
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
Kt+1
(241)
From the resource constraint and capital accumulation
Y Dt = Ct + It +Gt (242)
Kt+1   (1  )Kt = It; (243)
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Substituted to the government budget constraint
0 =
1
C0
r0d 1 +
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
 
Y Dt   Ct   (Kt+1   (1  )Kt)

 
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
 
wtLt   'LLtCtLt

+
1
C0
(1  )  k0rK0 K0
 
1X
t=0
t+1Et
1
Ct+1
 
1   + rKt+1

Kt+1 +
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
Kt+1
(244)
From rmsdecision
DwtL
D
t = 
D
LY
D
t (245)
DrKt K
D
t =
 
1  DL

Y Dt (246)
Substituted to the government budget constraint
0 =
1
C0
r0d 1 +
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
 

 
wtLt + r
K
t Kt
  Ct   (Kt+1   (1  )Kt)
 
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
 
wtLt   'LLtCtLt

+
1
C0
(1  )  k0rK0 K0
 
1X
t=0
t+1Et
1
Ct+1
 
1   + rKt+1

Kt+1 +
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
Kt+1
0 =
1
C0
r0d 1   1
C0
(1  )  rK0 K0+ 1C0  (1  ) + (1  )  k0rK0 + rK0 K0
+
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
'LL+1t Ct  
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
Ct
+
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
(  1) (wtLt) +
1X
t=0
t+1
1
Ct+1
(  1)  rKt+1Kt+1 (247)
Dened A0
A0 =
1
C0
r0d 1 +
1
C0
 
(1  ) + (1  )  k0rK0 + 
 
rK0

K0 > 0 (248)
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Thus, the implementability constraint is
 A0 =
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
'LL+1t Ct  
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
Ct +
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
(  1) (wtLt)
+
1X
t=0
t+1
1
Ct+1
(  1)  rKt+1Kt+1 (249)
Note: A0 < 0
Dened rt
rt =
(1 +Rt 1)
t
> 1 (250)
Thus, the government budget constraint at t+ 1 can be rewrite as below
dt =
dt+1
rt+1
+
wt+1wt+1Lt+1 + (1  )  kt+1rKt+1Kt+1  Gt+1
rt+1
The household budget constraint can be rewrite as below
(1+ st)Ct+It+dt  rtdt 1+(1 wt )wtLt+

1  (1  )  kt

rktKt+Y
D
t

1  1
D

(251)
Rewritten it as debt = the net present values of future surpluses, and real
return
Introduced a cumulative discounting

t;t+s =
Y
k=1;s 1
rt+k (252)
No Ponzi condition
lim
s!1
bGt+s

t;t+s
= 0 (253)
Integrating forward, the implementability constraint is
dt =
X
s=0;1
wt+swt+sLt+s + (1  )  kt+srKt+sKt+s  Gt+s

t;t+s
(254)
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B.6 Lagrangian form of the Ramsey problem and the rst-
order condition of the closed economy model
The Lagrangian form of the Ramsey problem (Lc) is presented as follows:
Lc = E0
1X
t=0
t

logCt   'L L
1+
1 + 

+E0
1X
t=0
t2t

1
Ct
  Et 1
Ct+1

1  (1  )  kt+1

rKt+1 + (1  )

+E0
1X
t=0
t3t
 
(1  wt )wt   w'LLtCt

+E0
1X
t=0
t4t

1
Ct
  rt+1 1
Ct+1

+ E0
1X
t=0
t5t
 
Yt   (AtLt)L(Kt)1 L

+E0
1X
t=0
t6t
 
DwtL
D
t   DLY Dt

+ E0
1X
t=0
t7t
 
DrKt K
D
t  
 
1  DL

Y Dt

+E0
1X
t=0
t8t (Yt   Ct  Kt+1 + (1  )Kt  Gt)
+ 
" 1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
'LL+1t Ct  
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
Ct +
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
 
D   1 (wtLt)
+
1X
t=0
t+1
1
Ct+1
 
D   1  rKt+1Kt+1
#
(255)
This step involve nding the rst-order conditions of the Lagrangian problem
(Lc) with respect to considered variables, which are Ct; Lt; Kt+1; Yt; rt+1; rkt ;  kt+1;
wt ; wt:
The rst-order condition with respect to  kt+1 and 
w
t show that 2t = 0; 3t = 0
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Thus, the Ramsey problem is reduced to
Lc = E0
1X
t=0
t

logCt   'L L
1+
1 + 

+E0
1X
t=0
t4t

1
Ct
  rt+1 1
Ct+1

+ E0
1X
t=0
t5t
 
Yt   (AtLt)L(Kt)1 L

+E0
1X
t=0
t6t
 
DwtL
D
t   DLY Dt

+ E0
1X
t=0
t7t
 
DrKt K
D
t  
 
1  DL

Y Dt

+E0
1X
t=0
t8t (Yt   Ct  Kt+1 + (1  )Kt  Gt)
+ 
" 1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
'LL+1t Ct  
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
Ct +
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
 
D   1 (wtLt)
+
1X
t=0
t+1
1
Ct+1
 
D   1  rKt+1Kt+1
#
(256)
Note: In contrast to t; the   is not depended on time.
So, optimality condition implies that
  < 0
The detail of all rst-order conditions of the Ramsey problem with respect to
Ct; Lt; Kt+1; Yt; rt+1; r
k
t ; wt are shown as follows:
The rst-order condition with respect to rt+1
dLc
drt+1
=  4t 1
Ct+1
= 0 (257)
4t = 0 (258)
The rst-order condition with respect to Kt+1
dLc
dKt+1
=  5t+1(At+1Lt+1)L(1  L)(Kt+1) L + 7t+1DrKt+1   8t
+8t+1 (1  ) +  


1
Ct+1
 
D   1 rKt+1
= 0 (259)
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The rst-order condition with respect to Lt
dLc
dLt
Ct
wt
=  (1  wt )  5tDCt + 6tDCt +  

( + 1)(1  wt ) +
 
D   1 = 0
(260)
The rst-order condition with respect to wt
dLc
dwt
1
Lt
= 6t
D +  
 
D   1 1
Ct
= 0 (261)
The rst-order condition with respect to rkt
dLc
drkt
1
Kt
= 7t
D +  
 
D   1 1
Ct
= 0 (262)
The rst-order condition with respect to Ct
dLc
dCt
Ct = 1  8tCt    Yt
Ct
 
D   1
D
= 0 (263)
The rst-order condition with respect to Yt
dLc
dYt
= 5t   6tDL   7t
 
1  DL

+ 8t = 0 (264)
The rst-order condition show that the t are as follows:
6t = 7t =   
 
D   1
D

1
Ct

(265)
8t =
1
Ct
 
1   Yt
Ct
 
D   1
D
!
(266)
5t =
1
Ct
 
 
 
D   1
D

Yt
Ct
  1

  1
!
(267)
221
B. APPENDIX : OPTIMAL TAXES IN A SMALL-OPEN ECONOMY
Substituted 5t+1; 7t; 8t; 8t+1 to equation (259) and (260)
dJ
dKt+1
Ct =
 
1 +  
 
D   1
D

1  Yt+1
Ct+1
!
DrKt+1
Ct
Ct+1
 
 
1   Yt
Ct
 
D   1
D
!
+ (1  )
 
1   Yt+1
Ct+1
 
D   1
D
!
Ct
Ct+1
(268)
dJ
dLt
Ct
wt
=  (1  wt ) + D    

Yt
Ct
  1
 
D   1+   (( + 1)(1  wt )) (269)
At steady-state
0 = 

DrKt+1 + (1  )
 1+  D   1
D



DrKt+1  
Y
C
 
DrKt+1 + (1  )

+
Y
C

(270)
0 =  (1  wt ) + D +  ( + 1)(1  wt )   

Y
C
  1
 
D   1 (271)
B.7 The simple closed economy model with an imperfectly
competitive market and deep habit preferences
B.7.1 Household optimization
Households maximize their utility subject to the budget constraint and capital
accumulation dynamics. The householdsLagrangian function,LH ; can be written
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as
LH = E0
1X
t=0
t f[U (Xt)  V (Lt)]
+t
 
Rt 1Bt 1 + (1  wt )WtLt + st 1 (qt + dt) +

1   kt (1  )

RktKt 1
 Ct   It  Bt   stqt)  t[Xt   (Ct   Ct 1)]
+tQ
K
t [(1  )Kt 1 + It  Kt]
	
(272)
, where QKt is the shadow price of capital. The householdsdecision is derived
from the rst-order condition with respect to Xt; Ct; Lt; It; Bt; st; Kt+1;
@LH
@Xt
= U 0 (Xt)  t = 0;
@LH
@Lt
=  V 0(Lt) + t(1  wt )Wt = 0; (273)
@LH
@Bt
= t+1Rt   t = 0; (274)
@LH
@Kt
= t+1R
K
t+1

1   kt+1 (1  )

+ t+1 (1  )QKt+1   tQKt ; (275)
@LH
@It
=  t + tQKt = 0; (276)
@LH
@Ct
=  t + t   t+1; (277)
@LH
@st
=  tqt   t+1 (qt+1 + dt+1) ; (278)
which imply QKt = 1
B.7.2 Implementability constraint
The governments budget constraint can be obtained by combining rms
and householdsbudget constraints and the market clearance condition equation
(116). Following Chari & Kehoe (1999), the period zero household budget
constraint is replaced by the discounted sum of the nancial constraints that the
representative household will face in the future. Then, scal variables such as tax
rates and government debt will be eliminated by using the householdsrst-order
conditions. This process derives the generalized budget implementability
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constraint for an economy with deep habit formation. The implementability
constraint relates to a households initial assets to the discounted sum of
marginal utilities. All households intertemporal budget constraints become
redundant as they will only solve for the future value of government debt.
Recall that the household budget constraint is
Ct+ It+Bt+ qt = Rt 1Bt 1+ (1  wt )WtLt+

1  (1  )  kt

RKt Kt 1+ (qt + dt)
The above equation is discounted with a market discount and integrated
forward.
1X
t=0
ttCt +
1X
t=0
ttIt +
1X
t=0
ttBt +
1X
t=0
ttqt
=
1X
t=0
ttRt 1Bt 1 +
1X
t=0
tt(1  wt )WtLt +
1X
t=0
tt

1  (1  )  kt

RktKt 1
+
1X
t=0
tt (qt + dt)
Firstly, considering the Euler equation t = EtRtt+1; which implies
E0
1X
t=0
ttBt   E0
1X
t=0
ttRt 1Bt 1 = E0
1X
t=0
tBt
 
t   EtRtt+1
  0R 1B 1
=  0R 1B 1
Secondly, using the Euler equation for shares, consider equation (105), which
implies that
1X
t=0
tt (qt + dt) = 0 (q0 + d0)+
1X
t=0
t+1t+1 (qt+1 + dt+1) = 0 (q0 + d0)+
1X
t=0
ttqt
Thirdly, using the householdsFOC with respect to capital , consider equation
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(102)
1X
t=0
tt

1  (1  )  kt

RktKt
= 0

1  (1  )  k0

Rk0K0 +
1X
t=0
tt+1

1  (1  )  kt+1

Rkt+1Kt+1
= 0

1  (1  )  k0

Rk0K0 +
1X
t=0
t

t    (1  ) t+1

Kt+1
= 0

1  (1  )  k0

Rk0K0 + (1  ) 0K0 +
1X
t=0
tt [Kt+1   (1  )Kt] :
Finally, the study utilizes the capital accumulation equation, equation (5), and
labour supply, equation (103), to obtain the nal expression
1X
t=0
ttCt  
1X
t=0
tV 0(Lt)Lt = 0A0; (279)
, whereA0 denotes the initial assets. A0 =

1 +
 
1   k0

(1  )Rk0

K0+R 1B 1+
(q0 + d0)
Finally, the expression for prot, t = (1 mct)Yt is combined with rst-order
conditions.
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B.8 Proof of proposition 4
The Lagrangian form for the Ramsey problem is
J = E0
1X
t=0
t fU(Xt)  V (Lt)g
+E0
1X
t=0
t1t (Yt   Ct   (Kt+1   (1  )Kt) Gt)
+E0
1X
t=0
t2t
 
t   Ett+1

1   kt (1  )

Rkt + (1  )

+E0
1X
t=0
t3t ((1  wt )twt   V 0(Lt))
+E0
1X
t=0
t4t
 
t   Rtt+1

+ E0
1X
t=0
t5t
 
(AtLt)
1 (Kt)   Yt

+E0
1X
t=0
t6t (wtLt   (1  )mctYt) + E0
1X
t=0
t7t
 
RKt Kt   mctYt

+E0
1X
t=0
t8t (t   U 0(Xt) + U 0(Xt+1)) + E0
1X
t=0
t9t ( Xt + Ct   Ct 1; )
+ E0
"
0A0  
 1X
t=0
ttCt +
1X
t=0
tV 0 (Lt)Lt
!#
:
The rst-order conditions of J with respect to Rt;  kt+1; 
w
t ; wt; R
K
t suggest that
2t = 0; 3t = 0; 4t = 0; 6t = 0; 7t = 0:
The rst-order conditions are
 t
dJ
dCt
=  1t + 9t   9t+1    t = 0 (280)
 t
dJ
dXt
= U 0(Xt)  8tU 00(Xt) + 8t 1U 00(Xt)  9t (281)
 t
dJ
dt
= 8t    Ct = 0 (282)
 t
dJ
dYt
= 1t   5t = 0 (283)
 t
dJ
dLt
=  V 0(Lt) + 5t Yt
Lt
    [V 0 (Lt) + V 00 (Lt)Lt] (284)
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 t
dJ
dKt+1
=  1t + (1  ) Et1t+1 + Et5t+1 (1  ) Yt+1
Kt+1
(285)
The study substitutes for 5t+1 = 1t+1; 8t =  Ct; which reduces equation
(281) to 9t = U 0(Xt)    U 00(Xt)Xt: The last equations (284) and (285) are
combined with the rmsdemand for capital (equation (108)) and labour demand
(equation (107)).
1t =  (U
0(Xt)   U 00(Xt)Xt)  Et (U 0(Xt+1)   U 00(Xt+1)Xt+1)   t
= 0; (286)
V 0(Lt) = 1t
wt
mct
    [V 0 (Lt) + V 00 (Lt)Lt] ; (287)
1t = Et1t+1

(1  ) + 1
mct+1
RKt+1

; (288)
Recalling equation (101) and considering the CRRA form of utility function,
let U 00(Xt)Xt =  U 0(Xt); and V 00 (Lt)Lt = vV 0 (Lt) : Then, the equations (286),
(287), and (288) can be written as
1t = t (1 + (   1)  ) ; (289)
V 0(Lt) [1 + (1 + v)  ] = t (1 + (   1)  )
1
mct
wt; (290)
t = Ett+1

(1  ) + 1
mct+1
RKt+1

; (291)
The combination of equation (290) and (291) with equation (102) and (103)
denes the optimal tax rate.
 kt+1 =

1  1
mct+1

1
1  
(1  wt ) =
1  (1  )  
1 + (1 + v)  
1
mct
, where   is the shadow price of the budget constraint. If lump-sum taxes are
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available,   = 0; the optimal policy is a subsidy to labour (1  wt ) = 1mct :
B.9 The small-open economy model
Using equation (142) and (143), the ratio of domestic output to export output
is
Y Dt
pXY Xt
=
(Ct + It +Gt)
 
pD
  1
1 
s
 1
1  pM (C + It +Gt;) (pMt )
  1
1 
Y Xt
Y Dt
= s
 1
1 
pM
pX

pMt
pD
  1
1 
(292)
Using equation (127) and (130), the ratio of domestic rms labour demand to
export rms labour demand is
LXt
LDt
=
D
X

spMt
pD
  
1  XL
DL
= LXD;t (s) (293)
Using equation (128) and (131), the ratio of domestic rms capital demand to
export rms capital demand is
KXt
KDt
=
D
X
 
1  XL

(1  DL )

spMt
pD
  
1 
= KXD;t (s) (294)
Using equation (126), (129), and (292), the ratio of export price to import price
is
pMt

spMt
pD
  1
1 
=
pX(AtL
X
t )
XL (KXt )
1 XL
(AtLDt )
DL (KDt )
1 DL
(295)
Considering a simple case when 
X
L
DL
= 1, the ratio of domestic rms labour
demand to export rmslabour demand, and the ratio of domestic rms capital
demand to export rms capital demand, the ratio of export price to import price
and the aggregate price is reduced to
s =
pD
pX
(296)
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LXt
LDt
=

spMt
pD
  
1 
LXt
LDt
=

pX
pMt
 
1 
(297)
KXt
KDt
=

spMt
pD
  
1 
KXt
KDt
=

pX
pMt
 
1 
(298)
 
pD
 
1  = 1 +

pX
pM
 
1 
(299)
Considering a simple case when 
X
L
DL
= 1
 
pD
  
1  = 1   spM  1  
pD
 
1  = 1 +

pX
pM
 
1 
Using
 
pD
 
1  = 1 +

pX
pM
 
1 
; the capital accumulation equation can be
rewritten as
It; =
 
pD
 
1  KDt+1   (1  )
 
pD
 
1  KDt (300)
The government budget constraint is
dt = rtdt 1 +Gt   wt wtLt   (1  )  kt rKt Kt (301)
The household budget constraint, equation (121), can be rewritten in the
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implementability constraint form as below (See details in Appendix B.10)
A0   1
1   + E0
1X
t=0
t'L
 
LDt + L
X
t
+1
+ E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
pDY Dt

1  1


+E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
pXY X

1  1


= 0
, where A0 = 1C0R 1d 1 +
1
C0
 
1  (1  )  k0

rk0    (1  )
  
KD1 +K
X
1

Substituting equation (292).
A0   1
1   + E0
1X
t=0
t'L
 
LDt + L
X
t
+1
+E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
pDY Dt

1  1

"
1 + s
 1
1 
pM
pD

pMt
pD
  1
1 
#
= 0 (302)
B.10 The implementability constraint of the small-open
economy model with price markup
The households budget constraint (121) can be rewritten in the
implementability constraint form as below:
Applying the E0
P1
t=0 
t 1
Ct
operator to the households budget constraint
 E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
Ct   E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
It   E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
dt
+E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
Rt 1dt 1 + E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
(1  wt )wt
 
LDt + L
X
t

+E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct

1  (1  )  kt

rkt
 
KDt +K
X
t

+E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
pDY Dt

1  1


+ E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
pXY X

1  1


= 0 (303)
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Analyzing the term E0
P1
t=0 
t 1
Ct
Rt 1dt 1 and applying the Euler equation 1Ct =
Rt
1
Ct+1
E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
Rt 1dt 1 =
1
C0
R 1d 1 + E0
1X
t=0
t+1
1
Ct+1
Rtdt
=
1
C0
R 1d 1 + E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
dt (304)
Substituting above equation
 E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
Ct   E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
It
+
1
C0
R 1d 1 + E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
(1  wt )wt
 
LDt + L
X
t

+E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct

1  (1  )  kt

rkt
 
KDt +K
X
t

+E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
pDY Dt

1  1


+ E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
pXY X

1  1


= 0 (305)
Substituting labour supply condition, (1  wt )wt 1Ct = 'L
 
LDt + L
X
t

 E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
Ct   E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
It
+
1
C0
R 1d 1 + E0
1X
t=0
t'L
 
LDt + L
X
t
+1
+E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct

1  (1  )  kt

rkt
 
KDt +K
X
t

+E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
pDY Dt

1  1


+ E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
pXY X

1  1


= 0 (306)
Considering the term
P1
t=0 
t 1
Ct
It and applying a dynamics capital
accumulation, KDt+1 +K
X
t+1   (1  )
 
KDt +K
X
t

= It;
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
It =
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
 
KDt+1 +K
X
t+1
  1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
(1  )  KDt +KXt  (307)
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Using the FOC for interest rate
1 = Et
Ct
Ct+1

1  (1  )  kt+1

rKt+1 + (1  )

1

1
Ct
  Et 1
Ct+1
(1  ) = Et 1
Ct+1

1  (1  )  kt+1

rKt+1

(308)
Substituting the FOC for interest rate
E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct

1  (1  )  kt

rkt
 
KDt +K
X
t

=
1
C0
 
1  (1  )  k0

rk0    (1  )
  
KD1 +K
X
1

+ E0
1X
t=0
t+1
1

1
Ct
 
KDt+1 +K
X
t+1

 E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
(1  )  KDt +KXt  (309)
Combining above term to the households budget constraint
 E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
Ct
+
1
C0
R 1d 1 + E0
1X
t=0
t'L
 
LDt + L
X
t
+1
+
1
C0
 
1  (1  )  k0

rk0    (1  )
  
KD1 +K
X
1

(310)
+E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
pDY Dt

1  1


+ E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
pXY X

1  1


= 0 (311)
Dening A0
A0 =
1
C0
R 1d 1 +
1
C0
 
1  (1  )  k0

rk0    (1  )
  
KD1 +K
X
1

(312)
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Finally, the implementability constraint is as follows:
A0   1
1   + E0
1X
t=0
t'L
 
LDt + L
X
t
+1
+ E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
pDY Dt

1  1


+E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
pXY X

1  1


= 0 (313)
Substituting equation (292).
A0   1
1   + E0
1X
t=0
t'L
 
LDt + L
X
t
+1
+E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
pDY Dt

1  1

"
1 + s
 1
1 
pM
pD

pMt
pD
  1
1 
#
= 0 (314)
B.11 Lagrangian form of the Ramsey problem and the
rst-order condition of the small-open economy
model
The Lagrangian form of the Ramsey problem (Lo) is presented as follows:
Lo = E0
1X
t=0
t
"
logCt   'L
 
LDt + L
X
t
1+
1 + 
#
+ 
"
  1
1   + A0 + E0
1X
t=0
t'L
 
LDt + L
X
t
+1
+E0
1X
t=0
t
1
Ct
pDY Dt

1  1

 
1 + s
 1
1 
pMt
pD

pMt
pD
  1
1 
!#
+1;tE0
1X
t=0
t

 Y Dt + (AtLDt )
D
L (KDt )
1 DL

+2;tE0
1X
t=0
t
h
Y Dt  

Ct +
 
pDt+1
 
1  KDt+1   (1  )
 
pDt
 
1  KDt +Gt
  
pDt
  1
1 
i
(315)
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(The di¤erentiate with respect to taxes,  kt+1 and 
w
t , Rt; wt; and r
K
t implies
that those multipliers are zero. Therefore, the restricted system is reduced as
above)
The detail of all rst-order conditions of the Ramsey problem with respect to
KDt , Y
D
t , Ct; and L
D
t are shown as follows:
The rst-order condition with respect to Y Dt
 t
@Lo
@Y Dt
=  
1
Ct
pDt

1  1

 
1 + s
 1
1 
pMt
pD

pMt
pD
  1
1 
!
  1;t + 2;t = 0 (316)
The rst-order condition with respect to KDt
 t
@Lo
@KDt+1
= 1;t+1
 
1  DL
 Y Dt+1
KDt+1
  2;t
 
pDt
  1
1 
 
pDt+1
 
1 
+(1  ) 2;t+1
 
pDt+1
  1
1 
 
pDt+1
 
1 
= 0 (317)
The rst-order condition with respect to Ct
 t
@Lo
@Ct
=
1
Ct
    1
C2t
pDY Dt

1  1

 
1 + s
 1
1 
pMt
pD

pMt
pD
  1
1 
!
  2;t
 
pDt
  1
1 
= 0 (318)
The rst-order condition with respect to LDt
 t
@Lo
@LDt
=  'L  LDt + LXt  +  'L ( + 1)  LDt + LXt  + 1;tDLLDt (AtLDt )DL (KDt )1 DL

= 0 (319)
  =
1
( + 1)
"
1  1;t
D
L (AtL
D
t )
DL (KDt )
1 DL
'L (LDt + L
X
t )

LDt
#
(320)
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B.12 The small-open economy with perfectly competitive
market
Proof. When D = 1; equation; the equation (316), (317), and (318) are reduced
to
1 = 2 (321)
 t
@L
@KDt+1
= 2;t+1
 
1  DL
 Y Dt+1
KDt+1
  2;t
 
pDt
  1
1 
 
pDt+1
 
1  + (1  ) 2;t+1
 
pDt+1
 1
= 0 (322)
2;t =
1
Ct
 
pDt
 1
1  (323)
Substituting rKt K
D
t = p
D
t
 
1  DL

Y Dt
 t
@L
@KDt+1
= 
1
Ct+1
 
pDt+1
 
1  rKt+1  
1
Ct
 
pDt+1
 
1  + (1  )  1
Ct+1
 
pDt+1
 
1  = 0
(324)
Therefore, the optimal condition for interest rate is
rKt+1 =
Ct+1
Ct

1  (1  )  Ct
Ct+1

(325)
Using 1 = Et CtCt+1

1  (1  )  kt+1

rKt+1 + (1  )

to nd the optimal capital
tax
Ct+1
Ct
  (1  ) = 1  (1  )  kt+1 Ct+1Ct

1  (1  )  Ct
Ct+1

 kt+1 = 0 (326)
When lump-sum transfer is allowed (  = 0); the rst-order condition with respect
to LDt is reduced to
1 = 1;t
DL (AtL
D
t )
DL (KDt )
1 DL
'L (LDt + L
X
t )

LDt
(327)
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Using (1 
w
t )wt
'LCt
=
 
LDt + L
X
t

to nd the optimal payroll tax
(1  wt )wtLDt = 1;tCtDL (AtLDt )
D
L (KDt )
1 DL
(1  wt )wtLDt =
 
pDt
 1
1  DL (AtL
D
t )
DL (KDt )
1 DL (328)
Substituting wtLDt =
DL Y
D
t
D
; D = 1; and pDt = 1
(1  wt )
DLY
D
t
D
=
 
pDt
 1
1  DLY
D
t (329)
wt = 0
B.13 The small-open economy with an imperfectly
competitive market and lump-sum transfers
Proof. When   = 0; equation; the equation (316), (317), and (318) are reduced
to
1 = 2 (330)
 t
@L
@KDt+1
= 2;t+1
 
1  DL
 Y Dt+1
KDt+1
  2;t
 
pDt
  1
1 
 
pDt+1
 
1  + (1  ) 2;t+1
 
pDt+1
 1
= 0 (331)
2;t =
1
Ct
 
pDt
 1
1  (332)
Substituting DrKt K
D
t = p
D
t
 
1  DL

Y Dt to
@L
@KDt+1
 t
@L
@KDt+1
= 
1
Ct+1
D
 
pDt+1
 
1  rKt+1  
1
Ct
 
pDt+1
 
1  + (1  )  1
Ct+1
 
pDt+1
 
1  = 0
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Therefore, the optimal condition for interest rate is
0 = rKt+1
Ct
Ct+1
D
 
pDt+1
 
1     pDt+1 1  + (1  )  CtCt+1  pDt+1 1 
rKt+1 =
Ct+1
DCt

1  (1  )  Ct
Ct+1

(333)
Using 1 = Et CtCt+1

1  (1  )  kt+1

rKt+1 + (1  )

to nd the optimal capital
tax
1 = Et
Ct
Ct+1

1  (1  )  kt+1

rKt+1 + (1  )

Ct+1
Ct
  (1  ) = 1  (1  )  kt+1 Ct+1DCt

1  (1  )  Ct
Ct+1

 kt+1 =
1  D
(1  ) < 0 (334)
Since D > 1 and  < 1; thus  kt+1 < 0: When lump-sum transfer is allowed
(  = 0); the rst-order condition with respect to LDt is reduced to
1 = 1;t
DL (AtL
D
t )
DL (KDt )
1 DL
'L (LDt + L
X
t )

LDt
(335)
Using (1 
w
t )wt
'LCt
=
 
LDt + L
X
t

to nd the optimal payroll tax
(1  wt )wtLDt = 1;tCtDL (AtLDt )
D
L (KDt )
1 DL
(1  wt )wtLDt =
 
pDt
 1
1  DL (AtL
D
t )
DL (KDt )
1 DL (336)
Substituting wtLDt =
DL Y
D
t
D
(1  wt )
DLY
D
t
D
=
 
pDt
 1
1  DLY
D
t
wt = 1  D (337)
Since D > 1; and pDt = 1; thus 
w
t < 0:
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C APPENDIX: Government spending on health
and economic growth
C.1 Unit root test of health model
This paper employs Fisher type unit root tests to examine the stationarity
of all variables. The advantage of Fisher type unit root tests is that they do not
require strongly balanced data and gaps in series are allowed.
The null hypothesis of the unit root test is
Ho All panels contain unit roots
Ha At least one panel is stationary
In order to remove a cross-sectional correlation, the option "demean"28 is added
to the unit root analysis. The cross-sectional correlation usually appears in a group
of countries that share similar characteristics (Levin, Lin & Chu 2002). In addition,
the unit root test command also includes the "drift" option for non-zero variables
and uses 8 lags in ADF regressions. According to Choi (2001), the most useful
statistic result of unit root test is the inverse normal Z statistic. It provides the
best trade-o¤ between the inuence and magnitude of variables. Therefore, this
paper selects the inverse normal Z statistic as a unit root test statistic.
The unit root test results for the life expectancy regression, infant mortality
regression and under-ve mortality regression are in Table 19, 20, and 21.
C.2 Unit root test of production function model
The unit root test results for the production function model are shown in
Table 22. Most OECD countries have increasing trends in life expectancy, except
for Estonia and Latvia, which show lower life expectancy during the 1990-1994
period after their independence from the Soviet Union.
28"demean" is the option of xtunitroot command in STATA.
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Table 19: The results of unit root test of life expectancy regression; Inverse normal
Z
FE , FE(2), RE , RE(2) 2SLS FE, 2SLS RE
life -1.27 -1.06
(0.10) (0.14)
govhealth 1.19 0.89
(0.88) (0.81)
gov -1.93
(0.03)
govdef -0.91
( 0.18)
govedu -0.46
( 0.32)
govpub -1.90
(0.03)
gdpcap -1.92 -1.06
(0.03) ( 0.14)
sani -2.36 -3.44
(0.01) (0.00)
phealthgdp -1.95 -1.82
(0.03) (0.03)
p-values are shown in parentheses.
Indicates that at least one panel is stationary at the 10% level
Indicates that at least one panel is stationary at the 5% level
Indicates that at least one panel is stationary at the 1% level
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Table 20: The results of unit root test of infant mortality regression; Inverse normal
Z
FE, RE 2SLS FE, 2SLS RE
mortainf -8.21 -8.26
(0.00) (0.00)
govhealth -6.95 -7.20
(0.00) (0.00)
gov -5.94
(0.00)
govdef -4.99
(0.00)
govedu -6.20
(0.00)
govpub -6.10
(0.00)
gdpcap -5.76 -5.93
(0.00) (0.00)
sani -9.90 -11.98
(0.00) (0.00)
phealthgdp -8.14 -8.07
(0.00) (0.00)
p-values are shown in parentheses
Indicates that at least one panel is stationary at the 10% level.
Indicates that at least one panel is stationary at the 5% level.
Indicates that at least one panel is stationary at the 1% level.
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Table 21: The results of unit root test of under-ve mortality regression; Inverse
normal Z
FE, RE 2SLS FE, 2SLS RE
mortaunder5 -8.51 -10.81
(0.00) (0.00)
govhealth -6.95 -7.77
(0.00) (0.00)
gov -6.45
(0.00)
govdef -5.52
(0.00)
govedu -5.58
(0.00)
govpub -6.01
(0.00)
gdpcap -5.76 -5.93
(0.00) (0.00)
sani -9.90 -9.09
(0.00) (0.00)
phealthgdp -8.14 -7.99
(0.00) (0.00)
p-values are shown in parentheses.
Indicates that at least one panel is stationary at the 10% level.
Indicates that at least one panel is stationary at the 5% level.
Indicates that at least one panel is stationary at the 1% level.
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Table 22: The results of unit root test of production function model; Inverse normal
Z
Global Developed countries Developing countries OECD countries
gdp -18.03 -6.98 -15.95 -5.89
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
capital -14.52 -5.74 -14.50 -4.38
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
labour -16.56 -8.26 -14.76 -8.51
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
life -16.61 -8.46 -12.96 -7.26
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
sugar -6.15
(0.00)
fat -5.92
(0.00)
alcohol -6.28
(0.00)
tabocco -5.76
(0.00)
p-values are shown in parentheses29.
Indicates that at least one panel is stationary at the 10% level.
Indicates that at least one panel is stationary at the 5% level.
Indicates that at least one panel is stationary at the 1% level.
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C.3 Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics for the health model and the production function
with the human capital model are shown in Table 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27.
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Table 23: Descriptive statistics of health model
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
elect overall 73.87 32.01 - 100.00 N = 847
between 31.44 1.64 100.00 n = 211
within 6.38 - 4.53 95.00 T = 4.01422
gov overall 38.28 11.17 11.32 85.26 N = 1209
between 10.15 16.38 62.51 n = 90
within 4.16 2.84 65.27 T = 13.4333
govdef overall 1.91 2.70 - 39.57 N = 956
between 2.87 - 23.32 n = 70
within 1.29 - 19.56 18.16 T = 13.6571
govedu overall 5.12 1.56 - 12.35 N = 964
between 1.63 1.49 10.38 n = 72
within 0.62 2.80 8.41 T = 13.3889
govpub overall 6.68 3.35 0.23 30.59 N = 966
between 3.26 1.34 21.12 n = 73
within 1.80 - 2.12 19.84 T = 13.2329
govhealh overall 4.79 2.11 0.34 8.91 N = 965
between 2.11 0.40 7.76 n = 72
within 0.77 1.16 8.28 T = 13.4028
govsocial overall 11.60 6.64 - 26.28 N = 962
between 6.40 0.00 23.54 n = 72
within 1.63 5.32 20.44 T = 13.3611
gdpcap overall 12.38 17.92 0.14 245.08 N = 7845
between 15.38 0.70 123.42 n = 179
within 8.96 - 54.56 134.03 T = 43.8268
phealtgdp overall 2.50 1.51 0.03 11.05 N = 3764
between 1.41 0.13 9.14 n = 192
within 0.58 - 1.69 7.12 T = 19.6042
sani overall 69.54 30.46 2.60 100.00 N = 5024
between 30.21 6.66 100.00 n = 202
within 4.96 32.85 97.62 T-bar = 24.8713
life overall 64.70 10.93 19.27 83.98 N = 9068
between 9.81 40.04 81.49 n = 199
within 4.86 34.42 83.37 T = 45.5678
Continued on the next page
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Table 23: Descriptive statistics of health model (continued)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
pop overall 31.13 117.14 0.01 1,369.44 N = 7845
between 109.99 0.02 1,118.30 n = 179
within 25.33 - 342.80 437.42 T = 43.8268
motainf overall 35.02 34.74 1.50 221.10 N = 1876
between 28.49 3.12 119.72 n = 193
within 19.97 - 4.49 190.12 T-bar = 9.72021
motaunder5 overall 49.73 56.84 1.90 400.00 N = 1876
between 45.93 3.92 187.10 n = 193
within 33.59 - 25.14 288.13 T-bar = 9.72021
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Table 25: Descriptive statistics of production function with human capital model
for developed country data
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
gdpcap overall 25,277.30 12,850.50 2,779.60 95,175.73 N = 1435
between 9,175.39 8,517.69 52,486.00 n = 35
within 8,997.66 - 2,410.87 67,967.02 T-bar = 41
empcap overall 0.45 0.07 0.27 0.76 N = 1435
between 0.05 0.35 0.56 n = 35
within 0.04 0.33 0.67 T-bar = 41
kcap overall 105,216.30 53,125.82 3,468.43 312,756.90 N = 1435
between 41,419.00 14,382.74 213,326.00 n = 35
within 33,198.90 17,518.58 204,647.10 T-bar = 41
life overall 75.13 3.74 65.66 83.59 N = 1575
between 2.55 70.13 78.96 n = 35
within 2.77 67.63 81.74 T = 45
C.4 List of developed countries and OECD countries
The list of developed countries is obtained from the World Economic Situation
and Prospects report 2014 (UN)30 and it is shown in Table 28. The list of OECD
countries is shown in Table 29.
C.5 The e¤ect of non-medical determinants on health on
life expectancy
The correlation of non-medical determinants on health and life expectancy is
shown in Table 30. All non-medical determinants of health variables and life
expectancy are slightly correlated. Only tobacco consumption is negatively
correlated with life expectancy. The e¤ect of non-medical determinants on health
on life expectancy is estimated by the xed-e¤ects model and the random e¤ects
model. Both models are included in the time xed e¤ect to test whether the
30https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/document_gem/global-economic-monitoring-
unit/world-economic-situation-and-prospects-wesp-report
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Table 26: Descriptive statistics of production function with human capital model
for developing country data
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
gdpcap overall 9,922.85 17,939.17 142.39 245,077.80 N = 6206
between 15,297.24 708.02 123,423.00 n = 147
within 8,998.85 - 57,010.01 131,577.70 T-bar = 42.2177
empcap overall 0.36 0.09 0.12 0.75 N = 5381
between 0.09 0.14 0.62 n = 143
within 0.04 0.16 0.56 T-bar = 37.6294
kcap overall 37,289.88 63,760.41 157.77 834,714.40 N = 6186
between 57,147.90 893.52 460,248.30 n = 145
within 25,814.54 - 195,190.90 411,756.00 T-bar = 42.6621
life overall 61.88 10.58 19.27 83.98 N = 4787
between 9.35 40.50 78.03 n = 107
within 5.06 31.12 80.07 T-bar = 44.7383
dummies for all year are equal to zero or not. The coe¢ cients of time dummies
are not presented due to a large number of coe¢ cients.
The regression results are shown in Table 31. The explanatory variables can
explain 89-92% of cross-country variations in the OECD countriess life
expectancies. The F-Statistics of all regression, which shows overall signicance
of the model, are signicant at the 1% level31. This value implies that the chance
for all regression parameters to equal zero is less than 1%. In addition, all
regressions are estimated by using the robust command in order to obtain
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors as recommended by Torres-Reyna
(2007). The Hausman test indicates that all life expectancy regressions prefer the
random e¤ects model.
Alcohol consumption is statistically signicant in regressions (L1) and (L5)
for both the xed-e¤ects and random-e¤ects models. The coe¢ cient of alcohol is
negative for life expectancy regression. One liter per capita increases in alcohol
consumption lead to 0.12 to 0.13 year decreases in life expectancy cross-country.
31Some regression does not show F-Statstic (N/A) because the computation software (STATA)
concerns the misleading, nothing necessarily wrong with the model.
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Table 27: Descriptive statistics of production function with human capital model
for OECD country data
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
gdpcap overall 25,351.10 12,852.64 2,099.99 95,175.73 N = 1430
between 9,188.89 10,480.58 52,486.00 n = 34
within 8,988.66 - 2,337.07 68,040.83 T-bar = 42.0588
empcap overall 0.45 0.07 0.23 0.76 N = 1430
between 0.06 0.30 0.56 n = 34
within 0.04 0.32 0.66 T-bar = 42.0588
kcap overall 103,415.50 54,247.27 3,951.80 312,756.90 N = 1430
between 42,604.18 24,603.54 213,326.00 n = 34
within 33,301.12 15,717.77 202,846.30 T-bar = 42.0588
life overall 74.95 4.52 52.26 83.59 N = 1530
between 3.03 65.03 78.96 n = 34
within 3.40 62.18 85.10 T = 45
tobacco overall 1,720.35 688.81 544.00 3,741.00 N = 300
between 695.89 893.47 3,541.22 n = 24
within 245.49 1,075.42 2,495.42 T = 12.5
fat overall 130.59 23.98 75.80 175.50 N = 410
between 23.61 85.28 166.81 n = 34
within 5.21 105.72 145.04 T = 12.0588
alcohol overall 9.37 2.74 1.20 14.50 N = 481
between 2.71 1.43 12.65 n = 33
within 0.74 6.58 12.10 T = 14.5758
Sugar overall 42.83 10.27 20.10 70.90 N = 410
between 9.77 22.98 66.13 n = 34
within 3.61 32.03 62.06 T = 12.0588
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Table 28: List of developed countries
Country Country Country Country
Australia Estonia Japan Portugal
Austria Finland Latvia Romania
Belgium France Lithuania Slovakia
Bulgaria Germany Luxembourg Slovenia
Canada Greece Malta Spain
Croatia Hungary Netherlands Sweden
Cyprus Iceland New Zealand Switzerland
Czech Republic Ireland Norway United Kingdom
Denmark Italy Poland United States
Table 29: List of OECD countries
Country Country Country Country
Australia France Korea Slovak Republic
Austria Germany Latvia Slovenia
Belgium Greece Luxembourg Spain
Canada Hungary Mexico Sweden
Chile Iceland Netherlands Switzerland
Czech Republic Ireland New Zealand Turkey
Denmark Israel Norway United Kingdom
Estonia Italy Poland United States
Finland Japan Portugal
Table 30: The correlation of life expectancy and non-medical determinants on
health
Life Alcohol Sugar Fat Tobacco
Life 1.000
Alcohol 0.051 1.000
Sugar 0.125 0.238 1.000
Fat 0.210 0.230 0.352 1.000
Tobacco -0.126 0.160 -0.135 -0.192 1.000
250
In contrast, other non-medical determinants on health variables are not signicant.
Therefore, tobacco consumption, fat supply and sugar supply cannot explain the
cross-country variations in the OECD countriess life expectancy.
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